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ABSTRACT 
Candidate: Arshad Habib 
Thesis title: Peshawar’s ‘Emergent Civil Society’: The Potential and Limitations of its 
Contribution to Peacebuilding  
Key words: Civil society, peacebuilding, violent extremism, religious orthodoxy, 
masculinity, and modularity.  
This thesis argues that a peace-oriented struggle has emerged in Peshawar from within 
the non–state space and is demonstrated at the empirical level by various associations 
in that space. The struggle to embrace peace and reject different forms of violence, by 
this associational life in Peshawar is what we call an ‘emergent civil society’. The thesis 
argues against those who claim that civil society cannot exist or flourish in a non-
western environment. Civil Society in Peshawar is emergent, as the empirical evidence 
suggests, but within an overarching tendency to root this in a local cultural identity. The 
latter is, however, imbued with values, belief systems, and gender roles, which limit the 
search for peace. Two examples are the dominance of a hyper masculinity and religious 
orthodoxies, which undermine forms of associationalism which might promote peace.  
To find an indigenous cultural identity, the ‘emergent civil society’ navigates, not 
without tensions, across three different worldviews that includes cultural 
(Pakhtunwali), religious (Islam) and, to a certain extent, liberal (human rights) 
perspectives. The tensions between different perspectives become more frictional when 
the ‘emergent civil society’ advocates women’s rights and religious pluralism, which is 
resisted by the antithetical forces of masculinity and religious orthodoxies.  
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Amidst these contestations, the ‘emergent civil society’, while resisting these 
antithetical forces, pressurizes the state also to provide favourable conditions to 
continue its peace-oriented struggle. This thesis, however, suggests that the ‘emergent 
civil society’ also needs an in-ward looking tendency to self reflect on certain challenges 
that seem to impact the potential for growth and development of an associational life, 
which can fully embrace the social conditions for peace.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
ACRONYMS 
AIML     All India Muslim League 
AKBT  Association for Behaviour and Knowledge 
Transformation 
CAMP      Community Appraisal and Motivation Programme 
CAPS      Community Appraisal Programs-Peshawar 
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KP      Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
‘Emergent civil society’1 in Peshawar2 and its limitations 
This thesis analyses the peace-oriented struggle that emanates from the non-
state social space in Peshawar and is demonstrated, at the empirical level, by 
‘certain’3 associations based in Peshawar. It is argued, here, that something 
reminiscent of and akin to the Western debate on the conceptualisation of civil 
society helps illuminate the non-state social space in Peshawar and the 
associations of this non-state social space may be called an ‘emergent civil 
society’4 in Peshawar. This emergence is taking place around the search for a 
source of peace and against violence and is reflected, at the empirical level, by a 
dynamic of associationalism that has new components. However, it is also 
imbued with certain antithetical forces, which act as limitations and seem to 
limit the potential emergence of civil society in Peshawar. Such antithetical 
forces, ultimately, impact the peace-oriented struggle in Peshawar and 
demonstrate that whilst the Western notion of civil society may be helpful to 
capture this specific moment yet it is not without problems.  
The ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar tends to show an explicit desire to 
embrace local traditional and religious perspectives to build peace and reject 
                                                        
1 Civil society is a complex and contested idea as is the notion that it is emergent, hence I have 
used commas to suggest that this is a tentative conceptualization to analyse those specific 
sections of the Pakhtun associational forms, which exhibit peace oriented claims amidst violence 
in Peshawar.    
2 Peshawar is the capital city of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (See map in Appendix B).  
3 In this thesis, we want to highlight certain associations based in Peshawar and which are 
engaged to build peace, as being part of the ‘emergent civil society’.  
4 The adjective ‘emergent’, here, means the process of coming into being or becoming prominent 
(Oxford Dictionary). Emergent civil society, here, means that civil society in Peshawar is in the 
process of coming into being.  
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violence. It retains an identity rooted in local cultural norms rather than 
deriving its philosophic base from liberal individualism. The ‘emergent civil 
society’ in Peshawar, in this sense, is oriented more towards the ‘alternative5’ 
discourse of civil society rather than the mainstream ‘liberal’ approach, as 
explored in the coming sections.6 However, the desire of retaining a local 
cultural identity triggers certain antithetical forces such as hyper masculinity 
and religious orthodoxy, which renders the ‘emergent civil society’ a 
battleground of contested ideas and, which ultimately seem to act against the 
desire. The contestations, which emerged confuse the character of this 
‘emergent civil society’ and the idea of civil society, which can both contribute to 
peace and nonviolence but still retain its affinity with the Pakhtun culture 
becomes difficult to sustain. Yet, this thesis argues, these efforts are, 
nevertheless, signs that the struggle to construct forms of associationalism, 
which can progressively transform public values is possible, even without the 
classic shifts to fully marketised and liberalised societies, which characterise the 
West.   
                                                        
5
 ‘Alternative’, in this thesis, is used in two different but overlapping meanings: first, as a 
reference to the non-Western value systems, such as local traditional and religious 
perspectives, which will be explored in coming chapters and second, as a reference to a 
distinct theoretical approach to civil society, which can be distinguished from the mainstream 
‘liberal’ approach and, which can ultimately be used as a criticism of the gender and liberal 
assumptions of the latter approach.  
6 ‘Alternative’ and ‘liberal’ approaches are used, in this thesis, as analytical shorthand, which are 
underpinned by distinct theoretical threads and neither of them is conceptually coherent. 
Certain theoretical themes in the ‘alternative’ discourse of civil society rather than mainstream 
‘liberal’, as will be explored in the coming chapters, resonate in our case study such as: the 
retention of local cultural identity rather than embracing individual liberalism, civil society as 
the battleground of contested ideas, imbued with unequal power relations rather than civil 
society as a homogeneous ground, engaged in a consensual relation with the state and market, 
and civil society retaining a collective, communitarian orientation. However the ‘emergent civil 
society’ reflects a ‘liberal’ thread, i.e. Habermasian perspective of establishing validity claims 
through dialogue, yet it maintain a distinct alternative character by presenting a traditionally-
constituted perspective of reason.  
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The embrace of an indigenous persona and the presence of antithetical forces 
make it difficult for the ‘emergent civil society’ to flourish, develop and impact, 
because those traditional norms appear in some aspects, for instance, 
conservative masculine worldview and religious extremism, to hold back the 
potential to build a vibrant associational life, which is also owned and rooted in 
Peshawar society.  
It is argued in this thesis that the strong tendency exhibited by the ‘emergent 
civil society’ to retain its own indigenous identity generates implications, which, 
in turn creates serious limitations. Retaining a local cultural persona seems to 
form an overarching tendency within which the ‘emergent civil society’ seems 
to operate at the empirical level and navigates across three different 
worldviews that includes local cultural (Pakhtunwali), religious (Islam) and, to a 
certain extent, ‘liberal’7 (human rights) perspectives. The navigation between 
these three worldviews, however, is not without tensions and a contested battle 
of ideas ensues at multiple points. Tensions between these three perspectives 
become more frictional and observable when the ‘emergent civil society’ posits 
the desire for cultural change and advocates peaceful interactions, as feminist 
voices demonstrate in this thesis, that is resisted by the conservative masculine 
forces. The frictional encounter, once again, becomes visible when the 
‘emergent civil society’ rejects violent extremism and religious orthodox forces 
and comes into tension with the religious extremism on the one hand and the 
state on the other hand. These encounters render the entire ‘emergent civil 
                                                        
7
 ‘Liberal’, in this thesis, means the tendency of an individual to articulate, protect and advocate 
his/her individual interests and rights before a given community. This may be seen as akin to 
the Western conception of human rights. However, in this thesis ‘liberal’ is used as embedded 
within local cultural and religious perspectives.  
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society’ in Peshawar as an arena of cultural reproduction in which clashes 
between different perspectives occur, thus, reflecting Gramscian approach to 
civil society, as explored in chapter 5.  
While this thesis argues that the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar tends to 
retain its local value systems as the metaphysical foundation of civil society and, 
thus, deviates from the mainstream ‘liberal’ approach of civil society, yet this 
thesis also draws attention and analyses, in detail, the complexities involved in 
such a trajectory.  
Amidst these contestations the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar, that 
advocates peace and rejects violence, looks towards the state to create 
favourable conditions for the ‘emergent civil society’ to operate. These may 
include social justice, improved law and order and the implementation of 
citizenship8. This thesis suggests that in order to overcome these contestations, 
the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar, while keeping up pressure on the state, 
may also need to develop an inward-looking tendency to self-reflect on these 
challenging contestations that are potentially impacting on the co-ordinating 
synergy of the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar.  
In order to understand the nature of the tensions between different worldviews, 
the following section will present the three worldviews and their specific 
characteristics.  
Contestations within the non-state social space in Peshawar 
                                                        
8
 Such a tendency diffuses the difference between the ‘alternative’ and ‘liberal’ approaches 
to civil society as both approaches advocates the creation of favourable conditions.  
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The ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar invokes three perspectives to find an 
indigenous persona that may ultimately form the philosophical foundation of 
the ‘emergent civil society’. By seeking an indigenous, immanent persona, the 
‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar deviates from the mainstream liberal 
conception of civil society and instead shows an orientation towards the 
‘alternative’ discourse of civil society. In other words, it is not individual 
liberalism rather local traditional and religious value systems, which emerge as 
the dominant features of the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar as explored 
below. However, retention of local cultural identity renders the ‘emergent civil 
society’ into a battleground of competing perspectives also, which illustrates the 
way associational life can be a field of multiple and contesting value systems as 
the ‘alternative’ challenges to the liberal ideal of civil society also recognise.  
Pakhtunwali, an important traditional perspective, is an un-written code of the 
Pakhtun way of life inherited from the distant past, ‘transmitted through an oral 
tradition’ to the next generations, that ‘governs the life of the individual 
Pukhtoons as well as their communities’ (Spain, 1972; Yousafzai & Gohar, 2005: 
44; Khatak, 2012). It is Pakhtun’s unwritten social constitution, developed over 
hundreds of years, that ensures community cohesion and social order, 
addresses their needs, acts as a social contract among the Pakhtun, defines 
social roles and responsibilities of various gender groups and preserves the 
Pakhtun culture and identity. It comprises various norms and values, social 
structures, institutions and individual and collective practices.  
Nevertheless, Pakhtun are also Muslims. For them, Islam acts as an extremely 
important worldview like Pakhtunwali that links them ‘with model past’ and 
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‘persons’ that ‘offers the only sound basis… for forming and reforming one’s 
society in any age’ (William Graham as cited in Zaman, 2002: 3). In Pakhtun 
society, Islam has mingled with the Pakhtunwali, creating a unique character of 
its own. For some, Pakhtunwali and Islam are in harmony. As, for instance 
Akbar S. Ahmed (1991: 139) argues that ‘Islam is so much a part of the Pakhtun 
structures as to suggest that the dichotomy is false’. While this is an important 
interpretation of the relationship between Pakhtunwali and Islam, another 
interpretation also exists, as examined below, whereby the tension between 
them seems to take a frictional encounter.  
Besides cultural and religious perspectives, the liberal worldview is also 
considered to be an important perspective that may inform the philosophical 
base of the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar as demonstrated by women 
respondents of this research from Peshawar in particular. The liberal 
perspective proposes the importance of people as citizens, entitled to certain 
human rights irrespective of their cultural, ethnic, or gender background. The 
liberal worldview oscillates between two perspectives: a liberal Western 
perspective and liberalism as constituted within local traditional and religious 
perspectives. However, the liberal discourse being originated in the West and 
carrying a Westernized connotation, is perceived as the international agenda of 
human rights by others and seems to develop in conflict with other 
perspectives.  
The ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar, in order to find the source of peace 
that may enable it to reject and oppose violence, seems to navigate across these 
three worldviews. The ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar, in its search for an 
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immanent philosophical base, invokes these three competing worldviews that 
may yield the ‘emergent civil society’ an immanent character. Pakhtunwali is 
perceived by some9 normatively as the secular, plural social order that may 
potentially indigenize the very concept of civil society and contribute to peace. 
Civil society if indigenized within Pakhtunwali may retain its cultural identity 
informed by a community oriented spirit, which, unlike the ‘liberal’ individual 
underpinning of the dominant civil society discourse in the West, does have 
some resonance with those who see civil society as a space of contested 
worldviews and norms. If the ‘emergent civil society’ embraces Pakhtunwali 
then it may lead to the construction of indigenous collective arrangements, 
whereby people with different religious identities will participate. The non-
violent movement amongst the Pakhtun in the 20th century is quoted, in 
particular, as an example, wherein the Pakhtun tried to construct a new social 
order based on non-violence. This is the potential reference point for an 
associational life, which opens up to distinct views and religious philosophies, 
while retaining the sense of identity imbued within the historical evolution of 
Pakhtun society.  
Islam, on the other hand, is perceived as the most appropriate perspective that 
can inform Pakhtun’s interactions and may create a plural and tolerant social 
order if interpreted positively. For some10 Islam, then, is a progressive religion 
that has to be prioritized over cultural identity. For them Islam’s ageless 
principles of social justice and equality and Islamic human rights can potentially 
                                                        
9
 We call them ‘traditionalists’ as chapter 5 shows in detail.  
 
10
 We call them ‘religious-reformists’ as will be discussed in chapter 5. 
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provide an immanent value system wherefrom civil society may emerge. 
However, unlike traditionalists, religious-reformists give equal importance to 
religion and do not seem to support the secular and nationalist tendencies as 
exhibited by those who prioritize Pakhtunwali.    
The liberal worldview does not seem to oppose the importance of civil society 
having a cultural identity yet emphasises individual rights rather than collective 
cultural rights. Citizenship and human rights seem to form an important value 
system for liberals11. This perspective is mostly embraced by women 
respondents. In addition to the acceptance of Pakhtun culture as an important 
value system and Islam as an important philosophical system, they introduce an 
individualistic strand. Civil society perceived as an organic sphere, rooted in 
local cultural consciousness, with communitarian structural arrangements 
seems to experience a fissure. An emphasis on individual human rights, 
perceived to be Western in origin and character, then places them in opposition 
to both traditionalists and religionists.  
These tensions seem to inform us of the contestations between different 
worldviews that occur within the overarching desire, expressed by all 
respondents, to embed the ‘emergent civil society’ in local traditional and 
religious perspectives. Respondents, with different worldviews whether 
Pakhtunwali, Islam or human rights, tend to show the desire of retaining a 
cultural identity for the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar. Integrated within 
these perspectives are the forces of tradition as exhibited by a masculine 
mindset that is criticised and challenged by women respondents from 
                                                        
11
 This thesis has named them ‘reformists’ as will be discussed in chapter 5.  
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Peshawar. This antithetical force seems to limit the ‘emergent civil society’s’ 
desire of cultural change, wherein women may live as persons with rights. On 
the other hand, the forces of religious extremism that grew in particular social 
and political contexts in Pakistan, also seem to limit the ‘emergent civil society’s’ 
desire to promote tolerance and a religiously plural society.  
Unlike civil society in the West which challenged both religion and tradition, 
rejected pre-defined roles and obligations, the ‘emergent civil society’ in 
Peshawar seems predisposed towards retaining religion and culture as 
important sources of civility and tolerance. In other words, instead of acquiring 
impersonal and contractual relations, civil society in Peshawar tends to retain a 
cultural identity and collective spirit. Diverging from the mainstream ‘liberal’ 
perspective of civil society, the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar seems 
inclined towards the ‘alternative’ discourse of civil society. In other words, civil 
society in Peshawar does not seem to be inclined to embrace modularity12 as its 
central defining feature. While the ‘emergent civil society’ wants to retain the 
cultural dimension yet this cultural dimension also seems to weaken it in 
specific respects such as gender relations and the specific use of Islam by the 
state. In other words, certain aspects in tradition and religion may also inhibit 
the potential emergence of civil society. This thesis will argue that despite these 
tensions, Peshawar’s civil society is likely to make a contribution to peace, but 
only if it shows the capacity to deal with its own internal tensions.  
                                                        
12 ‘Modularity’, deduced from ‘modular’, was used by Gellner (1996). Gellner, being a strong 
proponent of the mainstream liberal conception of civil society, argued that ‘modularity’ alone 
can build civil society, which emerges within certain liberal conditions as explained in chapter 3.  
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Contestations within the non-state social space13: leaping from mild to 
frictional encounter 
The ‘emergent civil society’s’ tendency to retain a local cultural identity and 
immanent value-systems that may form the philosophical foundation, seems to 
experience certain limitations. As our data analysis shows in chapters 5 and 6, it 
was observed that there are deeper issues involved that are closely linked with 
the very desire of embedding civil society in immanent value systems. If the 
‘emergent civil society’ has to have an indigenous persona as our respondents 
are inclined to show, then what could be the possible implications of these 
tensions between different worldviews and how one can observe them at the 
empirical level?  
As this thesis unpacked respondents’ ideas of ‘peace’ and ‘violence’, the data 
analysis revealed that the friction, between cultural change and forces of 
tradition, problematize the very desire of embedding civil society in indigenous 
value systems. This frictional encounter demonstrates that the concept of civil 
society has assumed importance as a non-state social space in the Pakhtun 
society.  
To manifest itself, this frictional encounter is expressed clearly, by our 
respondents, at the empirical level, in two different but overlapping accounts i.e. 
referential and at the discourse level. At the referential level, respondents’ make 
references to NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) in which NGOs are 
either criticized or defended by them, depending upon their respective 
                                                        
13 It means an unbounded space with specific social character and, which lies outside the state 
structure. Such a usage is inspired by Gramscian perspective of civil society as an arena of 
cultural reproduction and social-identity formation.  
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backgrounds and worldviews. At the discourse level, respondents’ narratives of 
‘peace’ and ‘violence’ also exhibit the tension between change and resistance to 
change, in which both adversarial forces tend to retain a cultural identity.  
As most of these references were either directed against women’s NGOs or 
emanated from women’s NGOs, therefore, in order to understand this frictional 
encounter better this thesis has given particular importance to the women’s 
voices in Peshawar. Women’s voices not only spell out this encounter better but 
are also helpful in drawing our attention to the latent forms of violence, 
whereby masculinity seems to limit the prospects of ‘emergent civil society’. Our 
women respondents, then present different perspectives on NGOs and reveal 
their distinct approaches to ‘peace’ and ‘violence’, which tend to be more 
gendered in essence.  
Some male respondents see local traditional and religious perspectives as 
important sources of civility and peace that inform sociability amongst the 
Pakhtun. They refer to and count a number of informal14 associations as 
important examples of local structures that promote peace and civility within 
society. Besides quoting examples of indigenous mechanisms that maintain 
internal social order, they also count norms and values both from Pakhtunwali 
and Islam, which sustain internal social order.  
Women, on the other hand question and challenge men’s description of civility 
and peace. Dismissing it as too narrow and partial, they argue that such 
immanent worldviews is predominantly masculine in character. They fear that if 
                                                        
14
 ‘Informal’ according to our respondents means the unregistered networks for instance Hujra 
(public/community centre), Jirga (Council of elders), shrines etc. 
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civil society in Peshawar is indigenized in such a masculine worldview, then the 
entire concept of civil society will be contested as it may sustain biases against 
women. They, however, do not wish to dismantle the entire approach to 
indigenize civil society and instead attempt to modify it by injecting their voices. 
In other words, they express a desire to retain their cultural identity, but resist 
the tendency amongst men to preserve tradition because the latter, according to 
them, marginalises women and takes their voices away. Thus the contested 
discourse around ‘rights’ creates tension between tradition and cultural change, 
between structure and agency.  
For women to construct non-violent interactions amongst different members of 
the society, hyper masculinity has to be unveiled and rejected. It is precisely 
here that women’s voices present a feminist dimension of the notion of civil 
society. For instance, women respondents emphasise the inclusion of family or 
the private sphere within civil society because, according to them, the exclusion 
of family from civil society will hide an important site of women’s subjugation in 
the Pakhtun society. They, however, also argue, at the same time, that women’s 
associations within the non-state social space in Peshawar has enabled them to 
pursue their struggle of achieving better status for the Pakhtun women. Thus 
blurring the boundaries between civil society as a distinct sphere from family, 
as perceived within the mainstream liberal conception of civil society, emerges 
as an important feature of the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar.  
This frictional encounter gathers its initial momentum around the very idea of 
NGOs. The ‘emergent civil society’ needs to be indigenized within the Pakhtun 
society rather than informed by the perceived agenda of NGOs alone, as male 
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traditionalists argue. The women argue that such NGOs are important spaces to 
secure women's rights in a masculine society and the agenda of women's rights 
must be a part of the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar.  
The discussion about NGOs provides the initial empirical instance and evidence 
of the pressure that is built between the forces of masculinity, structure or 
tradition and cultural change and agency. Tensions between them, however, 
assume more frictional form when several questions were asked about 
‘violence’ and ‘peace’ (civility) from all respondents involved in our research.  
Words and phrases such as ‘peace’, ‘non-violence’, ‘tolerance’, ‘peaceful social 
order’, ‘respecting differences’, ‘democratic behaviour’, ‘collectivism’, ‘self-help’, 
and ‘a deep sense of security’ were frequently used by male respondents while 
describing peace. The male respondents’ perception of ‘peace’ is inspired by 
local cultural and religious perspectives and serves as a direct contrast to the 
violent extremism that is seen by them as the product of certain political and 
social conditions that prevailed in Pakistan since the 1980s. For them, the 
sources of violence are external whereas that of peace are internal. By external 
sources they mean that the phenomenon of religious violence in KP and other 
parts of Pakistan is not an indigenous, organic phenomenon, rather it is 
imported and imposed on the Pakhtun community.  
Perhaps it might have been an important conclusion of our thesis that the 
celebration of local cultural identity means an automatic arrival of ‘peace’ if we 
had not explored women’s voices on similar issues. Underpinned by a masculine 
mindset and utopian in character, ‘peace’ and ‘violence’ seem to be a ‘man’s job’. 
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Women reformists challenge this perception of ‘violence’ and ‘peace’ as offered 
by men. 
Stretching the definitional spectrum of violence as offered by men, women-
reformists emphasise more the internally situated layers of violence. For them 
latent violence, lying deep within certain norms and social structures of 
Pakhtun culture, mainly Pakhtun male honour and badal (revenge) deeply 
impact their conditions and interactions. Such masculine norms and structures 
weaken their (the Pakhtun men’s) capacity to imagine and create a society 
based on tolerance and respect for all members of society, irrespective of their 
social status and gender backgrounds. Such feminine voices bring an extra 
dimension to the very conception of peace as propagated by male respondents. 
More gendered in outlook, it exposes the partiality of the conception of peace 
offered by males, which seem to sustain the social division between men and 
women. With men the sources of violence lie outside Pakhtun culture, whereas 
women draw attention to the inward sources of violence. With men the 
‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar may be inspired by local traditional and 
religious perspectives whereas for women the ‘emergent civil society’ must 
include the voices of women.  
This develops the dilemma of whether the discourse of civil society has to be 
indigenized within the organic sources as proposed by different clusters of our 
respondents or it has to embrace a strain of women’s rights. Thus the argument 
of the male traditionalist and religionists, with an emphasis on the organic value 
systems only, seems to be challenged by the women reformists as explored in 
chapter 5.  
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However, women-reformists do not negate the argument that emerges from our 
thesis that the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar is attempting to assume a 
local cultural persona. Women respondents also quote cultural and religious 
perspectives to support their argument. For instance, they refer to different 
sources in Islam to advocate for a more respectful status of women. 
Nevertheless, the conservatives’ tendency of holding on to certain norms and 
structures, which seem to sustain hyper masculinity, and women’s rejection of 
such norms and structures seem to hinder the potential flourishing of the 
‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar. It is these contestations and clashes 
between different perspectives, which demonstrate, at an empirical level, that 
the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar is inclined towards the ‘alternative’ 
discourse of civil society and seems to diverge from the mainstream ‘liberal’ 
model of civil society. Embedded in such discourse is a tendency amongst the 
participants of this research in which they blur the boundaries of civil society 
from other spheres, such as family and count associations and networks, which 
are informed by local cultural perspectives, such as religion and kinship. Such 
an approach challenges the gender baises and liberal assumptions of the 
mainstream ‘liberal’ civil society. 
The ‘emergent civil society’ in its pursuit of an indigenous persona and organic 
character, in addition to the frictional encounter between cultural change and 
masculine forces, also experiences a new friction with religious orthodoxy. To 
imagine and advocate for a peaceful, non-violent society, the ‘emergent civil 
society’ in Peshawar resists violent extremism and religious orthodox forces. 
Rejecting violent extremism and grappling with religious orthodox forces within 
the non-state social space, the ‘emergent civil society’ opposes violence and the 
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threat of violent extremism. This peace-oriented struggle has assumed an 
associational form, amidst violence, in the post 9/11 period in Peshawar as a 
number of associations have emerged in Peshawar in the name of ‘peace’ 
against violence. It is ‘emergent civil society’s engagement with the peace 
struggle in Peshawar, which comes into tension with the orthodox forces, 
present in the non-state social space, and with the central state, which is 
accused of supporting such forces.  
The peace struggle assumes a reflexive dimension when voices of peace try to 
embed peace consciousness within local cultural history by quoting instances 
and norms of peace from Pakhtun and Islamic history. Such a peace discourse, 
not only rejects violent extremism incurred by the Taliban, but also stands up 
against religious fundamentalism, which is perceived to be the product of 
certain political and social conditions in Pakistan. Associations, engaged in 
peace work in Peshawar, are attempting to reach out to common people in 
order to enable them to reflect on the origin of violent extremism in the region 
and understand that the Pakhtun society was a peaceful society in the past. By 
doing so, these associations are trying to construct the narrative of peace. 
Seeking a religiously plural society, free from the threat of violent extremism 
and the threat of superimposition of a single fundamental religious world view, 
peace consciousness, then, comes into tension with religious orthodoxy that was 
allowed to flourish by the state in the non-state social space at the cost of 
secular and plural voices.  
Peace discourse, however, also comes into tension with the state that is seen as 
an important player in the conflict in the region since the 1980s. Demonstrating 
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criticality, the ‘emergent civil society’s’ criticism of the state is strongly focused 
on the state’s role in the encouragement of religious forces. However, criticism 
of the state is not restricted to the state’s alleged involvement in the regional 
conflict, but spins around the very idea of the state as a democratic, responsive 
institution. The state’s failure to implement citizenship, ensure social justice and 
lack of democratic culture in the state’s institutions are pointed out as key 
issues. It also holds the state accountable for using religion in an extremist form, 
which deteriorated the former moderate form of religion amongst the Pakhtun.  
Thus the ‘emergent civil society’s’ frictional encounters with the antithetical 
forces demonstrate, at the empirical level, that the ‘emergent civil society’ 
criticizes such forces and grapple with them. For instance, a large number of 
seminars, conferences, talk shows, and protests were held, by different 
associations based in Peshawar, to denounce religious extremism. Women’s 
associations, in particular, have been challenging hyper masculinity. However, 
criticism of such forces is also accompanied by ‘emergent civil society’s’ 
tendency to look towards the state, whereby the state is pressurized to deal 
with such antithetical forces and provide favourable conditions for the 
‘emergent civil society’ to continue its peace-struggle. Nevertheless, our data 
reveal that the ‘emergent civil society’s’ internal issues, such as the charges of 
corruption, and mismanagement within civil society and the distance between 
‘formal’15 and ‘informal’ civil society, also need immediate focus and attention. It 
is suggested, here, that engagement with these internal issues may need in-
depth reflections and a serious effort by the ‘emergent civil society’. Such an 
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 By ‘formal’ we mean a registered association such as an NGO and by ‘informal’ we mean 
unregistered associations such as Jirga, as explained in the first Chapter.  
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effort may improve its image at the public level and enhance the prospects of 
building peace.  
Use of ‘civil society’, the theoretical challenge of ‘modularity’ and a 
potential research contribution 
This thesis analyses the peace-oriented struggle of the Pakhtun that rejects 
violence and advocates peace and non-violence. The peace-oriented struggle in 
Peshawar is akin in some aspects to the Western concept of civil society because 
this struggle, which is oriented towards peace and civility, is taking place within 
the non-state social space in Peshawar and has taken an associational form. 
Thus to analyse the peace-oriented struggle, this thesis deploys the Western 
concept of civil society. However, to invoke a Western concept in a non-Western 
context generates certain challenges as given below.  
There are different contested versions of civil society rooted in the Western 
intellectual milieu. Some writers, such as Howell & Pearce (2002) and Chambers 
& Kymlicka (2002) have tried to use the terms, ‘liberal’ and ‘alternative’ as 
conceptual shorthand to render the diverse discourse of civil society. However, 
both these terms lack conceptual coherence and are used as ‘ideal types’ to 
manifest key distinctions between the two approaches. While the ‘liberal’ 
approach is predominantly oriented towards liberal individualism and 
‘partnership... among civil society, the market and the state’, the ‘alternative’ 
approach is oriented towards criticality and ‘seek to show the embedded power 
relationships and inequalities’ at societal level (Howell & Pearce, 2002: 17). The 
‘alternative’ approach is focused more on ‘other set of values and priorities’ 
(Howell & Pearce, 2002: 17) or what Chambers & Kymlicka (2002: 2) call 
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‘traditions other than mainstream liberal ones’. It is, however, the ‘alternative’ 
discourse of civil society, which has been recently used to critique the ‘liberal’ 
civil society to open up ways in which the ‘alternative’ idea could be explored in 
non Western contexts. It is this ‘alternative’ perspective of civil society, which 
has been recently revisited in alternative traditions such as Islam (Hanafi, 
2002), Judaism (Stone, 2002) and Christianity (Banner, 2002).  
While Howell & Pearce’s (2002) deployment of ‘alternative civil society’ is 
focused on the contrast between capitalist and non-capitalist world, Chambers 
& Kymlicka (2002) are more interested to use the term in non-Western 
alternative traditions and explore whether the discourse of civil society prevails 
in such traditions. In the notion of ethical pluralism as the basis of their 
argument, they provide the basis for the argument that civil society cannot be 
reduced to one variant in the liberal tradition. Chambers & Kymlicka (2002) 
usage of ‘alternative civil society’, as used in this thesis, is inspired by insights 
form Gramsci, Habermas, critical theory and feminism, women voices in 
particular as explored in chapter1.  
While the discourse of civil society cannot be dichotomized as ‘liberal’ and 
‘alternative’ as both perspectives have similar and dissimilar points (Hann, 
1996), the ‘liberal’ perspective is supported by strong theoretical traditions 
unlike the ‘alternative’ approach. Being more theoretically developed, the 
‘liberal’ version, which is in ascendance at present also, offers an explicit 
challenge to the very applicability of the term in the non-Western context.  
The concept of ‘modularity’, for instance, as the work of Ernest Gellner 
delineates the liberal concept of civil society, seems to problematize the 
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application of civil society in Peshawar. A ‘modular’ man, according to Gellner 
(1996), is freed from the ascriptive identities, pre-defined obligations and roles 
and is equipped with the right to enter and exit, voluntarily, any association 
without any fear. In other words, a modular man is not withheld by his 
particular background, such as ethnic or religious. Only a ‘modular’ man can 
build civil society, Gellner posits. He equates any pre-defined value-system, 
whether religious (Islam) or secular (Marxism) with tyranny and considers 
atomization as the natural destiny of human society, thereby, re-emphasizing 
the hope of classical enlightenment in which human society develops in a linear 
format i.e. from tribal, communal to open, liberal society. Unable to contribute 
to civility, the pre-defined value systems present suffocating human conditions, 
Gellner argues (1996).  
Gellner (1996) refers to Islam, in particular, and states that Islam cannot help 
the Muslim community to form a civil society because it imposes a certain pre-
defined worldview on its members. Such a proposition, then, challenges this 
thesis, which suggests that Pakhtun, having an ethnic and religious identity, 
show the tendency to construct a civil society from local traditional and 
religious perspectives. In our case, Pakhtunwali, Islam and to a certain extent 
human rights, as discussed above, are perceived by our respondents as 
alternative routes to construct a civil society of their own. While this thesis does 
not reject Gellner’s argument completely, this thesis argues that it is not only 
marketization and individual liberalism per se, as suggested by Gellner, which 
may serve as the philosophical foundation of civil society. In other words, by 
focusing on the ‘alternative’ traditional and religious perspectives, the liberal 
assumptions of the mainstream ‘liberal’ model are criticized.  
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It is, however, recognized that it poses an important theoretical challenge to 
those researchers who intend to use the notion of civil society in the non-
Western context as they may search deeper to examine the concept as 
embedded and rooted in their own respective traditions. Gellner’s ‘modularity’, 
which is an ideal type rather than an analytical category and, which provides the 
philosophic foundation of ‘liberal’ civil society, encompassing certain economic, 
social and intellectual conditions as they prevailed in the West since the 
Enlightenment, draws a line between ‘liberal’  and ‘alternative’ civil societies as 
the ‘alternative’ conception of civil society draws on values other than ‘those 
that came to predominate with the rise of capitalism’ (Howell & Pearce, 2002: 
31).  
While this thesis challenges Gellner’s argument and argues that there may be 
alternative routes to construct a civil society, this thesis also shows that the 
construction of civil society from within local tradition is also problematic. Such 
contested philosophic approaches have rarely been taken up in the literature on 
civil society in Pakistan. This encourages an investigation to search how an 
‘alternative’ version of civil society in a given non-Western context creates an 
intellectual foundation from within immanent sources.  
Studies on civil society in Pakistan seem to be focused more on the processes of 
state formation than civil society as a distinct sphere. The notion of civil society 
does not seem to be taking a centre stage and, thus, present us a different and, 
to a certain extent, confusing perception of civil society.  
Not to mention the uncritical invocation of the term in popular media in 
Pakistan, some writers in Pakistan have conflated the term with everything that 
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is not the state (researcher’s italics). The term has been used as broad analytical 
shorthand in opposition to the state (Malik, 1997; Rizvi, 2000) rendering the 
term ‘extremely vague’ (Interviewee No., 39). Some writers present Pakistani 
civil society in terms of binary oppositions, ‘civil’ and ‘uncivil’, and dichotomised 
between ‘liberal, modern, urban based NGOs’ and ‘Islamic civil society’ (Zaidi, 
2006: 356-357) without elaborating why a specific section is civil and the other 
uncivil. Some, in addition to urban based NGOs, broaden the spectrum of civil 
society and include kinship-informed associations (Qadeer, 1997) without 
illuminating their respective worldviews and potential conflict between them. 
Some are interested in the visible form of civil society and, thus, use De 
Tocqueville’s perspective of civil society as an associational realm (Spurk, 
2010), which is also frequently used by Western donors working in the 
developing world (Lewis, 2001). Such usage, however, in the context of Pakistan 
tends to count civil society organizations (CSOs) at the urban level and 
counterpoise them to associations, informed by religion (Danish, 2005). Others, 
while identifying potential conflicts between different world views that inform 
civil society in Pakistan, focus on the evaluation of urban based NGOs alone 
(Baig, 2001).  
While providing useful secondary data and some, such as Baig (2001) and 
Danish (2005) raise highly important questions, yet researchers interested to 
know why and how a Western specific notion would resonate in an entirely 
different context finds these scarce studies less helpful. Perhaps, it is important 
to ask questions such as: do these studies imply that civil society in Pakistan has 
either emerged from amongst the same conditions that Gellner identifies as the 
essential pre-requisites or that is moving towards Gellner’s view of what 
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constitutes a civil society? In the contemporary debate of civil society in 
Pakistan, the conceptual and metaphysical aspect of civil society is missing. This 
thesis offers an exploration of these aspects as one of its main contributions to 
the debate.   
Pasha (2001), for instance, refers to Gellner’s ‘modularity’ and dismisses it as a 
mistaken approach, but does not elaborate further that if it is not to be the 
liberal individualism then what could become the philosophical foundation of 
civil society in Pakistan. Pakistan is not only predominantly a Muslim country, 
but is an ethnically heterogeneous society also. In their emphasis on the urban 
based NGOs or the clash between Islam and liberal civil society in Pakistan, such 
studies seem to present an incomplete picture of civil society by ignoring 
important tensions between different worldviews.  
A prime focus on NGOs alone, which most of the Pakistani literature on civil 
society focus on, may generate an impoverished understating of the term 
(Beckman, 1997). Concerned more with civil society, democracy, and the state, 
none of these studies either focus on civil society in Peshawar or tend to 
evaluate civil society’s potential role in building peace amidst violence. On the 
other hand, by paying minimum attention to the ‘complexities and 
contingencies of real cultures and societies’ (Fowler, 1996; Edwards, 2013: 4) in 
Pakistan while importing and applying the term, the potential contribution of 
these studies to the theory of civil society raise serious methodological 
concerns. 
Methodologically rigorous research undertaking was, thus, needed to fill the gap 
by grappling with the very notion of civil society as the term emerged in the 
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West while exploring the internal complexities of our context. For this research, 
Peshawar, the capital of KP was chosen as my field work where registered 
associations can be accessed directly. Being an important urban centre, I hoped 
to find large, but diverse sets of respondents to explore the non-state social 
space in Peshawar, from where associations emerge and where the 
opportunities of peacebuilding norms and values may be examined. However, 
due to insecure conditions in KP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)16, Peshawar seemed 
the only safe city for my field work. I was also aware that some women’s 
associations operate in different parts of KP. Thus to approach women for 
interviews, the city of Peshawar seemed the only right choice. It is, precisely, 
women’s voices that, ultimately, influenced this thesis.   
This thesis builds its argument by exploring and grappling with the ‘liberal’ 
conception of the term that is in ascendance at present (Fowler, 2001). The 
rationale for focusing on the liberal conception of the term is that it directly 
challenges the import of the term in our context that has not experienced 
marketization and liberalism, the way they emerged and permeated the social, 
political and economic spheres in the West. However, a close focus on the 
‘liberal’ conception of civil society is also accompanied by critiquing its liberal 
assumptions to find a way of using civil society to open up the analysis of the 
phenomenon in non Western contexts, which the scarce literature on Pakistan 
civil society seems to miss.  
For this, this thesis focuses on Ernest Gellner’s conception of modularity that 
presents one of the most articulated expressions of ‘liberal’ civil society. On the 
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 KP is the north-western province of Pakistan.  
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one hand, we have ‘modular man’ freed from ascriptive identities, able to enter 
and exit any association at his free choice (Sunar, 1997). On the other hand, we 
have the Pakhtun, immersed in ascriptive identities, and who value bonds 
informed by kinship and religion. The Pakhtun, locked in cousinly relationships 
may be bound by tradition and thus unable to build a civil world. Gellner’s 
ethnocentric conception of civil society offers bleak prospects to import the 
notion of civil society in an entirely different context as the preconditions that 
led to the birth of modular man do not exist (Fowler, 2001). It is this tension 
between the modularity or individual liberalism and local cultural perspectives 
that most of the above studies on Pakistani civil society fail to address in detail.  
By grappling with the Gellnerian challenge this thesis does not only intend to fill 
an important gap in the literature on civil society in Pakistan, but also makes an 
attempt to show the possibility of imagining civil society within an alternative 
social order rather than a liberal one.  
Research questions 
To analyse and assess the peace-oriented struggle in Peshawar, which has 
emerged amidst violence and, which has assumed an associational form outside 
the state structure in the non-state social space, the following main research 
question was designed. 
Can civil society contribute to peacebuilding amidst violence in Peshawar?  
However, some sub-questions, as given below, were also formulated to help us 
answer the prime research question of this thesis.  
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What does civil society mean and what ideas of civil society resonate in the non-
Western contexts? 
What is the social and political context of our case study?  
What is the character of the peace struggle and how it is pursued by various 
actors and associations in Peshawar?  
What are the potential limitations, which can impact upon the peace-oriented 
struggle in Peshawar?  
Potential contribution of the research 
This thesis also seeks to make a contribution by drawing attention to peace 
voices in the region amidst violence that seem to have been overshadowed by a 
number of factors. Perhaps, at this point, it may be pertinent to state why this 
research was undertaken in the first place. The genesis of this research can be 
understood at two levels: personal and contextual.  
The genesis of this thesis lies deep within the researcher’s personal experiences 
of living amongst the Pakhtun, where violence between male Pakhtuns and by 
male Pakhtun against women was justified in the name of culture and Pakhtun 
honour. The presence of conflict-resolution mechanism (Jirga) and norms and 
values aiming at trust and peaceful behaviour presented a contrasting picture to 
the violence amongst the Pakhtun. The researcher was also personally aware of 
the Non-violent Movement in the 1920s amongst the Pakhtun that was inspired 
by immanent religious and cultural sources (Banerjee, 2000). The desire to 
understand tendencies of violence and non-violence amongst the Pakhtun, acted 
as my initial research inspiration that needed a systematic understanding.  
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However, it was the post 9/11 context in KP that motivated this research 
undertaking. People in KP saw the rise of brutal violence that was never 
experienced in the past as the Taliban emerged in FATA (Federally 
Administered Tribal Area) and the Swat Valley17. As violent extremism rose in 
the scale in the post 9/11 context, the entire Pakistani society was perceived to 
be receptive to militant ideals as Fair et al. (2010) discusses. With the rise and 
spread of violence in KP, the researcher noticed that non-state individuals were 
engaged not only in Peshawar but also in the Swat Valley in establishing 
collective forums to contribute to peace building amidst violence that included 
Peace Jirga, Pakhtun Peace Forum, Pakhtun Aman (peace) Jirga, Aman Tehreek 
(Peace Movement)18, and Aryana Institute of Regional Research and Advocacy 
(AIRRA). The researcher attended a large number of seminars, conferences, 
formal and informal gatherings being held in Peshawar and other parts of KP 
aimed at peace building. The word ‘Aman’ (literally meaning ‘Peace’ in Pakhtu 
language) became popular and entered community discourse during the same 
period. This ‘peace consciousness’ that rejected violence and emanated from 
amongst ordinary people needed an investigation and empirical understanding.  
The Taliban’s violence was clearly overshadowing these voices emanating from 
these forums and instead led to the emergence of crude journalistic analysis of 
the presence of a warrior culture amongst the Pakhtun and the Taliban’s 
violence was seen as a Pakhtun phenomenon (Levian, 2010; Chishti, 2012). The 
importance of drawing attention to these other Pakhtun voices was felt 
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 See Appendix C.  
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 ‘Aman Tehreek’ was established in March 2009 in Peshawar, which was a loose network of 
about 40 associations based in Peshawar.  
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immensely important by the researcher because these were the voices of the 
people who are historically labelled as warrior-like and prone to violence.  
Easwaran (1999: 17-18), for instance, mentions that the Pakhtuns have been 
depicted by historians as ‘brute’, ‘uncivilized’, ‘cruel as a leopard’ ‘treacherous 
murderer’ whose hands are stained with the blood of his kin and for whom 
badal (revenge) is the only way of securing his honour. Pakhtun living in FATA 
are, specially, branded as ‘fiercely autonomous’ (Hussain, 2007:143) or ‘too 
unruly to be governed’ (Dogar, 2009:10 cited by Farhat Taj, 2012: 11-12).  
Some have gone a step further as Anatol Levian (2011) asserts that the Taliban 
is a ‘Pathan19 phenomenon, with deep roots in Pathan history and culture’ (p: 
377). He further claims that ‘…in trying to create a strict Sharia-based system in 
the Pathan areas, the Taliban are not trying to impose something completely 
new. They are trying to develop something partly new out of elements that were 
old indeed’ (p: 373-74).  
There was, perhaps, a need to draw attention to the invisible voices of peace 
emanating from the same region and from amongst the same people, where 
violence was in consistent ascendance. Also, it was felt by the researcher to 
explore and analyse: to what extent these voices of peace can contribute to 
peacebuilding.  
Thus, this thesis seeks to make a contribution not only by challenging Gellner’s 
perception that ascriptive people are unable to build a civil world but also 
challenges certain stereotypes labelled against the Pakhtun. On the other hand, 
the burgeoning literature on the war on terror pays less or no attention to the 
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 Pathan is yet another word used in exchange for Pakhtun.   
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potential role of civil society in building peace (Paffenholz, 2010). This study, 
thus, seeks to make a contribution by focusing on the ‘emergent civil society’ 
potentiality to build peace in Peshawar.  
Thesis structure 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 explores the conceptual 
framework of the term ‘civil society’ and explains how the term will be deployed 
within the context of Peshawar. It is argued that despite different versions of the 
discourse of civil society, it is the alternative perspective, which is applicable in 
the context of Peshawar. Chapter 2 presents the methodological framework, 
researcher’s constructionist positionality and various ethical issues which were 
encountered during the field work. 
Chapter 3 presents the social and cultural context of our case study and the 
empirical evidence of non-violent movement amongst the Pakhtun that serve as 
the foundation of our argument. Chapter 4 presents the political context of our 
case study. It presents the roots and nature of violent extremism in Peshawar 
and explores how it impacted upon the Pakhtun society. Chapters 5 and 6 
present the core argument based on the analysis of empirical data collected in 
Peshawar. Chapter 7 concludes the summary of the entire thesis.  
Key terms 
This thesis frequently uses certain key terms, which are defined in the following 
section. However, these terms are explained, at appropriate places, in the thesis 
in different chapters.  
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Culture is deployed as ‘a particular way of life, which expresses certain 
meanings and values not only in art and learning, but also in institutions and 
ordinary behaviour’ (Williams, 1976: 57). Being a particular way of life, culture 
encompasses the entire past legacy and heritage of a given group, which 
includes arts and language, customs and rituals and moral values. Culture as 
such is learnt and shared and transmitted from generations to generations 
(Haralambos & Holborn, 2000; Morris, 2012). ‘Culture... is inextricably linked 
with the social groupings and social institutions which constitute society at any 
given time and in any specific place’ and ‘requires and implies interactions 
between people, between groups of people and between institutions’ and thus 
constantly evolve and change (Giles and Middleton, p: 31).  
Tradition, closely related to culture, is perceived as ‘The customs and practices 
held to have been handed down from generation to generation within a culture, 
or a particular instance of them. A tradition is often regarded as a cultural 
birthright’ (Morris, 2012: 254). However, tradition, linked to an imagined or 
real past, is also constructed in specific conditions (Hobsbawm and Rangers, 
1994).  
Power is used both as an individual and collective phenomenon in this thesis. In 
both cases, it may be exercised in subtle ways by the powerful to set the agenda 
or norms for the powerless, which may limit the alternative views or the ‘scope 
of decision-making’ of others (Bacharch and Baratz cited by Haugaard, 2012: p: 
30). Power may be institutionalised in traditional structures and within the 
social relations and, thus, ‘inherited from the past’ (Lukes 1984: 38). It is in this 
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sense, i.e. power as invisible and deeply embedded in social structures and 
relations, that the concept of power is deployed in this thesis.   
Gender, in this thesis, refers to ‘the social division between men and women’ 
(Rahman & Jackson, 2011). Gender roles are learnt and reproduced within a 
specific cultural environment and encompasses the entire spectrum of ‘social 
and cultural practices that go with the being labelled female or male’ 
(Woodward, 2011: x).  
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CHAPTER 1 
1. Civil Society in historical perspective and its potential resonance in 
Peshawar 
1.1. Introduction  
This thesis analyses the emergence of struggle for peace since 2006 in Pakhtun 
society, Pakistan, and whether they can be framed by the Western concept of 
‘civil society’. The empirical data, generated in the field in Peshawar, between 
March 2011 and May 2012, demonstrates that the Pakhtun society could be an 
important source of peacebuilding outside the state structure. However, this 
peace oriented struggle is only taking place within certain sections in the 
Pakhtun society, which stand in opposition to the state and some conservative 
sections within the same society. As this peace-oriented struggle has taken an 
associational form, which is taking place outside state structure, this thesis 
applies, conceptually, the Western notion of civil society to explore, examine 
and evaluate this struggle. 
However, to invoke the concept of civil society and apply it in a non-western 
context is not without problems. On the one hand, we have the Pakthun culture, 
imbued with traditional and religious perspectives, which inform Pakhtuns’ 
worldviews and their interactions and on the other hand, we have the concept 
of civil society that originated in the secular West and, which does not have a 
singular designation rather different ideas of civil exist, as this chapter will 
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demonstrate in detail. As the concept of civil society has a central position in 
this thesis, the aim of this chapter is to unpack the contested discourse of civil 
society and explore which ideas of civil society resonate in our context.  
It is argued in this chapter that different theoretical traditions inform ‘liberal’ 
and ‘alternative’20 approaches to civil society. Certain theoretical threads 
dominate the discourse of the ‘liberal’ approach,  such as the importance of 
commercial activities, bourgeoisie, the liberal market economy, and individual 
liberalism whereas civil society as the battleground of contested ideas, cultural 
reproduction, identity formation and unequal power relations emerge more 
clearly in the ‘alternative’ approach to civil society. The ‘alternative’ version of 
civil society, unlike the liberal model, does not necessarily perceive individual 
liberalism or liberal market economy as the essential pre-conditions of civil 
society. Being inspired by insights from Gramsci, critical theory and feminism21, 
women’s voices in particular, the ‘alternative’ version of civil society critique the 
gender biases and the liberal assumptions of ‘liberal’ approach to find a way of 
using civil society to open up the analysis of the phenomenon in non Western 
contexts, such as Islam.  
By exploring these key themes, this chapter is generate the conceptual 
framework of ‘alternative’ approach to civil society, which can be used not only 
to reflect the character of the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar but can also 
be used as a critique of the ‘liberal’ model in this thesis.  
                                                        
20
 None of these two approaches are theoretically coherent rather are informed by a number 
of distinct theoretical threads,as this chapter will demonstrate in the coming sections. This 
thesis also does not dichotomise the entire debate of civil society into ‘liberal’ and 
‘alternative’ as these two approaches overlap. However, certain key distinctions still prevail.  
21
 Feminism is used here not as a particular reference to a specific feminist school of thought 
or feminist movement rather women’s rights and their voices. 
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This chapter is divided into six sections. Section 1, starts its discussion by 
mentioning the wide embrace of civil society by thinkers, practitioners who 
belong to opposing theoretical traditions. To grapple with this confusion, 
section 2 shows that civil society, as a concept, has a contested history and has 
been informed by various theoretical traditions. The discourse of civil society 
emerged in the post-enlightenment conditions, mainly influenced by the rise of 
commercial activities, liberal economy and liberalism, which contributed to the 
rise of liberal, but ‘gendered’ concept of civil society in the West, as it failed to 
challenge the social division between men and women. Being reduced to a 
bourgeois society by Marx, it was inherited by Post-Marxists and the term, was 
revisited within a different theoretical tradition, attaining non-liberal features. 
Under Gramsci’s influence, the concept of civil society found a new ideological 
and cultural perspective, which some experts perceive as the nemesis of an 
alternative approach to civil society (Howell & Pearce, 2002). Rather than 
seeing civil society and human agency, in particular, as merely an outcome of 
market forces or reducing it to liberal individualism, Gramsci perceived it as an 
arena of power struggle, in which power operates in subtle ways and  limit the 
‘scope of decision-making’ of others and lead to the marginalisation of certain 
groups.  
While Gramsci perceived civil society as an arena of power struggle, writers of a 
later period, such as Habermas, conceived it as an arena of communicative 
interactions. Applying Habermasian perspective of communication theory on 
civil society as an arena of dialogics, an important diversion of alternative 
conception of civil society occurs, from that of liberal conception, as the former 
emphasise the ‘communicative autonomy’ rather than ‘voluntarism’. According 
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to critical perspectives of civil society, civil society will guard its right of 
communicative autonomy and the right to construct shared cultural meanings 
about the common good. This section also mentions that the idea of civil society 
as a public sphere of communicative interaction, as presented by Habermas, has 
been criticized by feminists as it does not seem to focus on power, which may 
operate in subtle ways.  
Section 3 shows how the ambiguities that surround the very notion have led 
some writers to divide the discourse of civil soicety, at the theoretical level, into 
‘liberal’ and ‘alternative’ approaches. This section explores why the liberal 
conception of civil society is in ascendance at present and explores two reasons: 
first, the discourse of civil society was soon overtaken by the so-called triumph 
of liberal economy and democracy in the early 1990s; and second, alternative 
non-Western traditions are not thoroughly investigated to explore whether or 
not ideas of civil society exist. However, both perspectives still seem 
problematic for this thesis as both ‘liberal’ and ‘alternative’ discourses 
originated in the secular West. As non-Western contexts are imbued with 
religious and local cultural worldviews rather than liberal individualism, the 
‘alternative’ discourse of civil society has been, recently, revisited in other non-
Western traditions such as Islam, Judaism and Confucianism. It is argued in this 
section that the ‘alternative’ discourse of civil society seems a pertinent 
analytical tool as it allows us to categorise and analyse the peace-oriented 
struggle that is taking place in a context, which is imbued with local cultural and 
religious worldviews.  
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Section 4, in this chapter, deals with the contested debate of boundaries and 
shows how an ‘alternative’ discourse of civil society, which does not 
overemphasize the boundaries of civil society from family, market and the state 
may serve the purpose of this thesis. Mainly focused on the private/public 
spheres, feminists find little attraction in the idea of civil society as an 
associational realm or a public sphere between family, market and the state. For 
them, the inclusion of private sphere or family is of extreme importance. To 
resolve this tension, some feminists have espoused critical thinkers’ argument 
that the boundary-debate of ‘liberal’ civil society is too narrow to be accepted 
and, instead, have suggested that civil society may be considered as a realm that 
exists between an individual and the state. Nonetheless, this chapter also argues 
that feminism per se may not need ‘liberal’ or ‘alternative’ discourses of civil 
society to draw attention to the feminist struggle in a given context. However, 
our context in Peshawar also demonstrates a peace-oriented struggle, which has 
distinct feminist features. This section also sheds light on how feminists may 
revisit the entire conception of civil society and contest the debate of 
boundaries by identifying family as an important part of civil society. It is, 
therefore, argued that the conceptual discourse of ‘alternative’ version of civil 
society, informed by a feminist understanding, is a conceptual framework, 
which may resonate in our context as well.  
Section 5 defines civil society as deployed in this thesis as a non-state socials 
pace, informed by competing perspectives, which are inspired by local 
traditional and religious worldviews. Giving a brief outline of different usages of 
civil society, section five presents two different but overlapping approaches to 
civil society that have been invoked in this thesis: spatial, which blurs the 
37 
 
boundaries of civil society from family and the market. It also helps us stretch 
the term beyond formal, registered association, to include informal networks 
and groups in civil society; and normative, in which the sources of civility are 
searched in local cultural and religious perspectives; and reflexive, which shows 
the agency of non-state civic actors for social and cultural change. However, 
these multiple deployments of the term in our thesis is based on and informed 
by the empirical data as we will show, in detail, in chapter 5 and 6.  
While these two usages of the term may be helpful, they may sound abstract. 
Therefore, section 6 of this chapter also presents how this thesis has made an 
attempt to operationalize the alternative conception of civil society in order to 
analyse the empirical civil society in Peshawar that served the basis of this 
thesis. The objective of this section is to show, at an empirical level, how and 
where respondents have tried to locate and embed civil society in Peshawar. 
The idioms of ‘formal’ and informal’ are used in this thesis, which explain the 
empirical forms of various associations and networks, which operate within the 
non-state social space, as explained in this section. This section provides the 
sociological background and features of both formal and informal networks in 
Peshawar. It may be reiterated, here, that the usage of these two terms is based 
on the arguments of the respondents, as they attempt to indigenize the concept 
of civil society within immanent sources.  
1.2. Celebrating the New Avatar22 of civil society 
The term, civil society, has experienced a few spells of hibernation since its birth 
in the Greek and Roman political thought. The 18th century European political 
                                                        
22
 The term ‘new avatar’ is borrowed from Mustapha K Pasha (2005).  
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thought resurrected it, after its prolong disappearance for about 2000 years, in 
which it was perceived as an arena of free voluntary action and individual 
liberalism. The term found a new life when some Marxist thinkers, such as 
Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), assigned it non-liberal features, in early 20th 
century, thus, opening up an alternative route to imagine civil society. The 
experience of Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, however, played a key role in 
providing a new life to the notion of civil society (Chandhoke, 2013). Instantly, 
the term was considered a new brand of political change and a new hope for the 
South (Powell, 2013).  
The discourse of civil society, since then, has captured the ‘contemporary 
political imagination in place of state as the new avatar of development, 
democracy, and emancipation’ (Pasha, 2005: 18). Considered as the ‘ideal elixir 
to counter the ills of the contemporary world’ (Chandoke, 2007: 609) and ‘the 
cure of current ills’ (Khilnani, 2001: 11) the concept has made a ‘dramatic 
return’ (Kaviraj & Khilnani, 2001: 1) and gathered ‘momentum’ (Baker, 2002: 1) 
since the 1990s.  
The potential role of civil society is recognised at different social and political 
levels such as civil society can strengthen democracy and make development 
effective (Howell & Pearce, 2002), it can contribute to peacebuilding 
(Paffenholz, 2010) and it can explain the changing geometry of human relations 
in societies, post-colonial societies in particular (Kaviraj, 2001; Ehrenberg, 
2013). The term was debated by thinkers, belonging to other intellectual 
traditions, such as critical theory and feminism while embraced by opposing 
political philosophies, whether ‘globalizers’ or ‘anti-globalizers’ (Pasha, 2005: 
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22), Liberals, Conservatives, Leftists or Rightists (Seligman, 2002). The 
extension and application of the term in the Islamic world have also, recently, 
gained currency (Hanafi, 2002; Kazemi, 2002; Kelsay, 2002). The magnetic 
appeal has attracted the attention of aid donors to the global South, policy-
makers, activists throughout the world (Alagappa, 2004). 
Its wide embrace by thinkers, belonging to opposing intellectual traditions and 
its unreflective invocation, mainly by practitioners, led some to question the 
usefulness of the term, calling it a ‘vapid phrase’ (Kumar, 1992; Eric Hobsbawm 
cited by Alison Rooy 1998: 11; Mann, 2005). Ignoring both distinct intellectual 
traditions, which informed the term over a period of 2500 years and the 
internal contingencies of the context in which the notion is applied, renders the 
term confusing and contested (Cohen & Arato, 1994; Alagappa, 2004 Edwards, 
2013).  
Some argue that the debate of civil society has been dominated by ‘mainstream’ 
liberal discourse of civil society and has become ‘narrow’ (Chambers and 
Kymlicka, 2002: 2) as certain voices in the liberal camp, such as Ernest Gellner, 
present the liberal version as the only ideal type while rejecting the possibility 
to consider alternative perspectives as the potential philosophical foundation of 
civil society.  
Civil society, as a concept, has a contested history, character and is not entirely 
without problems as a theoretical category, which needs to be clarified before it 
is invoked for a particular research project. In order to remove, as much as 
possible, the confusion that surrounds the term, this thesis grapples with the 
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theoretical debate about civil society, both liberal and alternative as given in the 
following section.  
1.3. Civil society in historical perspective 
Aristotle’s (c. 324 BC) use of ‘politike koinonia’ for political society, which was 
later translated in Latin as ‘societas civilis’ by the Romans (Cohen & Arato, 
1994: 84) implied that civil and political society are one integral unit (Keane, 
1988a). Following his predecessor, Plato (c. 427), Aristotle was also concerned 
more with moral, political community and with the question of how to maintain 
a legal, political order. Aristotle’s political society merged both society and the 
state into one unit. For him, the unity of civil and political society or polis, meant 
a specific political condition of order, generated by political participation of the 
citizens to ensure a ‘just’ society (Islamoglu, 2001: 1891). Amongst the Romans, 
the term ‘societas civilis’ was mentioned by Cicero (106-43 BC) as a political 
idiom, which potentially balanced unequal relations between different groups 
through law (Ehrenberg, 2013). Thus the term appeared first amongst the 
Greeks and the Romans thinkers, denoting a legal, moral, and political order. 
However, both Greeks and Romans thinkers were concerned, primarily, with 
the notion of polis, a stable political order, and the term was used to refer to the 
political community, locked in mutual cooperation, transcending individual 
interests. These writers of classical antiquity used the term without elaborating 
it, which referred to the political relationship of men and different forms of 
government.  
It was this Aristotelian notion of ‘political man’, transcending the individual 
interests, which was to survive a long time in European political thought. 
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However, market-driven changes and the rise of liberalism, in 17th and 18th 
centuries Europe, led to a new approach to civil society as we will examine in 
the following section as a new individualized mind set emerged (Seligman 1996: 
202-3), which overshadowed the Aristotelian notion of communitarian man. 
The post-17th century period in Europe, as a result, is perceived to be the most 
important formative phase of the concept of civil society.  
In 17th and 18th century Europe, the advent of modernity, mainly in the form of 
commercial activities, the growth of a private economy, scientific advancement, 
the growing emphasis on human reason and other factors such as wars and 
colonial enterprise, played key roles in breaking the traditional and religiously 
informed socio-political order. Tradition and religion were perceived to be 
incompatible with the then-emerging dynamics of sociability that required 
individuals’ freedom to associate as individuals rather than people that are 
locked in pre-defined social patterns such as kinship (Seligman, 2002: 14; 
Femia, 2001: 131).  
Impersonal rather than personal, and informed by self interest rather than pre-
defined obligations, duties and solidarity, new forms of social arrangements 
were triggered mainly by increasing commercial activities (Becker, 1994). A 
new distinct layer of sociability was emerging that ultimately caught the 
attention of the thinkers who perceived the classical concept of the state and 
society as a single unit, proposed by the Greeks thinkers, as less relevant 
(Keane, 1988a).  
The rise of commerce in Europe was praised by many thinkers for its assumed 
virtues (Baker, 2002), such as John Locke (1632-1704), Montesquieu (1689-
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1755), David Hume (1711-1776), Adam Ferguson (1723-1816), and Adam 
Smith (1723-1790). One such assumption, as expounded by Adam Ferguson in 
particular, was that the rising bourgeoisie will increasingly demand the 
protection of their commercial rights from the state. This in turn will contribute 
to the establishment of a legal order at the social level and will improve the 
status of rule of law. As the habitat was changing in certain parts of Europe and 
tradition and religion were losing ground to regulate people’s interactions, 
thinkers of that age defended the rising commercial activities on the ground that 
it was reshaping the associative bonds amongst people on the newly emerging 
market-driven rules. Such bonds, oriented towards voluntary choices and 
impersonal sociability, as they assumed, would contribute to a new sense of 
civility or respect for each other as individuals (Becker, 1994; Khilnani, 2001).  
The thinkers of the 18th century Europe assumed that although the emerging 
economic bonds are based on rational choices, yet they will create ‘a sphere of 
non-instrumental human relations, governed by natural sympathy’ (Khilnani, 
2001: 20). This was something that the pre-commercial societies lacked and 
was the ‘unintended’ result of market-driven actions. The birth of civil society 
discourse in the post-Renaissance period in Europe was the result of such ‘self-
understanding’ (Cohen & Arato, 1994) and ‘self-reflexive thinking’ (Kaviraj, 
2001: 287) as a new public sphere was emerging (Habermas, 1996). While 
increasing commercial activities certainly played a key part in imagining civil 
society, other factors such as the growing importance of human reason, 
knowledge of other communities around the globe, which were mostly 
perceived as uncivilized (Goody, 2001) and persistent violence in some parts of 
Europe also played a role in conceptualizing civil society in Europe as an 
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important and distinct realm. It was this specific discourse of civility, civilised 
and civil society, ‘which in the course of encounters with hitherto unknown 
regions of Asia and Americas during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
became part of Europe’s definition of itself as the domain of the civilised’ 
(Islamoglu, 2001: 1983). However, commercial activities were identified as the 
main drivers of the new layers of sociability in Europe (Ehrenberg, 2013) and a 
source of stability (Becker, 1994). Referring to these moments of transition 
Joseph Femia (2001: 131) writes:  
‘The break with past traditions and custom, as the binding forces of society, 
engendered the search for new principles of moral unity. Because of the 
detachment of individual human beings from their defining social matrix, from the 
primordial givens of existence – kith, kin, membership in the Universal Church- 
there emerged a tendency to conceive people in terms of their humanity alone’. 
Commercial activities were perceived to have ‘unintended but benevolent moral 
effects’ upon social relations in the 17th and 18th century Europe, more 
specifically during the Scottish enlightenment (Khilnani, 2001: 22; Howell & 
Pearce, 2002). One of the prominent figures of the Scottish enlightenment, 
Adam Ferguson (1767: 225), wrote while referring to the fruits of commercial 
activities: 
‘We may, with good reason, congratulate our species on their having escaped from 
a state of barbarous disorder and violence, into a state of domestic peace and 
regular policy’.  
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In other words, the market economy can possibly build a civil society by 
creating a bourgeoisie who will be interested in the rule of law to protect their 
rights and thus pressurize the state. This important theoretical strand that the 
bourgeoisie will create civil society was to be challenged, theoretically, in the 
early 20th century by Gramsci and by the empirical example of the rise of civil 
society in Eastern Europe against authoritarian regimes in 1990s.  
However, writers of that age were also conscious that increased commercial 
activities have brought forth a new ‘self’ that is more individualized and 
prioritizes self-interests at the cost of community interests (Seligman, 2002: 
17). This newly emerging ‘self’, conscious of individual rights and the freedom 
to act, informed by ‘self’ interest, may generate harmful implications for others 
and create conflicts. This was conceived as a potential threat by some (Baker, 
2002) that may lead to conflicts. Thus, a legitimate political order or a state was 
perceived to be highly indispensable in guaranteeing the growth of civilization. 
Civilization for them23 was the pursuit of commercial activities and the 
protection of individual rights of the commercial class. Such a state, however, 
has to be held accountable by the people to ensure their individual liberty 
(Dunn, 2001). This was the arrival of the liberal, secular concept of the state that 
was to guarantee individual rights while having limited power to intervene in 
people’s affairs (Ehrenberg, 2013). On the other hand, prioritizing society over 
government and empowering individuals to hold the state accountable also 
added another theoretical strand to the liberal concept of civil society (Kaviraj, 
2001: 292). However, the concept of civil society was not free from biases as it 
                                                        
23
 Writers of that age glamorized the economic activities that can guarantee the progress of 
civilization (Ehrenberg, 2013). 
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mainly referred to a particular white, male bourgeois class (Keane, 1988; 
Howell &Pearce 2002).  
Seventeenth and Eighteenth century Europe presents a historical moment in 
which the concept of civil society finds its first articulated liberal expression 
(Becker, 1994). Using ‘self-understanding’ and reflexivity, the writers of that age 
relied on their own reasoning to understand the newly emerging bonds and the 
accompanying complexities rather than seeking a ‘transcendental referent’, for 
instance the Church (Habermas, 1996; Seligman, 2002: 15). Laying the 
foundation of the liberal concept of civil society and the liberal state, the writers 
of that age endeavored to understand the newly emerging regulative framework 
of interactions. This was the embryonic stage of the liberal concept of civil 
society in which liberal economy and liberalism were perceived important 
features of civil society. However, so far, the concept of civil society was 
interchangeably used for political society and the state in opposition to the state 
of nature (Femia, 2001). The concept of civil society entered the intellectual 
debate of the 18th century thought yet no one amongst the Scottish 
enlightenment, with the exception of Ferguson to a certain extent, can be 
credited with theorizing the concept (Oz-Salzberger, 2001).  
Hegel (1770-1831) ‘synthesized much of late-eighteenth-century thought on the 
subject’ (Cohen & Arato, 1994: 89) as the concept of civil society received 
enormous attention in the Continental Europe intellectual milieu.  For Hegel, 
civil society was a distinct realm from the state and family. Enabling people to 
socialize and integrate, civil society can also nurture poverty and inequality due 
to unrestrained commercial activities and thus needed a higher ethical body i.e. 
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the state. If Locke feared the encroachment of the state upon individual rights, 
then Hegel saw civil society’s internal complexities and conflicts and expected 
the state to regulate it (Femia, 2001).  
While European writers deployed the concept in the European context, some in 
the American context used it differently (Howell & Pearce, 2002). Alexis de 
Tocqueville (1805-1859) needs special mentioning here because his concept 
seems to have attracted donors and international agencies working in the 
developing world since the second half of the 20th century. De Tocqueville’s 
emphasis on the importance of associational life in America, which can possibly 
lead to democratize the state, strengthened further the liberal strand of civil 
society (Howell & Pearce, 2002). Laying emphasis on independent citizenry, his 
important contribution was his argument that not only the authoritarian state, 
but an elected government can also encroach upon the liberties of civil society, 
which civil society needs to guard (Rooy, 1998).24  
Within the European intellectual context, the post-Hegelian perspective of civil 
society led to a new way of imagining the idea of civil society. However, the idea 
of civil society, initially, received a setback with Marx (1818-1883) as he was 
approached the term from a distinct set of preoccupations. Disagreeing with 
Hegel, Marx rejected the entire concept as the expression of a capitalist market 
economy that only serves the interest of the bourgeoisie (Kumar, 1992). Marx, 
while criticizing Hegel, seemed to have missed the Hegelian emphasis that civil 
                                                        
24 Extending on de Tocqueville’s emphasis on the importance of associational life, Robert 
Putnam, later in the 20th century, developed his concept of social capital that proposes that 
engagement and interactions at the associational level may build trust and social capital that 
may play a potential role in both liberal democracy and a market economy (Mustafa, 2005).  
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society may nurture conflicts also. However, Marx was more interested in class 
conflicts rather than conflicts based on individuals’ interests and perceived civil 
society as a bourgeois-mask of class-conflicts (Howell & Pearce, 2002). Unlike 
liberal thinkers, Marx reduced civil society to a byproduct of unequal economic 
relations, a seat of exploitation and an arena of private property owners.  
The pre-Hegelian thinkers of civil society employed the term in opposition to 
the state of nature and as synonymous to the rule of law. However, the gender 
roles, employed as culturally and socially reproduced roles and responsibilities 
between men and women (Walby, 2012) in this thesis, did not become part of 
the discourse of liberal civil society. As Hegel perceived the idea of civil society 
distinct from family, the liberal conception of civil society attained a more 
‘gendered’ connotation (Phillips, 2002: 72). In other words, the notion of civil 
society emerged as a masculine concept where men were visible and powerful 
compared to women, who remained subjugated and invisible within private 
sphere i.e. family.   
With the arrival of the 20th century, the liberal, but the gendered conception of 
civil society dominated the discussion amongst the European writers. Such a 
liberal discourse received further impetus in America under de Tocqueville in 
America. However, with Marx, the concept of civil society received a different 
treatment, which reduced the entire liberal conception of civil society to an 
arena of economic exploitation and a by-product of economic forces. Both these 
themes, that is, liberal and reductionist, received distinct attention from 20th 
century’s writers. While Gramsci (1891-1937) rescued Marxist reductionism in 
the early 20th century, liberal strands were embraced and expanded, much later, 
by Robert Putnam in USA and Gellner in UK whereas Habermas introduced a 
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critical strand in the notion. Feminists, too, developed a specific feminist 
approach towards civil society as the concept became popular in 1990s.  
After 100 years of hibernation the term re-emerged albeit in a different guise to 
that of 18th century voices in Continental Europe (Kean, 1988). Gramsci, writing 
in the early 20th century, reinvented the term by modifying Marxist 
reductionism (Howell & Pearce, 2002). For Gramsci, civil society is the 
ideological and cultural realm in which hegemonies are constructed and 
deconstructed through power struggle. For him, power, which permeates within 
civil society in subtle ways, ‘resides in the production of ideas, not so much in 
the production of things’ (Chambers, 2002: 90). The survival of capitalism, for 
him, was due to the construction of capitalist hegemony through civil society 
(Alagappa, 2004). Civil society, for Gramsci, is not a passive realm, but an agency 
that can generate and maintain a particular ideology and check the state’s 
hegemony. However, the state can also build its own hegemony through civil 
society and create consent. Differing with Marx’ limited critique of civil society, 
Gramsci did not consider it a passive structure to be determined by the forces of 
production. For him, civil society is a sphere in which the struggle to maintain or 
challenge a particular status quo occurs (Baker, 2002: 6). Contrary to other 
liberal thinkers of civil society of the 18th century Europe, Gramsci’s concept of 
civil society had a cultural and sociological content, which some experts 
perceive as the nemesis of an alternative approach to civil society (Howell & 
Pearce, 2002). Rather than seeing civil society and human agency, in particular, 
as merely an outcome of market forces or reducing it to liberal individualism, 
Gramsci perceived it as an arena of power struggle between different groups 
who contend to establish their respective hegemonies. In other words, civil 
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society is the battleground of contested ideas. It was this specific Gramscian 
conception of civil society that was not only used by thinkers and activists in the 
Eastern Europe in 1980s to theorize their moment of struggle but is also 
reflected in our case study. Gramsci’s links of the discourse of civil society with 
power, has implications for this thesis also as in our context power seems to 
operates in invisible forms and, which seems to have marginalised certain 
groups.  
Power is used both as an individual and collective phenomenon in this thesis. At 
an individual level, it may be exercised in subtle ways by the powerful to set the 
agenda or norms for the powerless. Limiting the alternative views or the ‘scope 
of decision-making’ of others (Bacharch and Baratz cited by Haugaard, 2012: p: 
30), the powerless, the marginalized or the poor have to take positions within 
such an agenda. However, this thesis does not restrict the concept of power to 
individual decision making, as it may be exercised by groups and institutions at 
the collective level. In such cases power is institutionalised and structured 
within the social relations and, thus, ‘inherited from the past’ (Lukes 1984: 38). 
It is in this sense, i.e. power as invisible and deeply embedded in social 
structures and relations that the concept of power is deployed in this thesis, 
which enlightens the struggle of cultural change as explored in chapter 5 and 
chapter 6.  
Under Gramsci’s influence, the concept of civil society found a new ideological 
and cultural perspective, and thus, the debate about civil society shifted, at the 
conceptual level, from the narrow Marxist perspective. So, as a result, civil 
society was also seen as a ‘sphere of identity formation, social integration, and 
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cultural reproduction’ (Chambers, 2002: 91). It was this perspective of civil 
society, inspired by Gramscian insights, which some writers, predisposed 
towards the Critical School of thinking, embraced and extended, which 
ultimately deviated from the mainstream liberal perspective as shown in the 
following section.  
An important voice in this lineage is Habermas, who combined both the 
elements of the Frankfurt School of thinkers and that of Kantian liberalism as he 
conceived civil society as an important realm ‘to mitigate the worst effects of 
liberalism’ (Chambers, 2002: 92). Unlike the early critical thinkers such as 
Horkheimer and Adorno, who presented a more radical form of criticality by 
dismissing liberal institutions, with Habermas, we find an inside-out approach 
in which liberal institutions can be remedied and can still be used for human 
emancipation. While overall critical theory presents an immanent critique of the 
liberal ideals and institutions, it is a Habermasian theory of communication that 
helps us understand civil society better in a critical way (Baynes, 2002) in which 
people establish their validity claims in non-coercive ways using 
communication interactions. Habermas locates his argument in Western history 
and shows how the publics emerged in which issues related to public were 
discussed by the public in places such coffee shops, newspaper stalls and other 
associational connections and such debates were conducted in a non-coercive 
order. However, such a public sphere was soon consumed by the hegemonic 
influence of capitalism (Habermas, 1989).  
Civil society, for Habermas, ‘comprises those nongovernmental and 
noneconomic connections and voluntary associations that anchor the 
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communication structure of the public sphere...civil society is composed of those 
more or less spontaneously emergent associations, organisations, and 
movements that, attuned to how societal problems resonate in the private life 
spheres, distil and transmit such reactions in amplified form to the public 
sphere’ (Habermas, 1996: 367).  
Applying Habermasian perspective of communication theory on civil society as 
an arena of dialogics, an important diversion of alternative conception of civil 
society occurs, from that of the liberal conception, as the former emphasise 
‘communicative autonomy’ rather than ‘voluntarism’. ‘Individuals do not 
develop life plans in isolation. They develop them in interaction with others in 
society. The freer that interaction is from the distorting effects of power and 
domination, the more opportunity actors have to explore and exercise 
individual autonomy’ (Chambers, 2002: 93).  
According to critical perspectives of civil society, civil society will guard its right 
of communicative autonomy and the right to construct shared cultural 
meanings about the common good, unlike the liberal view of civil society 
according to which it is the individual choice that needs to be guarded alone 
against any potential encroachment of the state or any other powerful group 
(Baynes, 2002; Chambers, 2002). However, Habermasian perspective of civil 
society is rooted in his liberal approach to ‘reason’, which has been criticised for 
being instrumental and less capable to evaluate ends (Nicholas, 2012). Reason, 
for some such as Alasdair MacIntyre (2012) is situated in the overall social 
argument of tradition and linked to the moral question of what is a good society. 
It is this specific Habermasian focus on dialogics and criticality that the 
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‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar reflects, underpinned by an approach to 
reason that is constituted within the local traditional and religious perspectives, 
as explored in 6.  
The idea of civil society as a public sphere of communicative interaction, as 
presented by Habermas, has been criticized by feminists, which is relevant to 
this thesis also as it does not seem to focus on power, which may operate in 
subtle ways. Nancy Fraser (1997) argues that Habermas’s notion of discursive 
public sphere is not a bounded sphere and ‘societal inequality’ may inhabit such 
a sphere. Sub-public alternative discourses, as a result, may not find a space and 
voice in the mainstream public sphere. ‘In that case members of subordinated 
groups would have no arenas for deliberations amongst themselves about their 
needs, objectives, and strategies. They would have no venues in which to 
undertake communicative processes that were not, as it were, under the 
supervision of dominant groups’ (81). Besides feminists’ take on the boundary 
debate, their identification of unequal power relations in civil society is of key 
relevance to this thesis as explored in chapters 5 and 6.  
Such a non-liberal alternative perspective of civil society presents a contrast to 
the one articulated by Ernest Gellner (1925-1995) when he posited his 
conception of modularity25 as the necessary pre-condition of civil society. The 
pre-Marx liberal strands of civil society were embraced and expanded by 
Gellner. Voluntarism, individual autonomy and a secular vision are some of the 
themes that Gellner weaves around his conception of civil society. Gellner, 
specifically, emphasises marketisation and individual liberalism as important 
                                                        
25 See chapter 3 for further detail.  
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pre-conditions and pre-requisites of civil society, whereas kinship relations and 
pre-defined value system, whether religious (Islam) or secular (socialism), are 
perceived as antithetical to the very notion of civil society. Gellner’s specific 
liberal notion of civil society is explored and analysed in chapter 3 as Gellner’s 
liberal approach is relevant to this thesis.  
Thus, this section discussed how different ideas of civil society, conceptualised 
as ‘liberal’ and ‘alternative’ exist in the intellectual discourse of civil society. 
Zeitgeist led to the construction of civil society in different epochs. However, the 
application of civil society in the non-Western context may not only experience 
tension with the liberal perspective of civil society, but a mild tension with the 
non-liberal alternative perspective also as both discourses are intellectually 
located within the secular tradition of the West whereas this thesis focuses on a 
context, which is imbued with a religious worldview and kinship models of 
interactions. The following section will explain how some experts have revisited 
the term in non-Western context, which is Islam.  
1.4. The contested character of civil society: expanding the alternative 
approach  
Some experts have attempted to clarify the ambiguities that surround the very 
notion by dividing the discourse of civil soicety, at the theoretical level, into 
‘liberal’ and ‘alternative’ approaches (Roche, 1995; Howell & Pearce 2002; 
Alagappa, 2004). The ‘liberal’ conception of civil society informed by liberal 
individualism is perceived to be the ‘support structure’ (Baker, 2002: 1) and 
moderator of liberal democracy and liberal economy and thus perceived to be 
the natural ally of both (Howell & Pearce, 2002). Many voices in the ‘alternative’ 
54 
 
camp draw on different theoretical traditions, for instance Gramsci or critical 
theory, and stand in opposition to both the authoritarian state and capitalism 
(Chambers, 2002). If individual liberalism and a triangular relationship between 
civil society, the market and the state are the key features in the ‘liberal’ model, 
criticality and civil society as an arena of clashes between contested ideas, 
identity formation and cultural reproduction emerge important theoretical 
threads in the ‘alternative’ approach to civil society.  
‘Alternative’ approach is focused more on ‘other set of values and priorities’ 
rather than liberal (Howell & Pearce, 2002: 17) and offers the possibility of 
exploring the phenomenon in the non-Western contexts. Despite relying on 
different theoretical traditions and historical experiences, the two paradigms 
have similar and dissimilar points also (Hann, 1996).  
While both ‘alternative’ and ‘liberal’ approaches remain, conceptually, 
incoherent, the ‘alternative’ approach, unlike the ‘liberal’ approach, does not 
provide a complete structured framework of an alternative vision (Hann, 1996). 
Despite the ascendance of the liberal conception of civil society, at present 
(Edwards, 2013), ‘alternative’ approach has offered some resistance to the 
mainstream ‘liberal’ conception of civil society (Howell & Pearce, 2002).  
Two reasons stand prominent, which led to the prevalence and dominance of 
the liberal conception of civil society. Firstly, despite the fact that the slogan of 
civil society was born in the non-liberal context of Eastern Europe in the 1990s, 
the discourse of civil society was soon overtaken by the so-called triumph of 
liberal economy and democracy as Fukuyama (1992) declared the end of 
history. Secondly, alternative non-Western traditions are not thoroughly 
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investigated to explore whether or not ideas of civil society exist. ‘As a historical 
phenomenon as well as a theoretical concept, civil society is tied to the tide of 
liberalism, and... entails liberal presuppositions’, such as ‘societies can and 
should be differentiated into distinct spheres, each of which operates according 
to its own logic’. A ‘liberal’ perspective of civil society is implicitly recognised as 
the only dominant perspective of civil society, which ‘creates an imbalance 
between traditions’ (Chambers & Kymlicka, 2002: 5). 
Some, such as Chambers & Kymlicka (2002), Banner (2002), Stone (2002), 
Kelsay (2002), Kazemi (2002) and Hanafi (2002) argue that other traditions 
such as Islam, Christianity, Judaism and Confucianism may also have the 
discourse of civility and civil society, albeit using different idioms and 
expressions. In other words, the alternative discourse, which refers to the 
Gramscian and post Gramscian intellectual thought on civil society, which is not 
anchored on liberal individualism, may take a further alternative turn if civil 
society is explored in a given context, imbued with religious and local cultural 
perspective rather than individual liberalism. As our context is predominantly 
imbued with a religious perspective and worldview whereas the contemporary 
debate surrounding civil society is almost entirely dominated by secular views 
(Chambers & Kymlicka, 2002), it may be pertinent to explore to what extent the 
‘alternative’ term resonates in an Islamic tradition.  
Hasan Hanafi (2002: 172) argues that despite being a Western term, ‘most of its 
[civil society] key features may be found in Islamic ethical theory, and these 
features are slowly being realised in cultural contexts as different as the 
Moroccan and the Malaysian’. The concept of civil society has gained currency in 
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the modern Islamic world, mainly due to ‘increases in literacy, especially among 
females; regular and major movement population within the region and abroad; 
increased use of different forms of electronic communication; and other similar 
factors’ (Kazemi, 2002: 317). While both scholars argue that the concept of civil 
society is relevant to the Islamic world, despite its Western origin and identify 
the need to locate it within the Islamic sources to enhance its legitimacy, Hanafi 
argues that the discourse of civil society perceived as secular and Western in 
spirit, has extracted strong reactions from certain conservative sections within 
the Islamic community. 
Hanafi (2002: 173-74), then, draws out a number of terms from Islamic history 
and theory such as ‘nas (italics in original), which could mean either a group of 
people or the whole human race’, ‘ahl al-kitab, (italics in original) or “people of 
the Book,” namely Jews and Christians who share with Muslims the revelation of 
Abraham’, which shows that ‘Islamic theory and practice sustains a number of 
legitimate human groupings existing between the state and the individual’. 
While Hanafi counts a number of normative principles and Islamic human rights 
to bridge the gap between the East and West, John Kelsay (2002) argues that 
Islamic societies, mainly due to the role of ulama, are oriented more towards 
retaining their Islamic identity and Islamic values rather than the liberal values 
as understood in the Western context. Unlike Gellner, none of these authors 
reject the possibility of the emergence of civil society in an Islamic context. 
However, they do point out that any such potential emergence would be 
predisposed towards immanent values. Thus, the debate of civil society, which 
once was ‘Americanised’ (Howell & Pearce, 2002: 39), is now Islamised.  
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It is this attempt to extend the alternative model, which comes into direct 
tension with the liberal model as propagated by Gellner, who identified Islam, in 
particular, as an important pre-defined value-system, which repulses any 
attempt to create a civil society as critically examined in chapter 3. Chapter 3 
also presents a detailed theoretical debate of how the alternative version of civil 
society can be investigated in alternative traditions.  
However, exploring the discourse of civil society in the Islamic world and in 
Pakistan, in particular, seems limited. Not much attention has been paid to 
which particular discourse of civil society is applicable in the context of Pakistan 
and what ideas of civil society already exist at the cultural level, which is the 
focus of this thesis also.  
While different usages of the term and different theoretical approaches render 
the debate about civil society, enriching, it is extremely important to understand 
how this thesis will deploy the term. It was already pointed out in the 
Introduction that the impoverished usage of the term within the scarce 
literature on civil society in Pakistan has led to further ambiguity and the need 
to understand civil society was emphasised. However, this thesis does not, 
entirely, rely on the theoretical debate on civil society rather it takes into 
account ideas of civil society as expressed by participants of this research.  
Before this thesis presents how the conception of civil society is deployed in this 
thesis, civil society’s relation and distance from the state, market and family is of 
immense relevance to this thesis and needs to be discussed as the following 
section shows. 
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1.5. The state, family, market and civil society: the arrival of the troika  
Civil society, in liberal debate, is conceived as a space situated between three 
important spheres that include the state, family and the market. It is these three 
spheres that help us define what civil society is and what is it not. The classic 
liberal debate mentioned above seems to suggest that civil society was 
conceived by thinkers such as Adam John Locke and Ferguson, in opposition to 
the state of nature but not in opposition to the state (Fukui, 2005). The question 
of civil society’s boundaries from other spheres, however, became much clearer 
with Hegel, who perceived civil society as a differentiated intermediate realm 
between the ‘state’ and ‘family’. This differentiation is still owned by liberal 
thinkers today who not only made this differentiation more pronounced, but 
also added ‘market’ as another point of differentiation, thus, slowly emerged the 
troika. 
However, the debate of boundaries does not mean that different spheres are 
neatly segregated and are guarded by non-permeable boundaries. Instead, at an 
empirical level, a dialectical relationship between them may exist and different 
spheres may influence one another in more than one way yet the ‘functional 
differentiation’ between them remains a helpful point of defining civil society ‘as 
the intermediate sphere different from all three institutional cornerstones of 
modern society’ (Baubock, 2000: 92). The debate of boundaries, nonetheless, 
takes a few diversions within the alternative approach to civil society, which is 
relevant to our case study, as Rosenblum (2002) has also suggested that the 
question of boundaries, in particular, has immense importance for feminist 
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thinkers. In the following section, civil society’s relation to the state, family and 
market is explored.  
1.5.1. The state and civil society 
Functionally, civil society is not part of the state because civil society does not 
aim to attain political power and instead is potentially regulated by the 
principles of self-organization and self-help (Baubock, 2000). Both ‘liberal’ and 
‘alternative’ paradigms emphasize different dynamics of civil society-state 
relationship. Within the ‘liberal’ perspective, civil society is conceived as the 
moderator of the state powers and a sphere where the individual rights are 
protected against any potential encroachment from the state (Howell & Pearce, 
2002). The alternative camp seems to adopt a more critical accent towards the 
state (Post & Rosenblum, 2002), which also emerges as an important feature of 
the ‘emergent civil society’ as explored in chapter 6. Rosenblum and Post (2002) 
argue that the relation of civil society and its boundaries and relation with the 
state are highly contested and vary from one theoretical and cultural tradition 
to another. 
If civil society is functionally different from the state (Howell & Pearce 2002; 
Post & Rosenblum 2002), then the debate of boundaries between civil society 
and the state is problematic in our context. Participants of this research contend 
whether political parties be placed within civil society or outside. While some 
participants from Peshawar strongly suggested that political parties, being 
partisan, patrimonial and seeking state power, cannot be part of civil society 
which advocates the interests of the entire community irrespective of their 
political affiliations, others argued that the entire struggle of civic rights is 
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political in character and political parties are, thus, the mainstream civil society 
associations.  
However, the contested debate of boundaries does not stop here. Does civil 
society need a legal, democratic state for its emergence and survival and, 
therefore, depends on it or civil society has the potential to self-create itself 
without any apparent assistance from the state and is, therefore, independent in 
nature (Post & Rosenblum 2002)? Liberals may quote the Western European 
experience, whereas the example of the Eastern Europe is quoted to support the 
latter. However, Post and Rosenblum (2002) argue that, both within liberal and 
alternative discourses of civil society, the state is expected to provide a legal 
framework and conditions of peace. State’s responsibility to provide a legal and 
safe environment for civil society emerges as an important theme of this thesis 
as chapter 5 and 6 show in detail as participants pressurise the state to ensure 
the safety of its citizens and their respective rights. However, this has a specific 
political context, which we explore in chapter 4, wherein we explore how the 
Pakistani state intervenes and manipulates the Pakistani civil society.  
1.5.2. The family and civil society 
The same contention exists over the boundaries between family and civil 
society in the literature. According to the liberal argument ‘family’ is unable to 
accommodate the complexities of modern life. For liberals, family, being the 
basic unit of socialization, is the private realm (Fukui, 2005) where members 
are ‘related by descent, marriage or adoption’ (Haralambos & Holborn, 2000: 
504). For them, family is the private arena of intimate relations ‘from which 
others may be shut out and it carries expectations of solidarity and generalized 
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reciprocity among members’ and where kinship may be more pronounced than 
other institutions and thus could be as coercive as the state (Baubock 2000: 93).  
Others, who do not necessarily subscribe to the liberal perspective, include 
family within civil society. Both Critical theory tradition and Gramsci, for 
instance, included family in civil society ‘because it is an institution that can be 
and usually is central in shaping the general political dispositions of citizens’ 
and ‘is a vehicle of culture and therefore of hegemony’ (Chambers, 2002: 90-91). 
Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato (1992) also included family within civil society 
unlike the liberal perspective.  
Within the alternative perspective of civil society, family is perceived as ‘the 
premier mediating, moralizing institution (Post & Rosenblum, 2002: 3), which 
has the potential to shape the moral being of social individuals who later may 
find opportunities in the social realm to develop it and contribute to the overall 
solidarity of a given society. Thus, civil society originates in the private realm of 
household (Miller, 2002).  
The debate, however, becomes extremely contentious if seen from a feminist 
perspective. For feminists, if family, as a sphere, is excluded from civil society, 
then it means that the entire idea of civil society may become a masculine affair. 
Irrespective of their different theoretical positioning, feminists emphasize the 
inclusion of family in civil society as an import site of women's struggles and 
assign family a ‘central place’ (Philips, 2002; Rosenblum, 2002: 153; Fukui 
2005).  
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The feminist perspective on family-civil society's boundary is of extreme 
importance to this thesis as feminist voices emerge very clearly from our data as 
explored in chapter 5. These voices show a serious concern that family needs to 
be included within civil society because family is the prime site of women’s 
repressions.  
1.5.3. The market and civil society 
Another important contention arises when one equates civil society with 
economic capitalism, which ignores the complex and problematic relation 
between them. As the above discussion shows that in the European history as 
the rise of commerce and new forms of economy emerged, new modes of social 
interactions surfaced, which replaced older forms of association and solidarity 
based on kinship, civil society was considered as the natural product and an 
integral component of a capitalist economy (Howell & Pearce, 2002: 72).   
One of the reasons for this assumed co-relation was that the 18th century 
thinkers saw civil society, as no different from the market and glorified the so-
called  benevolent effects of economy on the civil society, which fed liberal 
thinking, later, with some placing ‘productive and commercial organizations and 
networks, at the top’ of the civil society list (Fukui, 2005: 18). However, ‘civil 
society as a natural ally of capitalism’ is challenged. The repressive regimes of 
Eastern Europe did not allow civil society to exist, but despite such repressions 
and even in the absence of a middle class or bourgeoisie, civil society emerged 
that offered resistance to the authoritarian regimes (Keane, 1998).  
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The rise of capitalism in some ‘contemporary market regimes’, such as East 
Asian countries in 1990s, demonstrates a different scenario where a tacit 
understanding between the state and the rising bourgeoisie prohibited the 
potential emergence of civil society (Howell & Pearce 2002: 74-75). The 
bourgeoisie and the state’s convergence of vested interests can also be 
witnessed in the case of Pakistan as explored in chapter 4. Thus, to present the 
rise of commercial activities or bourgeoisie and civil society as co-related and to 
present market economy as the necessary condition of civil society is perceived 
as a simplistic approach (Keane, 1988).  
While some liberals, such as Ernest Gellner, give enormous importance to 
marketization as the essential pre-condition for civil society, this thesis deviates 
from such liberal understanding of civil society-market relations. Chapter 3 
shows in detail how a civic non-violent movement emerged amongst the 
Pakhtun in the early 20th century in the absence of marketization, which is 
frequently quoted by participants of this research as an example of civil society.  
While this thesis recognizes the contested character of the term and its different 
usages in different contexts as the above sections show in detail, the following 
section outlines two different but overlapping deployments of the term in this 
thesis. However, it may be pertinent to start the following section with a 
definition of civil society as employed in this thesis. Again, the definition of civil 
society and its deployment in this thesis were not only informed by the 
literature review, as explored in this chapter, but also by our primary data, as 
presented in chapter 5 and 6.  
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1.6. How does this thesis deploy civil society in Peshawar? 
Relying on Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato’s (1992: 429) definition of civil 
society, who also embrace alternative critical discourse of civil society, civil 
society may be defined as a non-state social space, which includes all formal and 
informal networks and associations, including family and social movements, which 
give impetus to communicative interaction, inspired by local traditional and 
religious perspectives (Researcher’s italics). According to this definition, civil 
society in Peshawar is composed of groups, such as family and kinship, which 
the liberal perspective dismisses as antithetical to the very conception of civil 
society. The communicative interaction is, however, imbued with unequal 
power relations.   
It is argued here that it is important to draw out a comprehensive sketch of how 
this thesis is going to deploy the term, which may capture not only the 
normative, but also the empirical forms of the ‘emergent civil society’ in 
Peshawar.  
It was mentioned that the confusion stems from the wide but very uncritical and 
unreflective invocation of the term when some authors, such as Ernest Gellner, 
chose a specific theoretical construction of the term and project it as the only 
universal route to construct a civil society. Therefore, the above discussion is an 
attempt to recognize that the notion, ‘civil society’, has a contested intellectual 
history and an in-depth awareness of its origin is important if the term is to be 
applied in a non-Western context. To create an explicit or an implicit impression 
that the term has a singular theoretical positionality may generate further 
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confusion not only about the term, but also when it is applied in the non-
Western context.   
However, the ambiguity around the term may also be because of different 
overlapping usages of the term by various academics, researchers, and 
practitioners in different but overlapping ways that has led to enormous 
ambiguity.  
Alison Rooy (1998), for instance, counts six different but overlapping usages of 
the term amongst practitioners, academics and researchers that includes civil 
society as a norm of civility, as an associational life, as a public sphere 
differentiated from the state, market and family sphere, civil society as the 
product of specific historical moments in the West, civil society as an arena of 
contestations and conflicts, and lastly civil society as social or public space. Each 
usage invokes a particular theoretical strand and each usage has its own 
downsize. For instance, when civil society is used as a norm of civility then the 
very adjective ‘civil’ may become contested as competing notions of civility exist 
in different parts of the world. Civility may be oriented more towards 
individuation in the West but such an understanding may be contested in the 
South (Fowler, 2001). Feminists also criticize the notion of civil society as a 
public sphere as it may overlook the private sphere in which women may be 
subjugated (Rosenblum, 2002).  
Besides these six usages, perhaps, some academics have employed the term as 
an analytical tool to measure the changing patterns of human relations or to 
inform us of the pathologies and transition of various civil societies (Kaviraj, 
2001; Pasha, 2005; Edwards, 2013). Such a usage seems to be more inclusive to 
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the private sphere or family and may inform us how the social patterns make 
and break outside the state and beyond the individual. Thus, besides contested 
theoretical strands, civil society as a term has been used differently in different 
contexts. This thesis argues that choosing a specific theoretical strand and a 
specific usage of the term and applying it to a given non-Western context may 
create methodological problems. The following section will show how this 
thesis is going to deploy civil society as informed, both by participants’ voices 
and literature review.  
1.6.1. Civil society as a heterogeneous non-state social space 
It is argued, in this thesis, that the peace-oriented struggle is taking place in the 
non-state space in Peshawar. To explore, examine and analyse, at an empirical 
level, the peace-oriented struggle amongst the Pakhtun, civil society is used as a 
non-state social space rather than voluntary groups alone. Space means 
distance, movement, place or locality and the various symbols that represent 
them (Massey, 1994). But such space is also inhabited by people who yield it a 
specific social character, rendering space and social relations inseparable 
(McDowell & Massey, 1994). Conjoining ‘space’ and ‘non-state’ perhaps still may 
be too vague to explain our conception of civil society.  
This usage blends both ‘liberal’ and ‘alternative’ approaches in which civil 
society as a non-state social space may generate public action or social 
movements (Bryant, 1993; UNDP, 1993), may assist the state by offering 
various services to people (Uphoff, 1993), may act as a check on the state 
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(Diamond, 1994) or may advocate social change (Sethi, 1993)26. Besides 
embracing broader features of both approaches, our deployment of the concept 
is still oriented more towards alternative perspective of civil society as 
informed by the respondents’ voices in Peshawar and as explained in the 
following section.  
Unlike liberal perspective of civil society, using civil society as a non-state social 
space, does not assign immense importance to the question of its boundaries 
from the state, market and family. In Peshawar, the market, to a certain extent, 
still exists as an informal arena and the presence of extended families, including 
kinship networks blurs the entire notion of boundaries. Deploying civil society 
as a non-state social space, then does not include voluntary groups alone, but 
demonstrates sensitivity to the feminine voices that emerge from within the 
family. Such a deployment will also permit groups, informed by religion and 
ethnicity and engaged in local cultural agendas, to be included. Doreen Massey 
(1995) also argues that social spaces do not have bounded boundaries and 
remain porous to other spaces, adjacent in particular.  
The usage of civil society as a non-state social space, however, does not 
necessarily inform us about the possible heterogeneity of the non-state social 
space in our context. At the empirical level, such a space may be imbued with 
unequal power relations and competing versions of peace and rights. People 
with different or perhaps opposing ontological positionality may compete for 
hegemony within such space. This aspect of heterogeneity seems to be an 
important trait of the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar as our data 
                                                        
26
 Uphoff, (1993), Diamond, (1994) and Sethi, (1993) have been cited by Alison Rooy (1998: 19-
22). 
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demonstrate. Thus, we employ the term as a non-state social space that is 
porous and extremely heterogeneous in character, filled by competing voices 
and world views.  
This approach comes into contradiction with most of the donors’ desire to 
create a rich associational life in the developing world whereby civil society is 
perceived in the post-Tocquevillian liberal sense by the Western donors. 
Associational life may be imbued with unevenness in terms of power. De 
Tocqueville himself failed to see the underlying power inequalities within 
American civil society (Alagappa, 2004). Focus on creating a rich associational 
life, then, shifts the power towards the registered associations with voluntary 
features at the cost of other associations which are informed by ethnic or 
religious perspectives and which remain informal in structure or do not speak 
the language of the donor community.  
Our usage of the term, ‘heterogeneity’ also comes into sharp contrast with the 
so-called depiction of Pakistani civil society as a homogeneous realm, with a 
singular identity as discussed in popular media in Pakistan. Using ‘liberal’ for 
the entire Pakistani civil society does not take into account the heterogeneity, 
which this thesis has explored in the case in Peshawar. It also does not tell us 
what the philosophical foundation of such associational life is, which is an 
important part of our argument.  
However, non-state does not imply that the social space in Peshawar is non-
political as well. Conversely, and as argued by a large number of participants of 
this research, the entire struggle for peace is political in character. Nonetheless, 
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the term ‘non-state’ is used as participants did not seem inclined to include 
political parties in civil society.  
1.6.2. Civil society as a norm of civility    
The above usage of civil society as a non-state social space observable through 
an associational life, still, does not inform us on what basis we can call the non-
state social space in Peshawar a ‘civil society’. ‘Does it mean that the entire non-
state social space is “civil”? This is an important question that ought to be 
clarified. In order to address this problem, this thesis also employs civil society 
perceived as a norm of civility. It is precisely this normative use of ‘civil’ that 
addresses some of the problems that emanate from our earlier usage of the 
term, i.e. civil society as a non-state social space as the latter does not inform us 
what to count as ‘civil’.  
The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘civil’ as polite and courteous, pertaining 
to the citizens, while ‘civility’ as courteous, decent, polite, and respect for social 
order as opposed to rudeness, anarchy, and violence (p: 255-57). Experts of civil 
society also interpret ‘civil’ as ‘polite’, ‘tolerance’, ‘non-violent’, and ‘non-
military’ (Keane, 1996b: 10; Elias, 2013; Pearce, 2013: 405). When ‘civil’ and 
‘society’ are juxtaposed into the singular phrase of ‘civil society’, the concept of 
‘civil society’ attains a normative value and is perceived by experts as the ideal 
of tolerance, civility and progress as Edward Shils (1991) has suggested. As a 
norm of civility, civil society, then offers immense potentiality of constructing a 
new social order whereby individuals willingly come together on human 
grounds that could possibly moderate their sectional and particularistic 
tendencies (Shills, 1991 cited by Alison V Rooy, 1998: 11). The adjective ‘civil’ 
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renders the entire concept of civil society as an arena of non-violence, where not 
only the absence of violence, but the absence of the will to dominate is 
perceived as an important normative feature of civil society (Alagappa, 2004). 
While our normative use of the term subscribes to the rejection of violence and 
shows commitment to non-violence, it also demonstrates its alternative 
character according to which the sources of civility are searched immanently 
rather than in the Western secular, liberal milieu.  
It is not only writers of the 20th century, but classical thinkers were equally 
conscious of the adjective ‘civil’, to a certain extent. Civil society, to the thinkers 
of the post - enlightenment period in Europe was a ‘civilized political 
community’ (Femia, 2001:131). The 18th century Scottish enlightenment 
thinkers perceived civil society in direct opposition to violence (Keane, 1996). 
To assign civil society the normative value of civility, the historical context of 
the wars in the middle ages inspired by religion and the earlier history of the 
crusades and Inquisition also played an important role in Europe. The 
enlightenment thinkers believed that human reason alone can end violence and 
bring some stability and order within societies (Swindler, 2004).  
‘Civil’ perceived in opposition to violence, then, enables us to understand civil 
society as a norm of ‘peace’. Both ‘peace’ and ‘civil’ being the opposite of 
violence has led some experts of civil society to explore the ‘deep affinity’ 
between these normative terms, because as a ‘normative concept, civil society 
focuses attention on all the violence-reducing, civil and civilizing components of 
human interaction’ (Pearce, 2013: 404-07).  
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More recently the debate about civil society’s potentials to build peace has also 
surfaced as some argue that ‘… the involvement of civil society seems to be 
undisputed’ (Paffenholz, 2010: 43) in peacebuilding. If peace is all about the 
potentials to exist without violence, then civil society emerges as an important 
sphere where the possibility of non-violent interactions can be exercised 
(Lederach, 2007: 48). Besides these normative constructions between peace 
and civil society, the history of peace organizations presents empirical evidence 
of civil society’s potentials to build peace. At the close of the 19th century, there 
were about 190 peace societies all across Europe and USA with thousands of 
members (Cortright, 2009: 25-43). The contribution of those peace 
organizations towards the League of Nations and UNO cannot be ignored 
(Cortright 2009; Paffenholz, 2010). ‘Peace’, ‘civil’, ‘non-violence’ and ‘civil 
society’,  are, then, seen as converging at the normative level, in which civil 
society, normatively, is perceived as a ‘milieu of positive sociability that is 
independent of the forces of coercion and, which is committed to ‘nonviolent 
forms of human interactions’ (Pearce, 2013: 405).  
If civil society is seen as a norm of civility then such an ideal aiming at civility, 
non-violence and mutual coexistence was not specific to the European 
experience and other societies around the globe might have observed and 
experienced it too. Norbert Elias (2013) argues that civility in Europe was 
neither even nor linear and thus must not be seen as the triumph of the Western 
liberalism. Other societies might have it before Europe (Hann, 1996). Civility, 
perceived as liberal individualism in the West or as informed by Gellner’s 
conception of modularity, as discussed in chapter 3,  then comes into tension 
with the specific notion of civility as posited by our respondents in Peshawar. 
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Respondents tried to locate civility within the local cultural and religious 
perspectives as explore in chapter 6.  
The normative use of civil society, however, helps us to identify and analyse 
peace-oriented struggle that is taking place in the non-state social space in 
Peshawar. Feminine voices, in Peshawar, form an important part of this peace-
oriented struggle in which women reject both explicit and implicit forms of 
violence and domination as chapter 5 and 6 show in detail.  
1.7. Operationalizing the concept of civil society in Peshawar: formal and 
informal civil society 
This thesis has deployed three different but overlapping usages of civil society, 
which subscribe to the conceptual framework, developed in this chapter and to 
the voices of our respondents, shown in chapter 5 and 6: spatial, which blurs the 
boundaries of civil society from family and the market; normative, in which the 
sources of civility are found in local cultural and religious perspectives; and 
reflexive, which shows the agency of non-state civic actors for social and 
cultural change.  
However, such a complex deployment may sound abstract. Therefore, it is 
important to operationalize these usages in order to demonstrate what is 
argued in this thesis has an empirical basis in Peshawar. To address this 
objective, the idioms of ‘formal’ and informal’ are used in this thesis. It may be 
reiterated, here, that the usage of these two terms is based on the arguments of 
the respondents, as they attempt to indigenize the concept of civil society within 
immanent sources. The objective of this section is to show, at an empirical level, 
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how and where respondents are trying to locate and embed civil society in 
Peshawar. 
1.7.1. Informal civil society 
As our respondents argued that civil society needs to be embedded within the 
local cultural and religious resources, therefore, we use the term ‘informal’ civil 
society to capture their understanding of civil society. Using ‘informal’ as an 
analytical tool is an attempt to extend their notion of civil society to the daily life 
where informal association lies in abundance and which may be counted as part 
of civil society. Although the commonsensical approach to everyday life may 
invoke the routinized lives of the ordinary, anonymous, nameless and less 
powerful people, yet the new approaches within sociology and feminist studies 
have focused on it as an important site of interactions and associations (Bennett 
& Diane, 2002). Informal civil society scattered within everyday life may 
provide instances of people’s tendencies to organize in unconventional ways, 
even though such arrangements may remain latent in everyday life as argued by 
Alberto Melucci (1988). Wachira Maina (1996) also mentions the activity sites 
lying outside the realm of registered associations in the context of Kenya. 
Nevertheless respondents of this research showed enormous sensitivity to the 
ideal of civility and thus remain quite cautious about including the entire 
informal society within the gambit of civil society. Civil society as a norm of 
civility seems to help them draw a clear line at the empirical level between what 
may be counted as civil and what not.   
The informal civil society includes unregistered associations and networks that 
have grown indigenously and perform multiple community tasks on a self-help 
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basis. Informal civil society may take different organizational forms, such as the 
mosque and shrines committees, neighborhood associations, sports associations 
(mainly run by male youth), saving schemes (mainly run by women) and more 
importantly Jirga that is used to resolve various disputes. It may also include 
transitory meetings and get-togethers around street corners, grocery shops, 
transport-stations and restaurants.  
Dispersed along various localities, informal civil society does not feel the need 
to connect on a broader level and thus has limited activity spaces in Peshawar. 
Informal civil society has enormous social depth and is mobilized during 
election campaigns as argued by Mohammad Qadeer (1997). Being the seat of 
Community Based Organizations (CBOs), informal civil society is accessed by 
formal civil society organizations for various developmental projects. However, 
being submerged within daily life, the informal civil society remains hidden 
from the public and donors alike.   
1.7.2. Formal civil society 
By formal, we mean registered, non-state, non-profit organizations, with visible 
structures, which address various developmental and peace related issues. They 
include NGOs27, trade unions, teachers and lawyers’ associations, trusts, and 
welfare organizations. In most cases, they have written records and have a 
voluntary character.  
However, our usage of the two terms ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ are not entirely 
problem-free and need to be recognized and kept in mind.  
                                                        
27 To understand the social and political context of NGOs in Pakistan, see chapter 4.   
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The problem that was faced in the field was where to place those associations, 
operating both within formal and informal civil society, which attend 
community needs yet are affiliated with different political parties and religious 
groups. For instance, Al-Khidmat is affiliated with Jumath-e-Islami, a religious, 
political party, ‘Dawa’ is run by a religious group that was banned by the 
government and its leadership has been declared terrorist by the USA. Another 
example is Bacha Khan Educational Trust affiliated with the Pakhtun nationalist 
political party ANP (Awami National Party). While the politically affiliated 
associations are funded mostly by indigenous financial sources and by their 
respective political parties, to a certain extent, the religious groups are funded 
by private financial sources in the Middle East.  
While this may not amount to oust the faith-based groups altogether from the 
realm of civil society, yet some respondents in the research have been 
demonstrating their sensitivity to the inclusion of such groups which are 
perceived as the developmental wings of political parties and various religious 
groups. The former may be used for electoral presence by the political parties, 
the latter may be used for promoting a specific interpretation of Islam at the 
cost of others. While our respondents wish to stretch the concept of civil society 
to the informal civil society they also remind us of the non-partisan character of 
the notion of civil society as a norm of civility. Therefore, our main focus may 
not include such sectional groups that may endanger the entire concept of civil 
society as a norm of civility.  
The use of ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ by these writers, in the context of Pakistan 
implies a dichotomy. Perhaps one reason for not retaining terms like ‘modern’ 
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and ‘tradition’ in this thesis is their respective contesting character that does 
not capture the empirical civil society in our case. More interestingly writers 
who have been using these terms as analytical shorthand still compromise their 
stand by resorting to the usage of formal and informal as Borchgrevink and 
Harpviken (2010) do in the case of Afghanistan. They adopt the ‘traditional’ and 
‘modern’ model developed by Masoud Kamali (2001) in the context of the 
Middle East, wherein Masoud Kamali also uses ‘quasi-modern’ in order to deal 
with the emerging dichotomy that flows from the traditional and modern usage 
(as cited by Borchgrevink & Harpviken, 2010). Perhaps it may be the sector-
wise division, such as health, education and advocacy that may tempt 
researchers to use the two terms which in our case loses meaning because at the 
empirical level a modern association may reflect a traditional agenda, whereas a 
traditional association may be addressing a modern agenda. For instance, JPI 
(Just Peace Initiatives), based in Peshawar, is a registered NGO yet working on 
Jirga as a conflict resolution mechanism, whereas Peshawar Jirga is an 
unregistered association yet uses social, print and electronic media in an effort 
to hold the state accountable for poor governance in Peshawar.  
Thus, more than dichotomizing the notion, our attempt is to incorporate 
respondents’ tendency to take the notion of civil society deep into the social 
space, from where associations may emerge and where the opportunities of 
peace-oriented norms and values may be explored.  
1.8. Conclusion 
As the first building block of this thesis, this chapter explored the contested 
discourse of civil society as informed by different theoretical strands in the 
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West, in different historical milieu. The examination of the term, at a theoretical 
level, was considered important for this thesis in order to be aware that the 
concept is not a singular homogeneous term and, instead, different versions of 
civil society exist, at a theoretical level, such as ‘liberal’ and ‘alternative’. While 
competing approaches to civil society exist within the Western secular 
intellectual thought, alternative non-Western cultural discourses are not 
necessarily antithetical to the notion of civil society. It is argued in this chapter 
that the alternative version, which focuses on civil society as an arena of cultural 
dialogue and reproduction and as a battleground of contested ideas is 
conceptually relevant to our thesis. However, such an alternative conceptual 
framework also needs to take into account the non-secular context, which may 
prevail in the non-Western context.  
Based on the conceptual framework, developed in the first section of this 
chapter, and respondents’ voices as explored in chapters 5 and 6, section five 
has explored how this thesis has deployed the notion of civil society in this 
thesis: civil society has a spatial dimension with blurred boundaries from other 
spaces such as family and the market; the normativity of civil society as 
expressed in the adjective ‘civil’ is helpful in both separating civil minded 
associations from uncivil groups and helps us see how the sources of civility are 
found within immanent value systems; and lastly, civil society as an 
independent arena where cultural discourses are enacted and human agency 
works for social changes. However, to capture the ‘emergent’ civil society in 
Peshawar, at the empirical level, the concept of civil society is operationalized 
into formal and informal and a brief empirical outlook of various associations in 
Peshawar has been presented to the readers of this thesis.  
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This chapter has outlined the diverse debate of civil society. However, it is from 
within the liberal paradigm that a challenge is offered to those who wish to 
apply the term in the non-Western context. This specific challenge is dealt with 
in chapter 3, in which the ‘alternative’ approach to civil society is used as a 
critique of the ‘liberal’ model.  
As this thesis draws attention to the peace-oriented struggle in Peshawar and 
argues that this struggle is taking place within the non-state social space, which 
exhibits an immanent character, it is important to show how this thesis has 
drawn and developed this argument. The prime argument of this thesis: the 
emergent civil society in Peshawar has an alternative character, which seeks 
inspiration from immanent value systems, was based on the voices of the 
respondents of this research. It is, thus, important to present a comprehensive 
methodological framework to the readers of this thesis. The next chapter will 
present a detailed sketch of our two field visits, which were conducted in 
Peshawar.  
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CHAPTER 2 
2. A constructionist research methodology amidst security anxieties 
2.1. Introduction 
It was suggested in the Introduction that this thesis draws attention to the 
peace-oriented struggle that has emerged within the non-state social space in 
Peshawar amidst violence since 2006-07. To explore the character of this peace 
oriented struggle needed an in-depth understanding and investigation. It was 
important to explore respondents’ own interpretations of peace and violence in 
the region and the value systems, which were potentially informing their 
perspectives of peace. Moreover, the idea of applying the Western specific 
concept of civil society in a non-Western context, was making the entire 
research project, intellectually challenging as some proponents of the liberal 
conception of civil society had raised questions about such an application. 
Qualitative research design, then, suited such a complex research agenda, which 
required an in-depth understanding of respondents’ views and opinions. 
However, while qualitative research design seems to underpin this research, 
this thesis has also employed some quantitative statistics to support the 
argument. The objective of this chapter is to present a detailed account of 
different phases and various features of qualitative research design as employed 
in this thesis. This chapter will also offer a detailed account of various 
limitations, which were experienced by the researcher, and how they were 
resolved.  
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It is argued in this chapter that the choice of research methodology does not 
solely depend on the nature of research topic alone and instead is informed, to a 
certain extent, by the researcher’s ontological and epistemological positionality 
also. In other words, in social science it is not only a research topic or a set of 
questions and the selection of a specific research method as two important 
research tools, but an in-depth awareness, recognition and expression of certain 
issues that precede and follow these two tools and how they have impacted the 
entire research design is equally important. Keeping such methodological 
complexities and limitations in view, an important objective of this chapter is to 
demonstrate how various issues, ranging from insecurity in Peshawar to ethical 
concerns, were dealt with in the field.  
This chapter has been divided into nine sections. Section 1 explores certain 
demographic features of Peshawar. This section deals with the specific 
difficulties, faced by the researcher in the field, in knowing the exact number 
and activities of various associations in Peshawar. The researcher could not find 
a single source or database, which could yield important information about the 
associational life in Peshawar. As a result, non-availability of an authentic 
resource was a serious limitation to quantify the associational life, both 
registered and unregistered, in KP and Peshawar. 
Section 2 informs the readers of this thesis that not knowing the associational 
life was a challenge. However, being a Pakhtun and being from the same region, 
personal contacts of the researcher were used to kick-start the fieldwork. These 
initial contacts proved very helpful in helping me to contact other individuals 
working or affiliated with registered or unregistered associations. Snowball 
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sampling, in other words, was used as a permanent strategy throughout my 
fieldwork. Snowball sampling was, in particular, helpful in contacting female 
respondents and members of the religious minorities.  
However, this section also presents a detailed account of how carefully snowball 
technique was used in order to check certain limitations. Reliance on snowball 
sampling may distort the real picture as there is a chance that only like minded 
people may be interviewed or new respondents may be referred without their 
apparent consent. In order to address these limitations, the researcher used his 
previous knowledge of the region, enlarged the data sample, and adopted 
certain ethical measures. In other words, every effort was made to sophisticate 
this technique and be aware of potential gaps.  
Section 3 explores the security situation in Peshawar in 2011 and 2012, which 
impacted upon this research in multiple ways. To lower the risks, certain 
strategies were adopted. Firstly, the fieldwork was split into two shorter 
durations. Secondly, a low profile was kept by the researcher and community 
ceremonies and going to public places was strictly avoided. While these 
strategies were to ensure the personal safety of the researcher, other safety 
measures to ensure no harm to the respondents were also followed. Ethical 
considerations such as the provision of consent form and offering anonymity 
and confidentiality to every respondent were some of the measures to ensure 
their safety.  
Section 4 offers comprehensive reflections on the researcher’s philosophical 
positioning. It is argued in this section that social reality is constructed through 
the mutual interactions of members of a particular society. However, not all 
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members participate in the construction of such a reality because such a space 
is imbued with unequal power relations. Presenting social constructionism and 
criticality as the ontological positioning of the researcher, it is argued, in this 
section, that such a philosophical point of view is not only owned by the 
researcher but is also inspired by the empirical data.  
Section 5 offers a detailed account of the researcher’ personal biography and 
argues that this research, which has employed an interpretivistic methodology, 
does not claim objectivity rather acknowledges the presence of the researcher, 
which then raises certain methodological concerns. It is argued that embedding 
reflexivity rather than objectivity helps us address some of the methodological 
concerns. It is argued that reflexivity has two kinds, i.e. ‘epistemological’ and 
‘personal’. While section 4 dealt with the ‘epistemological’ aspects, this section 
will deal with the ‘personal’ aspects. Explaining the concept of reflexivity, this 
section offers a detailed account of the researcher’s personal background and 
how it impacted upon this research. Being a native speaker of Pakhtu language 
and being from the same region helped the researcher to ensure his safety, 
mobilise his initial personal contacts for the interviews and build rapport with 
the interviewees. It is also argued in this section that the researcher was also 
aware of his professional status as a researcher and had to abide by certain 
professional procedures to ensure ethical responsibilities. As the researcher 
come from a different academic background and has a different professional 
background, therefore, this section also explores different strategies, which 
were employed by the researcher to generate a less distorted picture of the 
social realities in Peshawar, for instance increasing the number of the sample, 
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visiting two other adjacent cities, using semi-structured interviews to elicit 
important information, and using participant observation to triangulate data.  
Section 6 presents the rationale for choosing semi-structured interviews and 
shows how this choice fits in the overall research scheme. It is argued that 
exploring respondents’ worldviews in detail, allowing new questions to emerge 
and using prompts, semi-structured interviews seemed the most suitable data 
generation tool.  
Section 7 presents the specific details of the two field visits and elaborates why 
these two visits were conducted at two separate intervals.  
Section 8 deals with data sampling and the issue of representativeness. It is 
argued in this section that this thesis does not make a claim that the data 
generated during two field visits is representative of the entire population, 
inhabiting the non-state social space, in Peshawar. Security situations as 
explained in section 3 and the unavailability of exact information about civic 
associations as explored in section 1, were some of the factors that impacted 
this research. It is argued that a prolong stay in the field may have enabled the 
researcher to reach out to a large number of people.  
However, every effort was made to ensure representativeness of the local 
population and the researcher managed, to a certain extent, to interview diverse 
set of people in short but challenging situations. This section will show, while 
reaching out to the diverse people, variations in their respective gender, 
cultural, regional, religious, and linguistic backgrounds were prioritised. Data 
collection in two adjacent cities, the inclusion of non-Pakhtun and non-Muslims 
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in the data sample and the use of participant observation were different 
measures to ensure the inclusion of a large sample and to claim 
representativeness, to a certain extent.  
Closely linked to the issue of representativeness, is the issue of building trust 
and rapport with the respondents in order to encourage them to share their 
opinions and ideas about different topics, which is discussed in the last section 9 
of this chapter.  
Before we make an attempt to lay out our philosophical viewpoint and deal with 
various ethical issues, perhaps, it may be pertinent to present to our readers 
how did the associational life in Peshawar look like during our fieldwork and 
how insecurity in the field impacted upon our research. Nonetheless, conditions 
of insecurity in Peshawar already existed before the commencement of this 
thesis, which influenced this research and also the choice of a specific research 
method.  
2.2. Peshawar and the associational life: some limitations 
The main site of my field research was Peshawar City District (see map in 
Appendix). Peshawar, the capital of KP, is a densely populated city and has a 
vibrant associational life both registered and unregistered. According to 1998 
census28 the total population of Peshawar is 2.019 million that forms about 12% 
of the total population of KP. Nearly 50% of Peshawar’s population are migrants 
from other parts of KP. However, Pakhtun are in majority in Peshawar. There 
are other religious minorities such as the Christians, Sikhs, and Hindus and 
                                                        
28 1998 census is the most recent census.   
85 
 
linguistic minorities such as the Hindko speakers. Besides Pakhtu, Hindko is the 
second largest language spoken in Peshawar (KP, 2014). 
It was initially expected by the researcher that the details of registered 
associations may be found on a single database in Peshawar. However, sketchy 
information available on certain websites did not present useful information 
about the exact number, locations and objectives of registered associations. For 
example, the total number of non-governmental associations in Peshawar 
District, according to the provincial government portal, was 355 in June 2003 
(KP, 2003). The office was personally contacted by the researcher and the 
researcher was informed by the office staff that the database is under 
development.  
Another portal mentions 26 sectors, such as health, education, addressed by the 
voluntary sector, but mentions only 10 associations without any detailed 
record. Pakistan NGOs Directory and Guide portal, mentions some detailed 
landscape of NGOs in Peshawar with their respective websites, postal addresses 
and functions but mentions only 32 associations altogether. Non-availability of 
an authentic resource was a serious limitation to quantify registered 
associations in KP and Peshawar. On the other hand literature on civil society in 
Pakistan mentions different numbers at the national level rather at the regional 
level (Qadeer, 1997; Baig, 2001). Nevertheless, after interviewing a substantial 
number of respondents on the issue of the exact number of registered 
associations, who primarily belonged to various registered associations in 
Peshawar, the number of registered associations in Peshawar may be assumed 
86 
 
to be around 80029. This figure seems, perhaps realistic as my respondents 
reminded me certain events such as the earthquake in 2005 in KP, internal 
displacement in the post 2007 period in different parts of KP due to conflict and 
floods in 2009-10 in KP, as key events that led to the emergence of a large 
number of NGOs in different parts of KP. Most of these NGOs are engaged in the 
delivery of different services, such as health, education and safe water schemes. 
However, advocacy NGOs have also recently emerged. One such example is the 
Tribal NGOs Consortium (TNC) established in 2009 to work with other local 
associations in FATA towards sustainable peace and development. Another 
important example was the establishment of Regional Instituted of Policy 
research and Training (RIPORT) in 2005 in Peshawar to address peace and 
development related issues30.  
At times, the researcher reflected whether or not searching for a single database 
or the exact number of registered associations in Peshawar will be fruitful when 
the researcher found out the way some associations were maintaining their 
respective profiles. For instance, the ‘Institute of Peace and Development 
Studies’ (IPSD) was found on a website as a registered non-profit, non-
governmental organization based in Peshawar and registered in 2010 but did 
not provide any details of projects or contact information and thus the 
researcher failed to access the Institute. Similarly, the ‘Sarhad Conservation 
Network’ (SCN), based in Peshawar, that was referred to by a close friend of the 
                                                        
29 For further details on how NGOs emerged in the specific political and social context, see 
chapter 5.  
30
 For further details on how peace oriented associations emerged in the specific political and 
social context, see chapter 1 and 5. 
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researcher was a registered association yet did not maintain any website for 
researchers to know about them and their activities.  
The problem with un-registered associations was more challenging. While a 
researcher may expect to find some information about registered associations 
either online or from a government office, such an expectation may not be 
realistic with regard to un-registered associations.  
However, this was a serious limitation, which needed to be addressed effectively 
in order to generate effective and valuable data.  
2.3. Addressing limitations: using snowball sampling as an alternative 
strategy 
In the absence of an authentic data, reliance on personal contacts seemed to be 
the only option in the start of the research. Therefore, to start off my field work 
an email was sent out in advance in December 2010 from the United Kingdom 
(UK), where the researcher was based, to my personal friends working with 
civil society organizations in Peshawar. Thus, relying on my personal contacts, I 
managed to find important respondents and associations at the start of my 
research that were extremely relevant to my research aims.  
Nonetheless, it may be pointed out here that reliance on my initial personal 
contacts was helpful as they helped me access other individuals working in 
different associations. From there onwards, snowball sampling, a useful strategy 
to access other respondents (King& Horrocks, 2010), was regularly used to 
access different people. Snowball sampling is a ‘technique for gathering 
research subjects through the identification of an initial subject who is used to 
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provide the names of other actors’ (Lewis-Beck et al 2004: 1043). It suited me in 
order to access the hard-to-find individuals in Peshawar as I would request a 
particular respondent at the end of interview to refer me to a person who either 
works in a civic association or is affiliated with peace related work or who has 
knowledge about civil society in Pakistan.  
Instead of relying on the snowball technique, every effort was made to 
sophisticate this technique and constantly look for potential gaps.  
Miller and Brewer (2003), for instance, have counted certain limitations of 
snowball technique, which also resonated in my research. Firstly, it may be 
assumed that the referrals may belong to a like-minded network and as a result 
the researcher may be moving up and down within a similar group and thus 
may ignore alternative opinions of others who were never referred. I also 
experienced this effect during my fieldwork as some respondents insisted that I 
interview particular individuals with whom they shared similar thoughts and 
backgrounds. To check this limitation, I used my previous knowledge of the 
region rather than relying on my respondent alone.  However, in such cases, I 
would also request a particular respondent at the end of an interview to refer 
me to a person who would have a different understanding of the issues. 
Secondly, the researcher will be completely dependent on the choices of his/her 
initial respondents. To address this limitation, the data sample was enlarged, as 
explained in the last section of this chapter.   
Lastly, a snowball technique may trigger an ethical concern. A referral may be 
made without the apparent consent of the new respondent. In such cases, it was 
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my responsibility, to inform the new respondent of my research topic and all 
relevant details. However, not every time snowball technique was useful as in 
some instances my request for an interview was either ignored or the 
respondent declined to be interviewed.  
Using carefully snowball sampling as an alternative strategy, a large number of 
registered associations were visited. A brief sketch of some of such associations 
based in Peshawar is given in Appendix G, which were personally visited by the 
researcher.  
To approach unregistered associations, snowball sampling was also used in 
Peshawar. However, when my field work started, it had not been planned to 
include unregistered or informal associations may become part of this research, 
therefore, no prior preparation regarding how and where to find them was 
carried out in advance. It was during the initial interviews of my field work that 
respondents kept referring to such associations as the ‘original civil society’ or 
‘organic civil society’. For instance, on the third day of my field trip on 24th 
February 2012, a male Pakhtun respondent, working at UNDP, based in 
Peshawar, remarked about civil society: 
‘You should have started your research from your own village... because there you 
see the real civil society’. 
Again, it was with the help of such respondents that I managed to access some 
unregistered, informal networks and associations. For instance, the contact 
details of ‘Sahu Leekonko maraca (Association of Great Writers, Peshawar) was 
provided by a male Pakhtun academic/poet in Peshawar. It was there that I 
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found that this literary association was formed in 1967. Amongst 500 such 
literary associations, established in different parts of KP (BBC, 2014), the 
researcher could contact only two such associations, based in Peshawar, as they 
do not publicize their meetings and activities. Similarly, only one shrine 
committee was found in the interior Peshawar, named ‘Dargah-e- Aliya 
Sathariya’, which was also formed in 1957.  
However, I also regularly asked from my respondents about their professional 
background and their specific interests. 13 out of a total of 80 respondents who 
were interviewed by the researcher in Peshawar claimed membership of 
various literary associations and shrine committees.  
Unlike these informal networks, Jirga, being an informal and unregistered 
association has different features. The researcher was aware that Jirga is formed 
on the spur of the moment as a particular conflict occurs in a specific vicinity, 
therefore, instead of looking for Jirga forums, the researcher included elderly 
men, both within Peshawar and outside as elderly men are the potential Jirga 
members, who participate in Jirga on a regular basis. For instance, elderly men 
living as Internally Displaced Members (IDPs) instantly formed Jirga to put their 
demands before the state in Peshawar (Geo, 2014).  
The snowball sample was also used to access women and members of religious 
minorities. Despite being from Peshawar, I found it hard to access these two 
segments. Women, in particular, were hard to access. As a result, only twenty-
two females out of a total of eighty were interviewed. The researcher was 
already aware of this constraint in advance as in Pakhtun culture, it is easier for 
a woman to talk to another woman. To resolve this challenge, I had to rely on 
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male respondents working in registered associations who arranged my 
interviews with women colleagues, whom they already knew. Some of the 
members of religious minorities, who were interviewed for this research, 
worked in government offices. As I also have been working in government 
offices in my past, my personal contacts were used to access them.  
While snowball sampling was carefully used to redress certain challenges in the 
field related to data collection, the real challenge was how to ensure safety in an 
environment that was threatening and insecure. This was posing serious 
concerns not only for the personal safety of the researcher, but for the 
respondents also who were to become part of this research.  
Perhaps a better security situation in Peshawar may have enabled the 
researcher to prolong his stay, explore better the dynamics of unregistered 
associations and gather relatively large quantifiable statistics. The following 
section shows, briefly, the nature of such challenges.  
2.4. Threatening security situations in Peshawar: a brief overview 
Instead of giving details of the entire security situations in Peshawar and going 
into its history, the researcher chose to present a few instances to the readers of 
this thesis, that  
Section 4occurred during the fieldwork. These events may enable us to see how 
the growing insecurity acted as a potential limitation.  
1. Interviewee no. 39 (3rd May 2012 at 1639 hours) 
Venue: Peshawar city (interviewee’s personal bookshop) 
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During the middle of the interview the interviewee started receiving 
anonymous calls four times. The interviewee looked puzzled and upon the 
researcher’s inquiry said: 
‘I do not know but someone is calling me to come out now... he is asking me to 
come out of the shop and threatening me that I will be shot’. 
The interviewee was known for his anti-Taliban views in Peshawar and had 
published a few articles in a Pakhtu magazine against their violence.  
2. Venue: Badaber dated: 12-03-2012 (researcher’s village, situated in the 
south of Peshawar at 12 KM distance) 
Badaber is the hometown of the researcher where a suicide bomber tried to 
assassinate the deputy speaker of the provincial assembly KP. The news 
reported the next day: 
‘Fifteen persons were killed and over 40 sustained injuries when a suicide bomber 
blew himself up minutes after the funeral prayers for a woman in Mamakhel area 
of Badaber village, 12 kilometres south of the provincial capital, on Sunday 
morning’ (TN, 2012). 
The Deputy Speaker was the apparent target of the suicide bombing because he 
belonged to ANP, which vehemently opposed the Taliban.  
3. Venue: Peshawar Ring Road dated 15-03-2012 
The researcher left the Badaber village to meet an interviewee in Peshawar city, 
but found the Ring road blocked. The researcher,  after being stuck in the traffic 
for 3 hours had to cancel the interview. The news reported the next day: 
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‘A senior police officer was killed in a suicide attack in Pishtakhara Chowk on the 
Peshawar Ring Road’ (CAO, 2012). 
While this was the situation in 2012 during my second field work, the situation 
in 2011 was not entirely different in 2011.31 
4. Venue: Peshawar Kohat Road dated 01-02-2011 
While the researcher was still in the UK and was preparing for the first field visit 
when the news reported: 
‘A suicide bomber detonated the explosives strapped to his body near the vehicle of 
the Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) on Kohat Road’ (Tribune, 2011). 
The researcher was aware in advance that the insecurity in Peshawar was a 
serious threat not only to my personal safety but to my respondents also. 
Personal safety and that of the respondents, thus, emerged as the topmost 
important issue as discussed below.  
2.5. Personal safety  
To conduct research in Peshawar in 2011-12 where bomb blasts and 
kidnapping for ransom was common, was not easy. However, it was not only the 
Taliban’s violence alone, but the kidnapping for ransom was also a serious 
concern. Although I belonged to the region yet I was conscious that I may be 
perceived as a foreigner and that may expose me to potential dangers. Not only 
Peshawar city, but my own village where I was residing was threatened by the 
Taliban’ violence.  
                                                        
31 The field work was conducted in tow different periods i.e. 2011 and 2012.  
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To lower security related risks, the researcher had to adopt two strategies. It 
was decided with the help of my supervisor that the fieldwork may be split in 
two shorter intervals rather than one prolonged stay. The objective of the first 
fieldwork, conducted in 2011, was to experience and observe Peshawar, 
whether or not another field work will be possible in 2012. The outcome of the 
first fieldwork was that another short trip is possible if certain enhanced-
security measures are adopted in a systematic way.  
Some of such measures were: to keep a low profile, not to use public transport, 
to keep a charged mobile with credits that can be used in case of an emergency, 
leaving details of interview-location with one of my cousins before I leave for an 
interview and assuring that I would come home by evening. These measures 
were regularly observed. I strictly avoided going to any party, funeral or public 
gatherings. I was also in regular touch with my Principal Supervisor in the UK 
and regularly informed her of my safety via emails and phone. Being a local of 
Peshawar, I was aware that the Taliban usually targets public spaces and areas 
where security forces are stationed. During my fieldwork, I avoided the 
Cantonment area, where the Pakistan army is stationed because army facilities 
were the prime target of the Taliban. I also used a private taxi to avoid public 
transport. In case of an army convoy passing on the road, I used to ask the taxi 
driver to pull up on one side and to wait until the convoy is passed.  
2.6. Consent, anonymity and confidentiality 
Seeking informed consent from respondents and ensuring no harm to them, and 
their anonymity and confidentiality are extremely important aspects of research 
ethics in social science research (Oliver, 2003). The researcher has not only to 
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ensure his/her personal safety in the field, but also that of respondents (Blumer, 
2008; Bryman, 2010; Seale, 2010). I was conscious that I was doing a research 
that did involve issues related to violence in the region. The Taliban’s extremist 
ideology of implementing a strict Sharia rule is underpinned by a strong anti-
Western discourse, for instance the Taliban’s bombing of girls’ schools as 
identified in chapter 5. I was conscious that as a researcher, based in a Western 
university, I will be asking questions about the Taliban’s violence from some of 
my respondents, which may expose my respondents to potential threats and 
dangers. In order to deal with this, I offered complete anonymity and 
confidentiality to all of my respondents in written. I also gave them oral 
explanations of the terms anonymity and confidentiality. However, it was 
explained to them that their right not to answer a question will be respected 
and no further question about the same issue will be asked. There was only one 
such instance when a Pakhtun woman based in Peshawar refrained to answer 
any question related to the threats she received from the Taliban. No further 
questions were asked.  
The consent form, presented to them, explained in detail how their details will 
be kept anonymous, how their recorded interviews will be stored and used for 
this thesis and any future research and how their details will be strictly 
accessible to the researcher alone. I observed in my initial interviews that 
verbal explanation of anonymity and confidentiality seemed to make them more 
comfortable. This strategy was adopted for my latest interviews, whereby I used 
to offer an oral explanation before presenting them written consent form.  
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From knowing Peshawar, its security situations and taking some safety 
measures, the following section will unpack one of the most important 
dimensions of this research project i.e. my philosophical positionality.  
2.7. Reflections on my philosophical positioning 
Social reality, for me, is neither an objective phenomenon, nor is human society 
governed by objective social laws that determine their interactions and 
behaviour. Instead, human beings are able to carry out calculated actions and 
construct their own realities. At a societal level, then, human beings are able to 
negotiate with their respective social structures. In other words, human action 
(agency) may mediate with a given structure. While human agency may open up 
the possibility of social change yet such an agency may operate within the 
structural constraints and may be limited by it (Walsh, 1998). In other words, 
there are no social laws that may regulate a given human society. Nevertheless, 
some social rules of interactions or social structures, being time tested may be 
perceived sacrosanct by some members of a given society and thus conserved. 
However, such a constructionist philosophical approach is not entirely based on 
the researcher’s personal disposition. Instead, such an approach is also inspired 
by the empirical data, collected in Peshawar, and on the anthropological study 
of the Pakhtun as given below.  
To build peace and minimize violence in Peshawar as exhibited by women’s 
associations and peace associations, seems to represent human agency that 
challenges (or mediates with) masculine social set up and forces of religious 
orthodoxy as analysed in chapter 7. For women’s associations based in 
Peshawar, the Pakhtun society as a ‘man’s world’ or the social identity of 
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Pakhtun as male are social constructions that suited the tribal society. 
According to them a region that was exposed to consistent warfare, as explored 
in chapter 4, prioritized men over women, which led to a masculine social set 
up. The masculine social set up was then taken for granted by men as a 
permanent social reality, which had led to serious intolerance towards women 
and thus needs to be changed.  
On the other hand, associations engaged in building peace and opposing 
religious orthodoxy also seem to identify that religious orthodoxy in Pakistan 
has grown within specific political and regional contexts, as explored in chapter 
5. To perceive religious orthodoxy informed by intolerance, towards others is 
neither an objective social law, nor a permanent social reality that ought to 
determine interactions in a semi-autonomous way. Women’s associations and 
individual voices show an ability to challenge such deterministic approaches to 
social reality and present the possibility of cultural change and shift. It is this 
desire of cultural change that is opposed by the masculine social set up and 
religious forces in Peshawar, as explored in chapters 6 and 7 in detail, whereby 
the ‘emergent civil society’ navigates between cultural change and conservative 
forces of tradition and orthodoxy.  
In this regard the anthropological research conducted by Frederick Barth in 
1954 on the political economy of Pakhtun from Swat Valley may be a pertinent 
empirical case study. His study, however, does not only challenge Gellner’s 
perspective that pre-defined identities may limit the construction of a civil 
society, but also seems to support our constructionist perspective with a clear 
reference to the Pakhtun society. Frederick Barth argues that in segmentary 
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tribes ascriptive identity is perceived to be the most important factor that 
potentially determines one’s political association as people of the same tribal 
lineage are inclined to stand with their respective extended cousins. However, 
in case of the Pakhtun from the Swat, personal choice seems to challenge this 
perception whereby the individual’s choice within specific context has a clear 
bearing on determining one’s political alignment and grouping. Placing 
individuals at the centre of society, Barth tries to show that the Pakhtun of Swat 
have the power and the agency to make choices, though such choices may be 
constrained by social structures. 
As I believe that human beings participate in the construction of their respective 
social realities as active human agents while working within structural 
constraints, therefore, such an ontological32 positionality is oriented more 
towards social constructionism. Social constructionism as an interpretivistic 
qualitative methodological framework differs from other ontological and 
epistemological33 approaches such as positivism and realism that claim the 
existence of an objective reality existing independently of an individual’s mind 
(Hughes & Sharrock, 1997). Claims to objectivity within qualitative 
methodology are perceived as too old fashioned (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998) and 
for some, they simply do not exist (Burr, 2003).  
Human reality, according to social constructionism, is constructed by members 
of a given society within their respective socio-political, cultural and historical 
context. We see this happening in the non-state social space in Peshawar. As 
                                                        
32 Ontology is understood, here, as a world view or a theory of being or existence (Potter, 2000; 
Berg, 2007).  
 
33 Epistemology is theory of knowledge (King & Horrocks, 2010).  
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masculine social set up that has led to the marginalization of women in 
Peshawar and religious orthodoxy are the constructions of certain political, 
economic and social contexts, the peace-oriented struggle is also constructed by 
the Pakhtun amidst violence within their own context and seeks inspiration 
from their respective contextual milieu.  
However, social constructionism also faces the charges of extreme relativism 
(Potter, 2000). To resolve this tension, a critical approach is adopted in this 
thesis. According to social constructionism not all members can participate in 
the construction of social reality because of unequal power relations that may 
be embedded within and sustained by structural contexts. Biases, embedded 
within structures, may constrain the construction of new social truth, which 
may be challenged by human agency. Social construction attains a critical 
dimension when members of a given society make an attempt to know who 
shapes the reality and who is excluded and why (Burr, 2003). By revealing 
marginalized voices, social constructionism assumes an emancipatory feature. 
The critical dimension of social constructionism seems to resolve the moral 
dilemma that seems to flow from an extreme relativism. While social 
constructionism seems to explain our philosophical positionality, it is the 
critical dimension that informs our entire research framework. Thus we 
recognize that if social constructionism is detached from critical dimensionality, 
then the risk of considering it a relativistic approach may be enhanced.  
The qualitative methodology, in which social constructionism with a critical 
note assumes a central ontological position, requires the study of social reality 
in its natural setting where people bring their own respective meanings of a 
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specific reality. By becoming an active part of such a setting, we can have an 
access to people’s interpretation of reality. Such an epistemological approach, 
then, may deploy a range of different but interrelated empirical research 
methods to study society and its members (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998). More 
specifically, researchers with social constructivist ontology tend to deploy 
qualitative research methods in order to draw a comprehensive portrait of the 
issue under investigation (Burr, 2003).  
Working within an interpretivistic methodology may generate another dilemma 
for the researcher or what Anthony Giddens (1987) calls ‘double hermeneutics’. 
I was aware that the reality constructed by the members of the society will be 
interpreted by me. In other words, a researcher working within a qualitative 
methodological framework has to be aware of his/her presence within the 
entire research project.  
This dilemma may, potentially, be resolved by laying out not only the 
philosophical positioning of the researcher, but also the ‘gendered, multi-
culturally situated’ self of the researcher (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998: 23). The 
following section further builds and explains this dilemma.  
2.8. Resolving methodological concerns 
I was aware that moving with an interpretivistic methodology to the field does 
not leave any space for claims to objectivity and neutrality (Hughes & Sharrock, 
1997). To claim that social scientific research can be conducted in a controlled 
environment like an experiment in a laboratory and allow things to happen 
uncontaminated and generate completely objective results, is impossible in the 
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social sciences. The researcher’s choice of the research area, research questions, 
his/her personal assumptions, ideas, theoretical positioning and personal 
background, all become part of the research process.  
Furthermore ‘... the interviewer as a human being cannot be seen as an 
inanimate writing pad or a machine that records the interviewee’s responses 
uncontaminated by human interaction’ (Burr, 2003: 152). The researcher’s 
‘personal biography’ becomes integrated within the overall research 
undertaking (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998: 23; King & Horrocks, 2010). Therefore, 
this thesis rather than claiming objectivity and neutrality, acknowledges the 
presence of the researcher in the overall research process that was undertaken.  
The presence of the researcher then creates certain methodological concerns. 
According to social constructionism a social scientist’s interpretation of a given 
reality is just one interpretation amongst a variety of other possible versions. If 
that specific perspective is just one account, out of many possible accounts, then 
does the research undertaking not become a political act? It may become a 
political act because the researcher chooses one form of interpretation of truth 
over another that may validate a particular way of life over another (Burr, 
2003). If the researcher is dismissing claims to objectivity, then does it not 
render the entire research undertaking a subjective affair (Potter, 2000)? We 
recognize that these methodological challenges must be addressed if the 
researcher seeks to make a meaningful contribution to the existing knowledge.  
Embedding reflexivity within the entire research project, then, may enable the 
researcher to address these methodological concerns. Reflexivity, as explained 
below, includes not only laying open the researcher’s philosophical positioning 
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and explaining the rationale for selecting a particular research method, but 
revealing the ‘gendered, multi-cultural situated’ self of the researcher also.  
2.9. Embedding reflexivity: my personal background and its impact on 
the research 
Reflexivity is the process of self accountability, a ‘questioning approach’, and a 
critical dialogue between the researcher and researched (King & Horrocks, 
2010: 125). ‘Through personal accounting, researchers must become more 
aware of how their own positions and interests are imposed at all stages of the 
research process... in order to produce less distorted accounts of the social 
world’ (Hertz, 1997: viii).  
C. Willing (2001) mentions two kinds of reflexivity i.e. ‘epistemological’ and 
‘personal’. The former refers to the researcher’s philosophical positioning, 
which is explored above whilst the latter refers to his/her personal background, 
aspiration and motivation for the research area and experiences in the field 
(cited by King Nigel & Horrocks Christine, 2010: 127-128). However, reflexivity 
is also about stating clearly the political aims of the research (Burr, 2003). The 
researcher is required to show how potential power relations between the 
researcher and his/her respondents were addressed and whether or not the 
researcher has ignored certain questions or people whose ideas were deemed, 
by the researcher, less sympathetic (Hertz, 1997; Burr, 2003). Social 
constructionism gives immense importance to reflexivity as the researcher’s 
presence in the entire research undertaking is acknowledged. While 
epistemological reflexivity i.e. researcher’s philosophical positionality has been 
discussed above, personal reflexivity needs an in-depth exploration here. While 
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the genesis of this researcher has already been presented in the Introduction in 
detail, the following paragraph is a brief sketch of the researcher. 
The researcher is 44 years old Pakhtun male. Born and educated in Peshawar, 
the researcher has spent time in Pakistan Air Force and has been in a 
government job. The researcher has also been affiliated with the teaching 
profession before his migration to the UK in 2004. However, it was English 
Literature, which was taught by the researcher. As violence erupted in the 
region in the post 9/11 period and as FATA became a new battleground of the 
Taliban’s violence, the researcher, being from Peshawar, became interested to 
understand and explore how this violence can be minimised.  
While the Taliban’s violence provided the immediate impetus for this research 
undertaking, I was aware of my status as a male Pakhtun Peshawarite and its 
potential impact on my research to a certain extent only. Some features of my 
personal background impacted positively while others needed a deeper 
reflection as given below.  
On the positive side, my background helped me in three different ways. Firstly, I 
was aware of the entire region, which helped me ensured my safety as I was 
aware which specific routes to travel and which to avoid. Secondly, being a 
Pakhtun and having lived in Peshawar for about three decades, I could mobilise 
my initial personal contacts, which were used then for snowballing. Thirdly, 
while this pre-knowledge was helpful in reaching out to my respondents 
quickly, its actual advantage reflected in building rapport with my respondents 
as I conducted my interviews in Pakhtu language. Building rapport is separately 
discussed in detail in the coming sections.  
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However, I was aware that I am in the field to gather highly important but 
complex data and had to prioritize my status as a researcher over my personal 
status. I was also aware that I have to display a professional demeanour in the 
field and treat my respondents as professional participants, which meant to 
respect certain professional boundaries.  
It was thus important to generate the sense of a professional researcher despite 
prior acquaintances with my respondents. Amongst such steps were making a 
formal request for an interview from my respondent; granting them the right to 
choose a convenient time and place of their choice; presentation of my 
supervisor’s letter from the university; presentation of the consent form and 
information sheet (see appendix F); formal permission to record the interview; 
explaining them their right to withdraw at any time during the interview; and 
enquiring about their interest whether they would like to receive a transcript of 
their interview. Such measures were regularly observed in the field.  
It was in the field that I grew conscious that I have very little knowledge of the 
status of the civil society in Peshawar and people’s opinions about it. I was also 
aware that I am not only a novice researcher, but also came from an entirely 
different academic discipline i.e. Arts and Humanities. Thus, I employed four 
different strategies. Firstly, I decided to continue with semi-structured 
interviews as data collection tool, so that I can elicit as much information as 
possible. Secondly, I decided to reach out to diverse sets of people, i.e. 
academics, journalists, students, women, and members of religious minorities. I 
also decided to expand my sample and visited tow other cities, i.e. Swat Valley 
and Islamabad. Thirdly, I readily accepted the invitations to participate in some 
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forums and events to triangulate the data. And lastly, I spent more than usual 
times with some of my participants, who had a diverse background and who 
could talk on the topic in detail. This was one of the reasons that 10% of my 
interviews (8 in total) were three hours long and about 5% of the respondents 
(4 in total) were visited twice to know better their ideas. While there is no 
guarantee that the researcher can negate his/her being in the field, yet 
awareness and being reflexive about one’s identity and prior knowledge may 
help the researcher not to distort the entire research project34.  
While my prior knowledge was helpful, to a certain extent, there were some 
instances, where I struggled to reach out to specific respondents. For instance, I 
found it hard to locate women’s organizations despite knowing the exact name 
and address. Looking for one such women’s organization took the researcher 
around 30 minutes to move up and down the same street as there was no 
signboard of the association. I soon came to know through a female respondent 
working in the same organization, that they had received threats from the 
Taliban and they had to close down their office for a short period. However, 
besides the Taliban factor, Pakhtun society does not seem to encourage the 
open advertisement of women participating in public life.  
While this thesis has not made any claims to objectivity, yet an attempt was 
made ‘to produce less distorted accounts of the social world’ as argued by Hertz 
(1997). For instance, I was aware that some women’s associations are engaged 
in challenging their marginalization in the Pakhtun society. However, I could not 
                                                        
34 The consent Form given in Appendix clearly shows what questions were in the researcher’s 
mind and what was found as the research came to an end.  
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anticipate at the start of this research that women’s voices will become an 
important part of this thesis.  
Consistent self-engagement and discussion with my principal supervisor around 
the ‘personal’ elements of this research undertaking enabled me to choose semi-
structured in-depth interviews as a tool to generate data. However, the selection 
of semi-structured in-depth interviews as a tool, also depended on other factors 
as given below.  
2.10. The rationale for selecting semi-structured interviews as a research 
method 
The research design does not include only laying out the philosophical 
positioning of the researcher and his/her research methodology, but also the 
rationale for choosing a specific research method. However, a sound research 
design would require the researcher to explain how these three parts form one 
coherent scheme of inquiry (Creswell, 2009). In social science research, the 
researcher’s philosophical assumptions, his/her research methodology, and 
research theme tend to influence the selection of the specific research method 
(Arksey & Knight, 1999; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; King & Horrocks, 2010; 
Rubin & Rubin, 2012). More specifically, the researcher with a qualitative 
research methodology and social constructionist ontology (Burr, 2003) and 
interested to explore, examine and understand respondents’ world views, ‘the 
what, how, when, and where of a thing’ and various social roles and social 
structures (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998; Berg, 2007: 2-8) may tend to use a 
qualitative research method.  
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Informed by social constructionist ontology and working within the 
interpretivistic methodological framework, semi-structured, in-depth 
interviews, then, seemed pertinent to the very aims of this thesis. Semi 
structured in-depth interviews help researchers explore respondents’ world 
view, their experiences and ideas in detail using probes to deepen their 
understanding of what and why they are saying something (Arksey & Knight, 
1999, Fielding & Thomas, 2008; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Bryman, 2010; Seale, 
2010; Rubin & Rubin, 2012).  
Keeping the aims and objectives of my research, I did not choose structured 
interviews as they would have required similar worded-questions irrespective 
of my respondents’ background, which might have distorted the social reality 
that I was trying to engage with. I also did not choose unstructured interviews 
because I knew my topic under investigation and prepared certain questions 
around the topics, for instance the Pakistani state, civil society, peace and 
violence. Semi-structured interviews, then, suited my research as I expected the 
possibility of new questions in the field to deepen understanding of 
respondents’ world view. Again important evidence in this regard was to 
compose questions about women’s marginalization in the Pakhtun society as it 
started emerging during my initial interviews as an important area to be 
investigated.  
However, I was conscious that the deployment of another research method 
might have been useful to compare the emerging themes. Participant 
observation (six to nine months) and spending time within different registered 
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and unregistered associations might have been a useful research method, but it 
seemed less realistic due to the security situations in Peshawar.  
2.11. Field work layout 
Peshawar was visited twice. First in March-April 2011 and then, again, in 
February-May 2012. During the first visit only 10 in-depth interviews were 
conducted. The objective was to start knowing my field, find potential 
respondents for future interviews and also develop some understanding of the 
character of civil society in Peshawar. Nonetheless, the prime objective was to 
know how secure Peshawar would be for another spell of fieldwork. The second 
round of interviews in 2012 was long in duration and well planned in advance. 
Sufficient preparation, as mentioned above, was done in advance to ensure my 
personal safety and that of my respondents. For instance, upon my arrival on 
24th February 2012, I was able to conduct my first interview on 25th February. 
Dividing fieldwork in two parts also helped me organize my data collection 
strategy. The first data set acted as a guide to the second one that enabled me to 
find out the right people not only in Peshawar but outside Peshawar including 
some parts of Pakistan. While the first set included 10 in-depth interviews in 
Peshawar, the second data set included 70 in-depth interviews and 12 
conferences and public meetings as part of respondent observation both in 
Peshawar and outside.  
2.12. Data sampling and the issue of representativeness 
As I was conscious that I am from the same region, therefore, to produce a less 
distorted picture of the social reality, I discussed this matter with my Principal 
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Supervisor, both before my first departure and from the field via Skype. It was 
decided that a large number of people may be interviewed to claim a degree of 
representativeness. Approaching to a large number of people and seeking their 
opinions, and listening to their experiences was to compare and verify their 
opinions with one another in order to enhance the adequacy of my data (Lewis-
Beck et al 2004). It was also decided to spend more time with those who are 
more ‘articulate and reflective than others’ to enhance the appropriateness of 
my data (Lewis-Beck et al 2004: 994).  
It may be pointed out here that most of the respondents interviewed through 
snowball technique were not known to me in person. However, to ensure the 
representation of different groups, other factors were also kept in mind as given 
below. 
Firstly, while carrying out a total of 80 in-depth interviews, variation in their 
respective professional, linguistic, regional, cultural, religious, and gender (sex 
and age) was kept in mind as the following three tables show the breakdown of 
data. The main objective of the data was to seek opinions from a diverse set of 
respondents to deepen our understanding of what civil society mean to them 
and how they see peace.  
Total 
number of 
interviews 
Male Female Muslims Non-
Muslims 
Pakhtun Non-
Pakhtun 
80 58 22 76 4 68 12 
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Total number of 
interviews 
Respondents  
from Peshawar 
Respondents from Swat 
Valley 
Non-KP 
Respondents 
80 68 7 5 
 
 
Age variation Number 
Between 16-30 12 
Between 31-45 52 
Between 46 and 
above 
16 
 
Secondly, to expand the data sample, two adjacent cities were included. A week 
long stay in the Swat Valley and ten-days in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, 
were extremely productive. However, the rationale of collecting data outside KP 
had its own aims. Swat had recently suffered from the Taliban violence 2007-
2010 and offered a fresh perspective on the Taliban’s violence. I witnessed there 
a number of local, indigenous formal and informal associations, informed by 
local cultural perspectives and run by local people on a self-help basis. Swat 
Qaumi Jirga (Swat National Jirga-working for peacebuilding), Qadam 
Organization (working for peace and development), Swat Environmental 
Protection Society (working on environmental issues) and Swastu were some of 
the organizations visited by the researcher. Swastu35 was working on 
reinventing a new role of Hujra as the social and cultural context has changed 
                                                        
35 My respondent explained that Swastu is the old name of Swat River.  
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and was trying to transform it into a community space. The visit to Islamabad 
enabled me to listen to the voices that did not belong to KP and listen to those 
who were conducting research on the Taliban’s violence in KP as for instance 
PIPS (Pak Institute of Peace Studies, Islamabad).  
Thirdly, to claim representativeness for this thesis, it was discussed with my 
Supervisor that interviews with non-Pakhtun and non-Muslims in the region 
may be helpful to compare their views with those who came either from 
Peshawar or were Pakhtun. I found respondents from religious minorities 
extremely uncomfortable in sharing their views openly. As a result interviews 
with them were relatively short in duration. They had their own community 
organizations, but it is extremely difficult to know about them because of the 
fear from religious orthodox sections in the society.  
Finally, to reach out to a large number of people in the region and to triangulate 
my findings, I also employed participant observation and attended a number of 
both small and large conferences, meetings, gatherings and youth group 
discussions. The rationale of using a supplementary research method and 
reaching out to diverse people both within and outside Peshawar was to 
triangulate our research outcomes or what Denzin (1978) calls data or 
methodological triangulation. Data triangulation would require the researcher 
to seek detailed opinions from diverse sets of people along ethnic, religious, 
professional and gender lines. Methodological triangulation would make use of 
different research methods to examine the results achieved through them.  
Access to some of these collective forums was provided and arranged by some 
of my interviewees who advised me to take part in different events and 
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meetings as an observer to help me explore the ideas and thought of ordinary 
people. However, I also relied on local newspapers to know more about such 
forums.  
Participant observation was not planned prior to the commencement of my 
fieldwork. I was conscious of the security situation in Peshawar and made an 
informed decision about which event to attend. However, these conferences and 
meetings helped me understand better the internal strains within the ‘emergent 
civil society’ in Peshawar and the potential tensions amidst ethnic, religious, and 
liberal ideals. Besides being complimentary to the interviews, the attendance of 
such events gave me access to a large number of people whom I did not know, 
yet had access to their thoughts. Listening to the panellists’ speeches, watching 
their presentations and participating in the question-answer sessions gave me a 
direct insight of their inner thoughts and ideas. Participant observation was a 
useful way to further complete the picture that was emerging from the 
interview data. The detail of these conferences is given in the table below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
113 
 
Serial 
No. 
Name of event Organized by Details of event Duratio
n 
Location 
1 FACEOFF Hunerkada Rising Intolerance & 
Violence in the 
Society 
Two 
days 
worksh
op/pre
sentati
ons  
Peshawar 
2 Fundraising Bacha Khan 
Education Trust 
How to mobilize local 
sources of funding 
One-
hour 
Peshawar 
3 Annual 
Convention 
National Party-
KP 
Sharing an agenda of 
political change 
One 
day 
Peshawar 
4 Peace in KP Jirga Forum Peace in Peshawar  One 
day 
Peshawar 
5 Annual 
conference 
Pakistan Trade 
Union Defence 
Campaign 
Celebration of 1st May One 
day 
Peshawar 
6 Literary 
gathering 
Saahu Leekunko 
Maaraka 
Discussion of a 
Pakhtu short story 
and related social 
issues 
Two-
hours 
Peshawar 
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7 Pashto Literary 
Society 
Pashto Literary 
Society 
Celebrating Pakhtu 
language/open 
discussion on KP 
security situations 
3 days Peshawar 
8 Climate change Sarhad 
Conservation 
Society 
Fund-raising and to 
devise a 
comprehensive 
agenda of climate 
change 
Two 
hours 
Peshawar 
9 World Music 
Freedom Day 
Bacha Khan 
Education Trust 
Celebrating music as 
peace 
Three 
hours 
Peshawar 
10 Meeting with 
donors 
 
Just Peace 
Initiatives 
Presentation of peace 
a project 
One 
hour 
Peshawar 
11 Drone attacks 
and their impact 
on society 
CAMP Discussion with 
Peshawar university 
students on peace in 
KP 
One 
day 
Peshawar 
 
Apart from a few organizations in Peshawar, whether registered or 
unregistered, that were personally visited during my field work, it is extremely 
difficult to talk with certainty about their accurate number, activities, values and 
current statuses. To know more about unregistered associations in Peshawar 
meant spending more time and expanding my mobility in Peshawar, which 
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remained restricted due to insecure conditions. An open mobility in and around 
Peshawar, and staying in the field for a long period of time, may have improved 
my claim of representativeness.  
2.13. Ethical issues: building rapport 
Building trust with the respondents is an important aspect of research ethics 
and reflexivity so that they do not feel under pressure and the researcher is able 
to get the required information (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). It was important 
for me that a place of their own choice is respected, where they can feel both 
physical and psychological safety and where there are less chances of 
interruption (King & Horrocks, 2010). However, building rapport is extremely 
helpful in creating an environment where respondents can openly share their 
ideas.  
It took me a very short time indeed to be part of their respective organizations. 
One of the reasons for building rapport instantly with my respondents was my 
knowledge of all the rituals and customs of meeting a person in the Pakhtun 
culture. Almost in all cases, I was offered food, tea and even in some cases a lift. 
In some cases, I was taken around their organizations for a short visit and was 
introduced to their colleagues and team members. It showed typical Pakhtun 
hospitality that they are so proud of. For instance, at Peshawar University and 
Khyber Medical College, Peshawar, I was taken to the staff room and introduced 
to the academics and students wherein I was asked about my research thesis. 
Spontaneously it led to very important discussions and I was able to gather 
extremely valuable opinions. However, in such cases I did take their permission 
to use their discussions for my research, which was granted.  
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Presenting consent form, but also explaining verbally my research topic, acted 
as icebreakers, especially with those respondents whom I did not know in 
person. To build rapport with my respondents, I had to use very active listening, 
presented a positive body language and showed respect to their ideas. One way 
to show respect to their ideas was to use ‘thasoo’ instead of ‘tha’36. Using slow 
pace and speaking clearly was also used. Clear communication plays an 
important part in building trust. However, if the researcher is speaking the same 
language, then it gives an extra advantage as it may minimize the chance of 
losing the meaning of important words or interpreting their responses and the 
researcher is not perceived as a stranger (Berg, 2007). I had the extra advantage 
of being a Pashtu speaker. Outside Peshawar, I used Urdu language for my 
interviews, which I am fluent in also.  
Building a rapport, nonetheless, also means to maintain certain boundaries. 
Therefore, I had to decline, though very politely, respondents’ very warm offer 
to stay overnight in their homes, especially during my visit to Swat and 
Islamabad.  
2.14. Data Analysis 
I was aware that I was collecting vast amounts of data, which may be difficult to 
handle. Therefore, I decided to transcribe the interviews on the same day, 
mostly at evenings. In order to ensure full verbatim transcription, I used a good 
recording machine. Moreover, my five years experience of Pashto/English 
interpreter and translator in the UK also helped me transcribe verbatim. 
                                                        
36 ‘Thasoo’ and ‘Tha’ in Pakhtu mean ‘you’. While the former is a plural pronoun, the latter is a 
singular pronoun. However, plural pronoun ‘Thasoo’ is used as a sign of respect in Pakhtun 
culture.  
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However, it was an extremely time consuming activity, but productive for the 
final data analysis. In other words, transcription helped me enter the realm of 
data as King & Horrocks (2010) argue. 
Analysis starts simultaneously with data collection and transcription processes 
and the researcher starts to know the emerging themes (Arksey & Knight, 1999; 
Rubin & Rubin, 2012). My case was not different. Transcribing in the field 
helped me compose new questions, which needed to be answered by different 
people who can, potentially, provide a different perspective on the issues that 
emerged from the data. However, as Berg (2007) argues that data collection and 
analysis, if systematically carried, may render the research rigorous, so I 
decided to use NVivo 8 to secure all data and make an organized record of all 
nods and themes.  
Using three stages of thematic analysis as argued by King & Horrocks (2010), I 
coded the entire data that enabled me to collect descriptive coding. Bringing 
similar codes in a hierarchy, I was able to collect interpretive coding. On a third 
level, similar interpretive codes were brought to higher forms of abstractions. 
Chapter 6 shows in detail different clusters that helped me build my argument, 
for instance ‘culturalists’ summed up those perspectives that show orientations 
towards the Pakhtun culture as an important value-system. Nonetheless, there 
were certain cross cutting themes that emerged from the data and which were 
difficult to be placed under any defined cluster. King & Horrocks (2010) call 
such cross cutting themes ‘integrative themes’ (151). However, This thesis has 
named such themes ‘connectors’ in chapter 6.  
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2.15. Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a detailed framework of the research design by 
presenting the researcher’s ontological and epistemological positioning and the 
rationale of employing a specific research method. While working within a 
qualitative methodological framework, this chapter has made an attempt to 
show how reflexivity was embedded in the entire research project.  
This chapter also made an attempt to show what Peshawar looked like during 
the fieldwork. The growing insecurity in Peshawar impacted upon this research 
by restricting researcher’s mobility. However, this chapter also showed that by 
taking certain safety measures, the researcher was still able to reach out to as 
many people as possible.  
The researcher was, however, able to know in a more systematic way about the 
registered associations rather than un-registered ones in Peshawar. In order to 
compensate for this apparent imbalance, the interview sample was increased to 
include a larger number of individuals who were not necessarily members of 
registered associations in Peshawar. It was amongst such people that the 
researcher found some respondents who were members of various shrine 
committees, literary associations, local sports club, local youth association and 
Jirga.  
To reach out to a large number of respondents, snowball technique was 
carefully used to overcome its limitations. This chapter has, in particular, shown 
that to overcome certain limitations related to security situations in Peshawar, 
the data sample was extended to two adjacent cities for a short period of time. 
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In addition to that, participant observation, for a short period of time, was also 
used to claim a certain degree of representativeness.  
The next two chapters will show, in detail, the analyses of the data and the main 
argument of this thesis.   
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CHAPTER 3 
3. The Pakhtun culture as the ground for ‘modularity’ 
3.1. Introduction 
Chapter 1 laid out the theoretical debate of the notion of ‘civil society’ and 
argued that the notion of civil society does not have a homogeneous body of 
doctrine rather different competing versions of civil society exist, at the 
theoretical level. It was also argued in chapter 1 that certain theoretical threads 
in the alternative discourse of civil society may be applicable to the context of 
this research, which entail a detailed investigation of the internal contingencies 
of the Pakhtun culture, which is dealt with in this chapter.  
It was argued that the embedded nature of civil society’s discourse within the 
secular Western intellectual history complicates the application of the civil 
society in a context, which is imbued with religious and local traditional 
worldviews. The liberal version with its strong emphasis on civil society’s 
differentiation from other spheres, such as family, market and the state, and 
individual liberalism, as its philosophic basis, has a long and robust intellectual 
historical lineage compared to the alternative version. The alternative version, 
though inspired by Gramsci and oriented towards Marxist thought of class 
conflicts, has recently been revisited within alternative non-Western conditions. 
However, the import of the Western alternative notion of civil society in the 
non-Western conditions, seem limited and remains suggestive only. Thus, an 
empirical study is needed to investigate the alternative discourse of civil society 
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and explore to what extent the notion of civil society resonate in other non-
Western traditions.  
It is argued in this chapter that in non-Western contexts, immanent value 
systems may be perceived as the philosophical foundation of civil society rather 
than the Western individual liberalism. Thus, diverging from the mainstream 
‘liberal’ conception of civil society, important aspects of the immanent value 
systems may be perceived as important sources of peace and civility. 
Normativity37, thus, may emerge as an important marker of civil society, which 
allow us to count informal networks and groups, informed by kinship and 
religious consciousness as part of civil society.  
The role of this chapter is threefold. In the first place it critically examines, at 
the theoretical level, the debate between the liberal and alternative discourses 
of civil society, with a particular emphasis on non-Western contexts and people, 
who are not essentially immersed in the Western individual liberalism. 
Secondly, this chapter critically explores the internal dynamics of the Pakhtun 
culture. Explaining the terms ‘tradition’ and ‘culture’ as employed in this thesis 
and by exploring the Pakhtun culture questions such as what is the philosophic 
basis of the Pakhtun culture, how people resort to these value systems in their 
day to day interactions, and how certain groups, such as women, have been 
marginalized, will be explored in detail. Thirdly, while other cultural and 
politico-linguisitic movements also emerged within Pakhtun at different times 
as briefly mentioned in this chapter, this chapter will examine the Nonviolent 
                                                        
37 The immanent values normatively derived from cultural and religious values.  
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Movement in detail as a case study of a prototype of civil society. To address 
these three points, this chapter has been divided into four sections.  
Pakhtuns are immersed in local, traditional and religious worldviews and 
identities and present a different kind of cultural ‘self’, knitted to the interests of 
the entire community and have distinct social-cultural mechanisms. Having 
ascriptive identities and pre-defined value systems in which different groups, 
based on gender, occupation and age, are assigned social roles and 
responsibilities, it may be pertinent to ask how the notion of a civil society, 
whether liberal or alternative, may be a meaningful conceptual tool. To deal 
with this tension, Gellner’s concept of ‘modularity’ is the focus of this chapter. A 
‘modular’ man, according to Gellner, is freed from the ascriptive identities, pre-
defined obligations and roles and is equipped with the right to enter and exit, 
voluntarily, any association without any fear (1996). In contrast to the 
segmented people, which Gellner studied in Morroco in 1969 and who are 
immersed in pre-defined perspectives and obligations and are locked in 
cousinly relations, it is only the modular man, argues Gellner, that can build civil 
society.  
Such a proposition potentially acts as a theoretical and empirical challenge, 
which needs to be recognized and addressed if this thesis suggests that the 
construction of civil society, even in an alternative demeanour, may be possible 
in non-Western condition such as Peshawar. Section 1 of this chapter explores 
this tension and deals in detail with Gellner’s ideal type ‘modular man’, which is 
contested both within the West and in the South (Hann, 1996; Varshney, 2005).  
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The detailed historical presentation of the region and the Pakhtun, in section 2, 
is to demonstrate how the region has been a consistent battleground, a regular 
route for the marching armies and a site of consistent violence for over 2000 
years. Section 2 also sheds light on how the region experienced the non-violent 
ideology as conceived in Buddhism and how different Pakhtun cultural thinkers 
realized the importance of peace.  
As the Gellnerian argument explicitly states that marketization and liberalism 
have created the ‘modular’ man, it is important to understand what local 
traditional and religious value systems inform Pakhtun’s ways of life. However, 
instead of discussing the entire Pakhtun culture, which is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, section 3 is restricted to the examination of important value systems, 
such as the Pakhtunwali and Islam. Examining the Pakhtun culture does not 
only inform us of the social and cultural context of this thesis, but also sheds 
light on the masculine character of the Pakhtun culture, which some section of 
the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar openly challenge. This section will show 
how local traditional perspective (Pakhtunwali) and religion (Islam) informs 
their interactions, how the Pakhtun are immersed in ascriptive identities, and 
are locked in cousinly relations and pre-defined roles and obligations.  
This chapter will, specifically, argue and show as evidence that the desire of 
peace and non-violence as the objective of life is not unfamiliar to the Pakhtun. 
It is argued, here, that, although, they have lived through the history of violence, 
yet they have been able, to a certain extent, to devise mechanisms and create 
spaces to imagine and practice the possibility of non-violence. The fourth 
section deals in specific with the rise of Nonviolent Movement amongst the 
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Pakhtun and provides an empirical instance, which serves as a challenge to 
Gellner’s perspective and also serves as the foundation of this thesis’ argument.  
3.2. Importing the concept in a non-Western context: the challenge of 
‘Modularity’ 
One of the most important perspectives in liberal paradigm is the emphasis on 
civil society as the outcome of specific Western historical conditions. This 
perspective lays enormous emphasis on certain pre-conditions for the potential 
emergence of civil society and challenges the very attempt of importing the 
concept of civil society in contexts that are entirely different to the Western 
conditions and has not experienced the Western experiences of marketization 
and liberalism. This section unpacks this philosophical debate and shows what 
justifies, at the philosophical level, the attempt of this thesis to apply the 
concept of civil society in Peshawar.  
The liberal concept of civil society implies a specific concept of social ‘self’ as the 
essential prerequisite of civil society, perceived as liberated from the bonds of 
kinship and all other ascriptive identities whether religious or ethnic. The 
individualized ‘self’ is potentially free and fluid in choosing his/her associations 
at will and is not enchained by any pre-defined bonds, obligations and roles. The 
specific individualized ‘self’ is capable of building a civil society which will be 
non-sectarian in essence because the ‘self’ is able to think rationally and act 
independently in his/her own self-interest. Such a ‘self’ uses human reason 
alone to decide his/her associations with others rather than any pre-defined 
cultural or religious perspectives imposed on him/her.  
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According to this argument the liberal concept ‘seeks to distinguish itself from 
the bonds of solidarity and belonging which characterize societies and which 
have not embraced the project of modernity…’ (Femia, 2001; Pearce, 2013: 
409). This conception of a specific ‘self’ was a Western experience, wherein 
obligations and roles prescribed by religion and tradition were displaced by 
impersonal, individualized bonds (Becker, 1994). In its specific Western 
experience commercial activities and use of human reason diluted the 
traditional arrangements and allowed new ones to emerge (Crow, 2002). In the 
liberal concept of civil society the individualistic fluidity of the ‘self’, informed 
by human reason alone, is the source of civility, which, alone, can contribute to 
peaceful interactions (Pearce, 2011: 409).  
The most influential exponent of this viewpoint is Ernest Gellner, who argues 
that civil society is a modern project in which simple, tribal interactions are 
transformed into complex, contractual relations and in which people choose 
their identities at will. Any pre-defined worldview will confiscate their freedom 
to choose associations and the fear of breaking socially-imposed pre-defined 
roles, responsibilities and obligations will obstruct the building of a civil society. 
To capture the Western specific experiences of marketization and liberalism 
and the individualized ‘self’, fit to build a civil society, Gellner used the term 
‘Modular Man’. A ‘Modular Man’, freed from the ascriptive identities, has the 
freedom to choose his associations voluntarily (Gellner, 1996).  Gellner (1996) 
argues that ‘The modularity of modern man was probably a precondition of the 
industrial miracle, and is certainly – by definition - a precondition of civil 
society’ that can prevent the tyranny not only of the state but that of cousinly 
relationships (p: 42).  
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Individualism understood as such may not exist in the non-Western contexts 
(Fowler, 2001). For Gellner, then, the existence of associational life may not be a 
sufficient evidence of civil society in non-Western contexts. The Gellnerian 
perspective, then offers a challenge to the international aid agencies’ endeavors 
that tend to see associational life as evidence of civil society in non-Western 
contexts (Rooy, 1998).  
It may be pertinent to point out that his conception of ‘Modular Man’ acts as a 
contrast to the segmented self that he studied amongst the Moroccan tribes 
(Hammoudi, 1996). A segmentary society is composed of various concentric 
segments based on genealogies that help them define their mutual interactions. 
Being able to maintain social order, such a segmentary society does not need a 
state (Hammoudi, 1996). Gellner’s anthropological findings, which have been 
contested both theoretically and methodologically (Hammoudi, 1996; Munson, 
1996) led him to consider ‘Modular Man’ as the opposite of ‘segmented man’ 
that is immersed in predefined identities and locked in pre-defined 
responsibilities. Internally cohesive and egalitarian, Gellner was still not 
convinced because of the tyranny of cousinly relations that made such segments 
suffocating. Referring to the segmented self, Gellner (1996) pronounced that the 
Muslim Umma has failed to create a civil society because of the condition of non-
modularity that has allowed the ritualized and ‘stifling social segments’ to 
prevail (Ibid:41).  
Extending Gellner’s argument, the problem with such segmented self is that it 
can build segmented associations only. Such associations may be closed for 
some groups as a person’s membership is decided on the basis of ‘a person’s 
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general characteristics’ (Post & Rosenblum, 2002: 5). As a result divisions and 
conflicts over power and authority may be common phenomena in such cases.  
It is argued in this section that embracing such an approach as a universal truth 
may create problems and may lead to the conclusion that ‘all other bonds’ are 
‘unable to contribute to this process (civility) by their very nature…’ (Pearce 
2013 p: 409). The ethnocentric emphasis on certain pre-conditions and 
individualized ‘self’ that declares civil society as a Western triumph and as one 
of ‘industrialism(‘s)…‘social corollaries’ (Gellner, cited by John Keane: 12) 
makes the debate of civil society rigid and orthodox. Gellner ignores the ‘uneven 
spatial and temporal distribution of the civil society’ even in the west and 
instead ‘conflates different forms of civil society in economistic’ term (Keane, 
1996b: 11-12). Also the concept has never been free from certain biases as it 
became a reference to the white, male, bourgeoisie class (Kean, 1998c) and was 
conceived in opposition to the assumed savagery and barbarism in other parts 
of the world (Goody, 2001; Kaviraj, 2001).  
While the concept of civil society was certainly born in the West, the over-
emphasis that only associations with modern traits, i.e. voluntary consent and 
formal structures built by ‘Modular Man’ driven by marketization and 
liberalism, has been challenged both theoretically and empirically.  
Carrying out a research on inter-communal networks and violence in India, 
Ashutosh Varshney (2005) confronted the same dilemma where traditional 
organizations were abundant and raised the important question of ‘Must 
associations, to form part of civil society, be of a ‘‘modern’’ kind – voluntaristic 
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and cross-cutting rather than ascriptive and based on ethnic affiliations?’ (p: 
40).  
He argued that there are various organizations in India that carry ascriptive 
identities, but they are still voluntary in nature because not all people living in 
that vicinity have to be its members. This is equally true of our informal 
associations in Peshawar wherein people immersed in ascriptive identities 
come together on a voluntary basis. His argument, based on his empirical 
findings in India, that most of such associations use modern techniques and 
tools, is also relevant in our context as many informal associations such as 
Peshawar Jirga use social media and print media in Peshawar.  
Varshney did not find the voluntary aspects of associations and individualism to 
be the essential determinants of a civil society as he found that associations 
immersed in ascriptive identities played a key role in diminishing violence. 
Based on his empirical findings, he then argues that modularity may not be the 
appropriate approach to study civil society in non-Western context.   
‘…at least, in the social and cultural settings that are different from Europe and 
North America, if not more generally, the purpose of activity rather than the 
form of organizations should be the critical test of civic life…Informal group 
activities as well as ascriptive associations should be considered part of civil 
society so long as they connect individuals, build trust, encourage reciprocity, 
and facilitate exchange of views on matters of public concerns – economic, 
political, cultural, and social’  (Varshney, 2005: 46).  
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The ethnographic case study of Malerkotla in India by Randhawa (2012) is yet 
another case that shows how Malerkotla society, informed by religion, remained 
immune to the communal violence in 1947 and how various religious 
communities live with peace today. Randhawa’s argument does not only dismiss 
Gellner’s modularity, but also seems to support our argument, as she shows that 
civil society in Malerkotla is embedded in local cultural and religious 
perspectives. Immersion in local cultural and religious perspectives consistently 
reminds different religious communities how they co-existed with tolerance in 
the past and how to stay non-violent in their interactions in future.  
Instead of focusing on the non-Western context, some anthropologists have 
countered Gellner’s argument by citing case studies from within the Western 
context as Elizabeth Dunn (1996) argues that ‘… recent anthropological work 
shows, civil society does not necessarily operate from the premise of liberal 
individualism’ (p: 27). The American Mormons, a Christian religious group in 
the USA demonstrates that despite being situated in capitalist world they ‘have 
created a form of “civil society’’ that looks much more like those described for 
“non-Western” societies’... based on the ‘moral system of community 
interaction’ (Dunn, 1996: 27-28).  
Tradition is not necessarily equal to the tyranny of cousins, and capitalist 
modernity does not always make civic interactions possible. Jenny Pearce 
(2013) argues that if associations are based on ethnicity it does not essentially 
mean that their ethnic roots will serve as the seeds of violence. Taking on 
Gellner’s essentialist rigidity, Melucci (1998) argues that civic actions may occur 
in a completely unconventional manner, embedded in the traditional life and 
130 
 
thus submerged in daily life in traditional societies. For many like Mamdani 
(1996) civil society emerged in the non-Western contexts against colonial 
oppression, but such movements were never recognized as civil society 
movements. Kothari (1996) argued that it is not important that a liberal 
modular man should be perceived as the appropriate substance for building 
civil society, because the public action may emerge against the increasing 
consumerism and commercialization that emanate from Western liberalism as 
some sections within an Indian civil society show.  
Gellner’s argument that only modular ‘self’ can build civil society appears to be a 
‘mistaken’ notion that restricts the import of the concept of civil society in non-
Western context (Pasha, 2005:19). Challenging this normative argument, some 
have argued that the specific individual self can equally be a source of conflict, 
whereas traditional associations, informed by different concepts of 
individualism, can also show a great tendency towards peaceful existence and 
mutual cooperation (Pearce, 2013).  
These case studies and counter arguments presented by different experts seem 
to suggest that the desire to imagine and build a civil and peaceful world 
(researcher’s italics) may, possibly, act as the criteria of measuring a society as 
civil (Varshney, 2005; Pearce, 2013). While Varshney’s argument of the 
purposive activity as the critical test of civil society may make sense, yet it is not 
entirely clear what the philosophical foundation of civility is if it is not Western 
liberalism. It is also not clear what problems a given emergent civil society may 
face if an alternative philosophical foundation is chosen. This thesis grapples 
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with these two issues, i.e. the alternative philosophical foundation and the 
possible limitations that such a choice may cause.  
The debate of modularity is relevant to this thesis as this thesis employs the 
concept of civil society in a context that is entirely distinct in every aspect. The 
application of civil society by experts in Pakistan sheds extremely limited light 
on this key challenge offered by the Gellnerian proposition. When different 
experts deploy the idiom of civil society in Pakistan, it is not entirely clear which 
specific version of civil society is deployed and what are the culturally-intrinsic 
ideas of civil society, which prevail in the Pakistani society. Also, the way the 
concept of civil society has been deployed in Pakistan seems to have generated a 
certain vagueness around the very concept. Some have conflated the entire idea 
of civil society with everything that is not the state (researcher’s italics) (Malik, 
1997a, 2009b; Rizvi, 2000), some have focused on NGOs alone and offered a 
limited picture of civil society (Baig, 2001) while some have proposed binary 
oppositions of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ and ‘Islamic’ and ‘un-Islamic’ (Qadeer, 
1997; Zaidi, 2006). By grappling with Gellnerian’s proposition, our thesis makes 
an attempt to take the discourse of civil society as understood in Pakistan, that 
still remains an under research area (Mirahmadi et al., 2012)one step forward 
and explore what value systems may inform the civil society and how the 
alternative version resonate there.  
While the case studies and counter arguments presented above are useful in 
offering an alternative dimension to the Gellner’s modularity, the Nonviolent 
Movement amongst the Pakhtun seems to be an adequate empirical example, 
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which is dealt with in section 4. The following section will acquaint the readers 
of this thesis with the Pakhutn, their region and history.   
3.3. The origin of the Pakhtun  
Although different relics suggest human presence in Afghanistan38 (See map in 
Appendix A) that dates back to 50,000 years, yet historians refer to the arrival 
and settlement of the Aryans39 in Afghanistan, Persia and India around 2000 BC 
as an important event in the history of the sub-continent (THF, 1999; Shroder, 
2009). However, subsequent but continuous waves of invaders, led by people of 
different origins but mainly of Irani (Persian) and central Asian stock who 
mixed with the Aryans, have been pointed out by many as the origin of Pakhtun 
as a race (Khan, 1950; Gankovsky, 1982; Vogelsang, 2002; Caroe, 2001; Khatak, 
2012). This seems more convincing as Pakhtu language belongs to the eastern 
Iranian language group, which assimilated a number of linguistic and cultural 
influences over the centuries by coming into contact with different groups 
(Ghani, 1988). The only ancient source that refers to the Pakhtun are the Hindu 
religious texts, Rig-Veda, composed around 1500 BC that mentions ‘Pakthas’  
living beyond Indus (See map in Appendix B) and is believed to be the earliest 
reference to them (Nath, 2002: 273).  
The earliest reference to Peshawar40 (See map in Appendix C) was made by 
Herodotus in the 5th century BC as the ‘city of Kaspaturos’41 and to its people as 
                                                        
38
 Afghanistan is the neighbouring country of Pakistan as map in Appendix A shows.  
39
 Arya was a race whose origin is contested in history. 
40
 Peshawar is our field area for this thesis and currently the capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as 
shown in the map in Appendix C.  
41
 Herodotus made this reference while writing about the Greek General, Scylax’ exploration of 
the region upon Darius’ orders, the Persian King, to know the geography better. Using the Kabul 
river, Herodotus refers to his journey that started off from the ‘city of Kaspaturos’ which 
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‘Paktuike42’ inhabiting Gandhara region (See map in Appendix D) (Caroe, 2001). 
Likewise in one of the inscriptions at Naqsh e Rustam of Shapur I (c. 240-270) at 
Fars (Iran) the early name of Afghan appears as ‘Abgan’ and that of Peshawar as 
‘Paskiboura’ (Caroe, 2001). Such passing references only transitorily illuminate 
the region and its people. Although such references do not help us build a 
complete valid theory of the origin of the Pakhtun yet they help us understand 
the fact that they inhabited the Gandhara region.  
With respect to their origin, however, there exists another tradition that 
establishes them of Semitic origin. This tradition being historically inconsistent 
and contradictory is strongly criticized as an invalid theory of their origin 
(Ghani, 1988; Caroe, 2001; Mehsud, 2010). However the tribal genealogies that 
flow from this tradition, paradoxically, yield important information about the 
Pakhtun tribes, revealing their cousinly relationships, modes of behaviour and 
social organizations, which the Pakhtun themselves believe to be true. For 
instance, according to the tribal genealogies, the tribes in FATA43 seem to have 
stemmed from an ancestor named Karlanr. Likewise the tribes of the Peshawar 
valley and surrounding region44and those inhabiting Afghanistan45 belong to the 
                                                                                                                                                             
according to the historian Sir Olaf Caroe is Peshawar because it is the only place where the 
Kabul River can be used for such adventures (Caroe, 2001). 
 
42 Herodotus also mentions to ‘Paktuike’ and writes that ‘their way of life is almost the same as 
that of the Baktrians’ who ‘wore cloak of skin and carried the bow of their country and the 
dagger’ and who were ‘the most warlike of all Indians’ (cited on p: 29 by Olaf Caroe, 2001). 
Moreover Herodotus refers to four tribes living in Gandhara. One of them he calls ‘Aparutai’, 
which could be a reference to modern ‘Afridis’ (Caroe, 2001: 37). 
43
 They mainly include Wazir, Mehsud, Afridi, Bangash, Orakzai, Daurs, Mangals, and Khatak etc.  
 
44
Mohmands, Yusufzais, Shinwaris, Khalil, Chamkanis, Kasis etc 
45
Abdalis, Achakzais, Sheranis, Popalzai etc. 
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two sons of Sarbanr, namely Kharshbun and Sharkhbun respectively (Caroe, 
2001).  
However, these genealogies do resemble other segmented tribal societies, for 
instance Ait Atta tribe in Morocco studied by Gellner (1969). The Pakhtun 
tribes, like the segmentary tribes of Morocco, are further divided into compact 
segments wherein each segment is traced to a male ancestor. As a segmented 
society, there is no single tribal chief. This renders their society egalitarian in 
spirit while the internally developed mechanisms of maintaining social order do 
not create the need for the state-institutions. Gellner also notes such 
observation with regard to his anthropological study in Morocco.  
At present, the Pakhtun live in Southern Afghanistan and North Western region 
of Pakistan, having shared religious, ethnic, and linguistic background. In order 
to understand better Pakhtun as a cultural group, the following section divides 
their history into three subsections. Each section deals with a specific era and as 
we move from one era to the next, we encounter a much clearer picture of the 
Pakhtun and their culture. Living at the Pak-Afghan border, the region inhabited 
by the Pakhtun was a consistent ground of violence. A region that was otherwise 
popularized as no man’s land was, indeed, everyone’s land (Banerjee, 2000: 25). 
However the desire of peace and non-violence also appears intermittently in the 
region as the following sections will show.  
3.4. The pre-Islamic era 
KP has a great historical depth and is credited with the Gandhara Civilization (c. 
500 BC-1000 AD). The Gandhara Civilization included the valley of Peshawar 
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and that of Swat (Khan, 1993) while stretching eastward towards Taxila in the 
Punjab and westward towards Jalalabad in Afghanistan (Dani, 1988) (see map 
in Appendix D). The Gandhara civilization experienced prolonged spells of 
Buddhist culture as Buddhism was adopted the state religion under the 
Mauriyas (c. 322 BC-185 BC) and again under the Kushans (c. 75 AD- 250 AD). 
The Gandhara civilization was a centre of art, and culture, and learning under 
numerous dynasties. Although Gandhara’s central capital fluctuated between 
Taxila (Punjab), Charsadda (North of Peshawar) and Peshawar, it was Peshawar 
that remained an important city of trade, arts, and culture for centuries, 
attracting foreign scholars and travelers. 
The Gandhara region was first conquered by the Achaemenian Dynasty in 
6thcentury BC, by the Greeks under Alexander in 327 BC (Docherty, 2007) and 
by the Mauriyas (322 BC-185 BC). However, it was under the Asoka’s rule (304 
BC to 232 BC) when Buddhism was declared the state religion (Khan, 1993). 
How the religious influences i.e. Zoroastrianism for 200 years and then 
Buddhism for about 100 years have impacted on people’s world-views, their 
sociability, arts and languages is not known to us in great detail, except for the 
archaeological monuments that show the fusion of different cultures and 
religions. The region then witnessed the arrival of different invading groups 
after the fall of the Mauriyas in 2nd BC (Docherty, 2007).  
It was during the Kushan dynasty (c. 75 AD to 250 AD) that Peshawar became 
the capital city and once again Buddhist religion and art, fused with strong 
Hellenic influences, reached its zenith transcending the frontiers of Gandhara 
and attracting foreign pilgrims to Peshawar. The Gandhara region remained a 
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battleground for the incoming armies of Persia in the 4th century AD, the White 
Huns in the 5th century AD and, again, Persia in the 6th century AD. In the 
absence of written, documented history, the Pakhtu folk literature does refer to 
these invasions, as one verse says: 
‘If our crops are not destroyed this year 
My beloved has promised to bring me a red shawl’ (Khatak, 2012) 
The persistent invasions made Gandhara a unique place that has witnessed a 
larger number of invasions than any other place in the world (Caroe, 2001: 25). 
The story of the pre-Islamic Gandhara is the story of fierce power struggles 
amongst different invading groups with varying cultural and religious 
associations. The Gandhara region had yet to experience a new spell of violence 
from Afghanistan. With the arrival of the Muslim rule, i.e. Ghaznavid (975-1186) 
in Afghanistan, both the pre-Islamic story of the region and the Gandhara 
civilization came to an end, introducing Islam as the new cultural force in the 
region, which was to create permanent stamps both on the region and its people 
(Ghani, 1988).  
The important characteristic of the pre-Islamic period of the region, besides 
violence, was the introduction of the non-violent ideology as conceived in 
Buddhism nearly 2000 years ago. The central authority, after declaring 
Buddhism a state religion, helped to propagate the norms of non-violence by 
building Buddhist monasteries and stupas that reminded the people of the non-
violent teaching of the Great Buddha. Though introduced and patronized by the 
kings, Buddhist Bhikshoos (missionaries), then, popularized the non-violent 
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religion, not only in the Gandhara but also in the adjacent countries. Some 
writers have argued that this cultural past might have possibly found 
expression in the Nonnviolent Movement in the 20th century (James, 1988; 
Banerjee, 2000). However, the Nonviolent Movement made precise references 
to Islam alone and not to this cultural past as explored in section 3 of this 
chapter.  
3.5. The Pakhtun after conversion to Islam 
The post Islamic era also brought new devastations, wars, and new competing 
forces to the ‘Indus frontier’, thus continuing the tradition of destruction and 
violence (Caroe, 2001: 117). However, this period offers, relatively, more 
information about both the region and its people. In this era, we hear about the 
Pakhtun, their tribes, their conversion to Islam, their involvement in the 
regional wars as ‘soldiers of fortune’, and fierce inter-tribal rivalries and battles 
amongst them (Caroe, 2001: 114)46. 
In this era we come to know that the Pakhtun tribes were helping different 
kings to conquer India to establish empires and kingdoms and while doing that 
the Pakhtun themselves held the Delhi throne three times47. However, in their 
own land they could not come up with an empire or governments of their own, 
not even a tribal ‘confederacy’ (Caroe, 2001: 249). Well-trained in the art of 
warfare, even the most powerful Mughal kings whether Akbar (1556-1605) or 
                                                        
46
 The word Afghan which had earlier appeared in 3rd AD in the Persian inscription started 
appearing again. The Muslim chroniclers especially al Beruni mentioned it in detail as Afghans 
living in the frontier of India and who are ‘rebellious and savage races’ (Caroe, 2001: 113). 
 
47
 First under the Khiljis (1290-1320), then under the Lodhis (1451-1526) and lastly under the 
Suris (1540-1556).  
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Aurangzeb (1658-1707) could not establish their writ in the Pakhtun region 
effectively.  
Amidst this resistance to the central authority by the Pakhtun and their mutual 
warfare, we hear of the Roshanaya Movement in the 16th century (c. 1560-
1638). It was led by Bayazid Ansari, famously known as Pir Roshan (c. 1525-
1582/85) with a mystical background. It successfully mobilized Pakhtun tribes 
for resistance against the Mughal. However, his movement had to face local 
resistance from a different set of religious leadership located in the Swat valley 
who declared his ideas heretic, thus contributing to the tribal rivalries. Some 
perceive this mobilization as a sectarian rift which was used by the tribes to 
maintain their autonomy but also to assert themselves against other tribes 
(Caroe, 2001). However, others argue, providing evidence from the Pakhtu 
poetry, that the movement was the earliest example of the Pakhtun 
enlightenment that aimed at liberty, equality and women’s rights, which were 
expressed in the prose and poetry by the members of the movement 
(Maghmoom, 1998; Khatak, 2012; Mehsud, 2012). An important feature of this 
movement was the emergence of female leadership from within the tribal 
structures, as Pir Roshan’s granddaughter Bibi Alai led the mobilization at a 
later stage until negotiation was reached with the Mughal emperor (Gandapur, 
2008).  
In the same period, we encounter the themes of love, peace, and humanity in the 
poetry of the mystic poet, Rahman Baba (1653-1711). In his poetry, the 
meaning of jihad is transformed from the physical struggle against an external 
enemy into an inward journey of self-purification. In his poetry the notions of 
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male ego and male honor otherwise popular amongst the Pakhtun are 
exchanged with love and service to humanity (Enevoldsen, 1993; APISF, 2010).  
Like the pre-Islamic period, this period also shows the continuity of the violence 
exhibited by different invading groups including Pakhtun tribes too. However, 
the pre-occupation with the themes of peace, love and non-violence also 
emerged in the writings of cultural thinkers, this time inspired by Islam. It is this 
set of values and norms, which the participants of this research identified as 
important organic sources of civility and peace. Participants also made frequent 
references to Pir Roshan’s movement as an indigenous example of cultural 
change.   
3.6. The Pakhtun in the colonial period 
The British colonization of the Peshawar valley illuminates both the region and 
its people much better as a number of Western envoys, historians and 
anthropologists explored the area. The British arrival in the region was 
necessitated by the possible Russian expansion towards Afghanistan, which was 
perceived as a potential threat by the British. The Peshawar valley once again, 
like its past, assumed a key role in the regional power politics. Soon after the 
decisive defeat of the Sikhs, Peshawar and the surrounding regions were 
included in the British Raj in 1849. It was in 1901 that a separate province, the 
North West Frontier Province (NWFP) emerged, excluding the tribal belt known 
as FATA, which was regulated by a different administrative set up (See map in 
Appendix C).   
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The British period is extremely important as it is the first ever recorded 
instance wherein we see the arrival of an early prototype of the modern state in 
the form of a firm government with a new administrative system, written laws 
and defined borders, which was to have great implications for the Pakhtuns. The 
‘Indus frontier’ had no such tradition as all previous kingdoms enjoyed very 
limited control at the plains of the frontier, and were concerned more with 
revenue collection or building road or towns.  
The administrative system was specifically bureaucratic in character, which 
kept a strict vigil on the possible emergence of political activities and resistance. 
The written law that came in the form of Frontier Crime Regulation (FCR) in 
1872 was yet another anomaly that led to the corruption of the local institution 
of the Jirga48 (council of elders) wherein the elders were handpicked by the 
British authorities with extensive powers to treat political resistance (Baha, 
1987).  
The region was cordoned off in the form of a new border, the Durand line, in 
1893 which divided the Pakhtun in two countries, i.e. Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
while the demarcation of the tribal belt from the settled districts of NWFP was 
to serve the British’s strategic purposes. Such geographical changes and the 
very presence of Colonial forces in the frontier were perceived by the Pakhtun 
as foreign occupation leading to volatile situations. Although NWFP was a 
separate province in 1901 yet for three decades, it remained without an 
assembly unlike other regulated provinces of the Indian Raj, and political 
reforms were considered not suitable for the people until 1932. NWFP was 
                                                        
48 Jirga, in Pakhtun culture, is a local mechanism of resolving different community issues, 
conflicts in particular (Yousafzai & Gohar, 2005).  
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perceived as an important strategic border area by the British that helped them 
to protect their borders against possible Russian incursions, therefore, political 
activities were discouraged in the early part of the 20th century (Banerjee, 
2000).  
The North West Frontier Province49 became part of the Pakistan in 1947 and 
once again the politics of the Pakhtun identity seeking equal rights from a 
strong central state were repressed. Pakhtu language assumed immense 
importance in its mediation with the state as Pakhtu language was seen the key 
source of the Pakhtun identity, connecting them to their cultural past (Raham, 
2005).  
NWFP became an international hot spot as the Afghan war began in 1979. The 
central state, in alliance with the international powers, pursued the policy of 
Jihad using FATA as an operational and training ground for the Jihadi. Both the 
role of the state towards its own people and the birth of violent extremism are 
separately discussed in chapter 4.  
The importance of the British period lay not only in the detailed picture of the 
Pakhtun but also in the fact that the British period was soon to act as the 
immediate context of the most important period in Pakhtun history and which 
is of great relevance to our thesis. The arrival of the modern prototype Western 
state, though without its parliamentary and political contours and oriented 
towards security concerns alone, was to act as the opposing but oppressive 
                                                        
49 The province was renamed as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) in April 2010.  
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structure to the emergence of the Nonviolent Movement, which is explored in 
the last section of the chapter.  
It was suggested, in the first chapter, that the concept of civil society as a 
heterogeneous non-state social space and as a norm of civility will be deployed 
in our thesis.  The following sections will explore in detail the Pakhtun non-state 
social space as it appears at present and how the norm of civility was 
constructed from local cultural and religious perspectives.  
3.7. The Pakhtun culture 
Culture is a contested term, which has different understandings in different 
academic fields. Being one of the ‘most complicated words in the English 
language’, the word ‘culture’, slowly acquired its meaning as different academic 
fields employed it (Williams, 1976 p: 87). Raymond Williams (1976) argued that 
despite different meanings of the word, it can be deployed as ‘a particular way 
of life, which expresses certain meanings and values not only in art and learning 
but also in institutions and ordinary behaviour’ (p: 57). Being a particular way 
of life, culture encompasses the entire past legacy and heritage of a given group, 
which includes arts and language, customs and rituals and moral values. Culture 
as such is learnt and shared and transmitted from generations to generations 
(Haralambos & Holborn, 2000; Morris, 2012).  
‘Culture... is inextricably linked with the social groupings and social institutions 
which constitute society at any given time and in any specific place’ and 
‘requires and implies interactions between people, between groups of people 
and between institutions’ and thus constantly evolve and change (Giles and 
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Middleton, p: 31). Closely related to culture, is the idea of tradition, which is also 
deployed in this thesis. Tradition is considered as ‘The customs and practices 
held to have been handed down from generation to generation within a culture, 
or a particular instance of them. A tradition is often regarded as a cultural 
birthright’ (Morris, 2012: 254). However, tradition, linked to an imagined or 
real past, is also constructed in specific conditions (Hobsbawm and Rangers, 
1994).  
However, certain aspects of a given culture may be perceived of permanent 
value and, thus, are repeated to instill a fixed behavior. In other words, certain 
aspects of a given culture are fixated or structured to embed certain way of 
imagining the world or behaviour. The structurisation of certain aspects then 
makes the entire cultural space a practicing field of power as certain groups 
may be perceived in a specific ways, which lead to their marginalisation in a 
given society (Giles and Middleton). Bourdieu (1984) also argues that a specific 
perception, which has acquired the status of knowledge, may place a specific 
group in a given culture at a privileged position. Closely linked to the concept of 
social structure, the concept of human agency, which mediates with structures 
and through which marginalised groups advocate their social position (Walsh, 
1998).  
Pakhtun culture has been influenced by two very powerful and highly inspiring 
perspectives, i.e. Pakhtunwali and Islam. However, culture, like a social space, is 
not a bounded and instead remains porous (Massey, 1994) and cannot be 
reduced to specific, countable perspectives. Living within new socio-political 
realities since the 20th century has also mobilised new discourses, which some 
144 
 
people do not see organic in character and, thus, resist them. For instance, the 
international discourse of women’ rights has also contributed to the emergence 
of feminine liberal forces amongst the Pakhtun as demonstrated by the women’s 
struggle for their rights discussed in chapter 5.  
Pakhtunwali is an un-written code of the Pakhtun way of life inherited from the 
distant past, ‘transmitted through an oral tradition’ to the next generations, that 
‘governs the life of the individual Pukhtoons as well as their communities’ 
(Spain, 1972; Yousafzai & Gohar, 2005: 44). While this definition projects 
Pakhtunwali as a Pakhtun tradition, others argue that Pakhtunwali is a culture 
(Khatak, 2012). It is their unwritten social constitution, developed over 
hundreds of years, that ensures community cohesion and social order, 
addresses their needs, acts as a social contract among the Pakhtun, defines 
social roles and responsibilities of various gender groups and preserves the 
Pakhtun culture and identity.  
Pakhtunwali comprises various norms and values, social structures, institutions 
and individual and collective practices, equally applicable to the household life 
and the public life, that include ashar (group work), badal (revenge), itebar 
(trust), nang (honour), melmastai (hospitality), Jirga (Elders’ council), Hujra 
(Community centre), gawand (neighbourhood) ‘Khegara’ (welfare), ‘loz or jaba’ 
(an oral commitment) and other fundamental aspects of community life 
(Afghanan, 2010; Khyber, 2010). These norms, structures and institutions seem 
to be the empirical expression of the ideals of justice, co-operation, collectivism, 
fairness, equality, peace, conflict resolution and dialogue. Pakhtunwali, at the 
normative level, conceives a society that is violence-free and is always ready to 
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debate a contentious issue. This is clearly expressed not only in the folk, but 
classical and modern Pakhtu literature. The Roshanaya movement writers, and 
classical poets such as, Khushal Khatak (1613-1689), and Rahman Baba have 
been propagating these ideals of peace, tolerance, dialogue and deliberations, 
and the importance of human reasoning (Khatak, 2012)50. However, it may be 
pointed out that Pakhtunwali is not a homogenous code.  Instead, the internal 
complexity that runs across class, gender, and power relations and the 
difference in geography has led to different specificities of Pakhtunwali suited to 
different regions within KP.  
Moreover the very existence of a large number of words in Pakhtu language like 
Jirga (an assembly to resolve a conflict), maraca (consensus seeking platform), 
theega (cease-fire), rogha (resolution), jora (reconciliation), and saaz 
(rebuilding relations) further testifies the normative ideals of Pakhtunwali and 
its orientation towards peace and civility (Khatak, 2012: 6). It is these 
traditional resources, which the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar invokes as 
an important alternative philosophical value system. However, invoking such 
resources also triggers certain antithetical forces as discussed in the following 
section and empirically examined in chapters 5 and 6.  
Some have criticized Pakhtunwali for its masculine character and declared it a 
‘male-centered code of conduct’ (Weiss, 1995: 109), others have argued that it is 
a change-repulsive tribal remnant (Azam, 2010) that helps maintain an ‘ordered 
anarchy’ (Levian, 2010). Some argue that the Pakhutn culture is for and by the 
                                                        
50 An important cluster of our respondents as discussed in chapter 5 i.e. ‘Culturalists’ perceive 
Pakhtunwali at normative level and consider it an unwritten, agreed-upon, time tested 
constitution of social order and mutual respect.  
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men in which women have low social status and image. The privileged social 
structures, institutions or roles are occupied by men only (Ahmed, 1986: 29).  
However, masculinity is neither restricted nor directed at women alone, rather 
knitted with male honour. In other words, patriarchy and masculinity have 
contributed to violence in different forms. The empirical cases where violence is 
justified in the name of Pakhtun honor (nang), whether committed in the form 
of honor killing of women or family enmities, are counted by many as the direct 
negation of the normative ideals of Pakhtunwali. For example, the important 
institution of Jirga is perceived to be productive in securing peace and resolving 
conflicts in the Pakhtun society. However, Jirga does not proactively intervene 
in the private affairs of families or other individual matters, nor does it address 
the root causes of conflict in order to discourage its re-occurrence in the future. 
Jirga, being regulated by Pakhtunwali and led by men alone, as Akbar s Ahamd 
(1986) argues, has condoned honor killing of women because Pakhtun honor is 
situated within women. He further argues that the respect and honor of her 
close agnatic relatives will always be vulnerable if she doesn’t keep her chastity 
as required.  
The man’s world of Pakhtunwali becomes once again prominent when women 
remain absent from the public space, shut within the private realm of household 
as ‘unrecognized workers’ (Benedict Grimas 1993 as cited by Aneeta Azam, 
2010: 32) where the tasks are ‘physically hard and monotonous’ (Ahmed, 1986: 
30). The only way to get respect in society and within her family, is to live in 
self-denial and please everyone around her. However, if she crosses the men-
made boundaries, she potentially faces the charges of social stigma (Safdar 
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1997; Azam 2010). The centuries-old Pakhtu folk literature depicts a stressful 
image of women as the victims of male Pakhtu honour, given to hard homely 
tasks, without any social rights (Ahmad & Boase, 2010; Azam, 2010). Similarly, 
Pakhtunwali’s negotiation with Islam is also interesting in this regard as in 
some cases it has altered the very basic Islamic principles, as is evident in the 
case of women’s inheritance rights, which is denied to them under Pakhtunwali 
though granted by Islam (Ahmed, 1986). The patriarchy in the Pakhtun culture 
seems to have been strengthened by the religious interpretations of women as 
weak, fickle, and unintelligent, which justified their exclusion from the public 
space51.  
Similarly ‘badal’ (revenge), an important norm of Pakhtunwali, needs special 
mentioning. Pakhtun do not tolerate the slightest of an insult to himself, his 
relatives, specifically women, or his property and it is binding on him to try his 
best to redeem his self-respect (Ahmad, 1986). Taking revenge is perceived as 
the true trait of Pakhtunness and seems to be strongly interlinked with male 
honor or ego (Khyber, 2010). Badal is strongly interlinked with the norm of 
‘nang’ (honor) that cuts through all aspects of Pakhtunwali and is a matter of life 
and death for Pakhtun (Ahmed 1980, Barth 1981). This tendency, however, is 
actively checked by the institution of Jirga, ‘nanawati’ (pardoning), and the 
Islamic teachings of pardoning enemies, yet it has contributed to enormous 
violence. However, in the cases of elopement, adultery or a love-affair, both man 
and the woman involved in the incident are killed. Badal, in such cases, is not 
sought by relatives of both persons as Pakhtun honor was compromised on both 
                                                        
51 An important cluster of our respondents as discussed in chapter 5 i.e. ‘women reformists’ 
seems to identify this masculine mindset that has led, according to them, to the subjugation and 
repression of women in the Pakhtun culture.  
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sides (Ahmed, 1986; Safdar, 1999). Thus, badal is underpinned by a strong 
masculine sense of honor. It is this trait of the Pakhtunwali that, at times, 
overshadows other traits that can potentially nurture tolerance and has invoked 
strong stereotyping from observers of Pakhtun society.  
Similarly, all are equal and independent of others, yet social stratification exists. 
The low working or professional classes, though not excluded from the Pakhtun 
society, yet they are not classed as pure Pakhtun, as depicted in the folk 
literature, which is why they are not so dominantly visible in the public space 
(Ahmed, 1986; Ahmad & Boase, 2010). For example, the landless class would 
never be seen acting as elders in the tribal Jirga (Weiss, 1995: 110). Although 
some think that Pakhtunwali does not encourage a separate platform for the 
young to connect and realize their potentials (CYAD, 2012), however, it is the 
‘masher’ or ‘speengeerey’ (the elder or grey bearded) who occupies a more 
dominant position (Safdar, 1997).  
As tribal genealogies still illuminate their roots, therefore, kinship networks are 
a common phenomenon. Kinship networks play an important role in the 
Pakistani society where family is an important institution that gives a sense of 
protection and identity to its members (Levian, 2010; Weiss, 1995: 100). These 
extended families or ‘biradari’ denoted as ‘khel’ or ‘zai’ are based on a common 
descent or locality, which play an important role in their mutual interactions 
(Weiss, 1995; Safdar, 1997). These networks or ‘the biradaris’ have traditionally 
served as a combined mutual aid society and welfare agency, arranging loans to 
members, assisting them in finding employment, and contributing to the 
dowries of poorer families’ (p: 101). While such network-systems may be a 
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source of strength to its members, cousinly relations may prevent them building 
civil society, as Gellner argued.  
In addition to Pakhtunwali, Islam, for Pakhtun, acts as yet another important 
worldview that links them ‘with model past’ and ‘persons’ that ‘offers the only 
sound basis … for forming and reforming one’s society in any age’ (William 
Graham as cited in Zaman, 2002: 3). In Pakhtun society, Islam has mingled with 
the Pakhtunwali, creating a unique character of its own. Most Pakhtun prefer 
Pakhtunwali owing to its compatibility to their religion, but also because 
Pakhtunwali has emerged from within their cultural habitat and therefore has 
social acceptance and is owned as the only legitimate way of life (Khatak, 2012). 
Pakhtun perceives Pakhtunwali as perfectly compatible with the principles of 
Islam, which further enhances its sublimity and grandeur amongst its 
practitioners as both emphasise self-help, cooperation, justice, forgiveness and 
peace. 'To the tribesmen, Islam provides specified political and socio-religious 
formations within which his Pukhtunness operates. The two are in harmony ... 
Islam is so much a part of the Pakhtun structures as to suggest that the 
dichotomy is false' (Ahmed, 1991: 139). While this might be true of certain 
tribes, our empirical findings have explored tensions between cultural and 
religious perspectives.  
Islam amongst the Pakhtun seems to have been interpreted in such a way that 
seems to have reinforced some of the institutions and values that already 
existed. For instance, Islam advocates that a daughter is legible to get half a 
share as compared to a brother in inheritance, but in Pakhtunwali women are 
not entitled to get any share.  
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However, it does not mean that Islam has a secondary position rather for the 
Pakhtun, Islam has been always a very sensitive issue. In addition to cultural 
change, nonviolent political struggle, and language, Pakhtuns were also 
mobilised in the name of Islam. The idiom of Jihad was not unfamiliar to them. 
For instance, Pakhtun were mobilized in the name of Jihad against the Sikhs in 
the 1830s mainly in the Swat Valley (Peer, 2008). Mullah Hadda (1839-1902) 
launched his Jihad against the British in the later part of the 19th century. While 
Pakhtun were experiencing the non-violent movement in the region around 
Peshawar, some leading Pakhtun individuals, such as Haji Saheb Turangzai 
(1858-1937) and Faqir of Ipi’s (1897-1960) were still actively fighting against 
the British (Haroon, 2010). While focusing on this Jihadist lineage, some 
historians have tried to link the current Taliban-phenomena with this Jihadist 
historical strand in KP (Levian, 2010). Others, while focusing on the social 
implications of Jihadist struggle in various parts of KP, suggest that the presence 
of these religious leaders and their influence to mobilise people for Jihad has, in 
part, seemed to have strengthened the position of the religious clerics in the 
Pakhtun society (Haroon, 2010). 
Sana Haroon (2010), in particular, argues that religion, Islam, remained more in 
revivalist hues that focused more on the standard literal understanding of the 
religion as preached by Deobandi scholars that had very close connections with 
the religious class in KP since the 16th and 17 centuries. A substantively large 
number of students from different parts of KP studied in Deobandi52 madrasa53, 
                                                        
52
 One of the oldest religious school of thought, Deoband, was established in 1867 in Saharanpur 
in United Province (UP), India as a response to the British secular culture in India. The 
graduates sought positions in mosques and madrasa throughout India. They rejected any 
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who, after graduation from Deoband, use to preach in different parts of KP 
(Haroon, 2011: 58-59).54 
Thus, both Pakhtunwali and religion are the dominant frameworks that inform 
Pakhtun culture. The presence of cultural and religious perspectives as pre-
defined worldviews, Pakhtunness as an ascriptive identity, the presence of 
roles, obligations and responsibilities may be perceived as potential hurdles to 
build a civil society. Moreover, in the Pakhtun culture we find certain norms and 
structures that seem to marginalize certain groups on the basis of gender and 
profession. A masculine social patterning seemed to have contributed to the 
violence against women.  
The above discussion may imply that the Pakhtun culture is a static social space 
wherein interactions are determined and reproduced by existing norms and 
structures quite mechanically. Structure and norms seemed to determine 
human affairs and human agency seems to take a back seat. It seems to imply 
                                                                                                                                                             
alliance with AIML. They were inspired by Shah Walli-u-Allah reformist school of thought and 
issued religious decrees or fatwa against bidats (innovations) and shirk (Polytheism). They also 
launched struggle against Ahmadis or Qadyanis before partition (Kazmi 2009 p: 76). 
53 Madrasas started appearing in the Indian subcontinent during Muslim rule. However they 
received great impetus under colonial rule as important spaces of vernacular but religious 
responses to the British secular educational system. As a result, its syllabus was extremely 
conservative in spirit opposing all forms of changes within the Islamic Jurisprudence (Rubbin, 
1999; Bano, 2010). As boarding and lodging including food was freely available, therefore, 
young male Afghan refugees flocked to these institutions. 
54 An important cluster of our respondents as discussed in chapter 5 i.e. ‘Religionists’ seems to 
resonate this kind of religious approach. However, this thesis does not propose that the 
religionists are the heirs of such an approach. Instead we argue that the presence of the 
religionists may be seen in the post-1980s context that includes political and regional 
geopolitical contexts.  
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that social structures have a destiny of their own and the social agents have 
limited potentials to negotiate with them and thus are bound to re-live them.  
The following section will not only normatively challenge such implications, but 
also present an empirical case of cultural dynamism wherein Pakhtun could 
imagine and practice a new social order. The following section will explore how 
Pakhtun public sphere imagined and practiced the norms of nonviolence, how 
the advocacy of women-rights and their inclusion in the public sphere were 
encouraged and how the ‘badal’ or revenge seeking tendency was discouraged 
in order to end bloodshed. While providing an empirical case to support our 
argument, the following case study will also demonstrate that the desire of a 
new peaceful social order was constructed from immanent sources, thus, 
serving as the foundation of our argument.  
3.8. The Nonviolent Movement amongst the Pakhtun (1929-1938):55 The 
proto-type of civil society 
The nonviolent movement amongst the Pakhtun was an entirely unexpected 
resurrection for some as Pakhtun were consistently perceived and popularized 
as warriors, prone to violence and their social order as male-centric (Banerjee, 
2000). Yet from deep within their folds and their culture there emerged a social 
movement, a movement of reformation and non-violence, a movement of a 
persistent and organized attempt to redefine their social order (Jansson, 1988; 
Easwaran, 1999; Shah, 1999; Banerjee, 2000; Mehsud, 2010). The movement is 
an empirical evidence of how people, as active agents, can negotiate with their 
                                                        
55
 Although the Movement was formally started in 1929 yet activities started off as early as 1912 
(Shah, 1999; Benerjee, 2000).  
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social structures that they inhabit, how tradition can be challenged by revisiting 
some of the norms that inform their sociability and how to exchange the norms 
of revenge and intolerance with those of civility and non-violence. The 
movement exhibits its rootedness in the same cultural habitat, seeking 
inspiration from the immanent systems, i.e. Islam and Pakhtunwali, thereby, 
transforming the notions of Islam and Pakhtunwali as life-ideals. The movement 
also exhibits how people, immersed in ascriptive identities and cousinly 
relationships, were able to challenge violence and imagine and practice non-
violence in the absence of marketization and liberalism.   
3.9. The Context of the movement 
The arrival of the British in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 1849, changing the 
geography of the region to suit their imperial designs by drawing the border, 
Durand Line, in 1893 that enabled them to ‘construct a rock and iron curtain on 
the fringe of their Raj’ and setting up different administrative units56 had far 
reaching impacts on the Pakhtun community (Caroe 2001; Banerjee, 2000: 24). 
The perception of NWFP as the gateway to the British India and that of Pakhtun 
as rebellious and volatile justified the enormous deployment of huge armies and 
implementation of Frontier Crime Regulation (FCR) (Uberoi, 1978; Weiss, 1995; 
Shah, 1999; Raqib, 2005). The denial of political status to the NWFP for three 
decades (1901-1932), unlike other British Indian provinces and the increased 
taxation mainly in Peshawar and Mardan further complicated the situations 
                                                        
56
 KP was ruled from Punjab for about 52 years (1849-1901). Gaining the partial status of a 
province unlike other Indian provinces, FATA was cut off and was governed directly by the 
Governor General of India whereas small principalities remained independent in KP (Shah, 
1999).  
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(Caroe, 2001)57. Consequently raids and attacks on the British check posts, 
officers and other strategic places became a common feature in the province 
(Banerjee, 2000). 
However, the non-violent movement was not the result of political 
circumstances alone and the local dynamics of the Pakhtun culture also played a 
key role. The realization amongst the protagonists of the movement was strong 
that in the presence of badal (revenge) that has contributed to the disunity, 
mutual rivalries, and bloodshed, a concerted movement is a remote possibility 
that will neither win their freedom from the British nor from their oppressive 
social structures (Easwaran, 1999).  
3.10. The rise of the movement  
It was in this context that Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (1890-1988) emerged with 
the realization of how to win freedom and how to end the miseries of the 
Pakhtun community by empowering them. However, he soon realized the 
constraining impacts of some of the social structures. Thus, in order to win 
freedom, Pakhtun culture must be reformed in order to purge it of all the 
potential inhibitions that has held them back from embracing the ideals of 
civility and progress (Shah, 1999; Easwaran, 1999). Once this realization was 
articulated he was soon joined by a number of influential people both religious 
clerics and landed class. Mobilising a large number of Pakhtun masses, the 
movement, however, would have not emerged if the ‘wildest and rudest’, as 
                                                        
57 The poor status of the region can be gauged from the fact that only 25 were literate out of 
every 1000 in 1911 and most of the administrative officers posted in KP were British rather 
Indians as out of 124 only 17 were Indians till 1947 (Banerjee, 2000: 44).  
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perceived by the British (Caroe, 2001: 337), had not made conscious decisions 
to join the movement (Banerjee, 2000).  
Commencing his reform agenda in 1912, they focused on education first, 
opening a large number of schools which emphasized both religious and secular 
learning in the mother tongue, connecting them with the past and infusing a 
nationalist spirit (Kakakhel, 2012). Anjuman Islah-e-Afghania (Afghan Reform 
Society) was established in 1921 in order to institutionalize his reformist 
struggle that soon spread to other parts of the province. This Society, 
specifically focused on reforming the Pakhtun customs of revenge and 
encouraging people to shun violence to offer an effective and concerted 
resistance to the British. In order to empower people that change is in their 
hands and can only be achieved through struggle, the Society also included tasks 
such as cleaning, weaving and helping the poor (Shah, 1999; Banerjee, 2000).  
To organize his struggle and broaden its horizons, he established Pakhtun Jirga 
(Pakhtun Council) in 1927 with a multiple socio-political and economic agenda 
for further reforms. A Pakhtu monthly magazine ‘Pakhtun’ was issued in May 
1928 that reached a circulation of 3000 in 1930s (Banerjee, 2000: 55; Raqib, 
2005; Kakakhel, 2012).   
In 1929 Khudai Khidmatgaar Tehreek or the Servants of God Movement (KKT) 
was launched by opening up training camps for voluntary members aimed at 
cementing unity among Pakhtun and nurturing the norms and practices of 
nonviolence. The number of volunteers rose from 1000 in 1931 to 100,000 in 
1938 (Raqib, 2005: 124). Members were involved in well-designed tasks of 
writing, reading, cleaning, and spinning. An important trait of this movement 
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was the open discourse in evening meetings that focused on the struggle and 
their emancipation. Volunteers before enlisting used to take an oath on the Holy 
Koran by saying that ‘I will not take revenge’ and ‘I will serve people without 
regard to their religion or faith’ (Banerjee, 2000 p: 74). KKT was open to people 
of all faiths and attracted Hindus and Sikhs. However, KKT proved to be an 
important space not only for the low professional class, but also women for the 
first time in the history of Pakhtun (Easwaran, 1999; Kakkhel, 2012).  
The greatest achievement of the KKT was to convince the Pakhtun men of 
women’s low status in Pakhtun society and their importance in the public 
sphere. As a result, hundreds of women became KKT members, attended 
meetings and joined or even led protests at different occasions (Banerjee 2000 
p: 97-101). A society so imbued with male honor and patriarchal structures was 
opening up spaces for women, on a large scale, for the first time in its history.  
For instance, in the ‘Pakhtun’ monthly magazine, women articulated their 
criticism of the social structures and male-norms that inhibited them from 
seeking education and joining the public sphere (Easwaran, 1999; Kakakhel, 
2012). They wrote openly about their subjugation to men in homes, their 
secondary role in society, advocated for the establishment of separate women’s 
associations, separate women’s schools, separate woman-newspaper and 
expressed their desire to contribute to the development of arts, language and 
society  (Kakakhel, 2012). 
The movement, however, remained restricted to the Peshawar valley alone, 
mainly due to an organized campaign, from the British and then from the 
Muslim League, to discredit it. It was argued by the opponents that KKT is 
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propagating the Hindu philosophy of Ahimsa (non-violence), which had nothing 
to do with Islam and Pakhtunwali.  
KKT had to face not only the British Raj but also its rival political party, the 
Muslim League. As political reforms were introduced in KP in the 1930s, KKT as 
the political ally of the Indian National Congress easily won elections in 1937 
and formed its government. Till 1947 KKT remained a part of wider national 
resistance against the British. However, as KKT was in alliance with the Indian 
National Congress, the rival of the Pakistan Muslim League, therefore, after the 
inception of Pakistan, the Muslim League’s leadership that was heading the 
Pakistani state banned KKT and the ‘Pakhtun’ magazine and its leadership was 
arrested under the charges of ‘sedition’ (Easwaran, 1999: 185). Nevertheless, 
Bacha Khan and his descendants continued their nonviolent struggle and 
worked for provincial autonomy and Pakhtun’s rights as explored in chapter 4.  
3.11. KKT: imagining non-violent spaces 
KKT with all its organized and designed activities and training programmes that 
spread over two decades, creating effects that were deeply felt by the Pakhtun 
community, was a movement for the desire of cultural shift and an attempt to 
create a new social order (Shah, 1999; Banerjee, 2000).   
Besides creating a number of non-state voluntary associations, the movement 
also deployed the idioms of non-violence, civility and tolerance, which were not 
imported from a foreign source, but rather found embedded in their own 
immanent sources i.e. Pakhtunwali and Islam (Banerjee, 2000). The narrative of 
Pakhtun bravery and heroism were transformed into tolerance and non-
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violence, thus, re-interpreting violence-encouraging norms (Easwaran, 1999). 
Both the notion of the jihad in Islam and the notions of ‘badal’ and ‘nang’ 
(honor) underwent transformation that was consciously and rationally 
conceived.  
It was a movement of organized and persistent self-reflection, of liberating the 
marginalized from the oppressive social order and social structures, of 
empowering the weak to change his/her conditions and of hope to ‘establish a 
non-violent persona from within their own cultural resources’ (Jansson, 1988; 
Banerjee, 2000: 212).  
3.12. Conclusion  
The liberal model of civil society, which is the focus of research amongst 
academics and researchers since the 1990s seems to suggest individual 
liberalism or as Gellner puts it: modularity is the essential precondition of civil 
society. The case study of this research, i.e. the Pakhtun and their culture has 
predefined local cultural and religious perspectives and ascriptive identities, 
which has locked the Pakhtuns in ethnic, cousinly relations. If the liberal model 
of civil society perceives the ritualised identities and interactions as a serious 
obstacle to construct a civil society, then chapter 3 challenged this approach by 
examining, in detail, the internal dynamics of the Pakhtun culture. By exploring 
the Nonviolent Movement amongst the Pakhtun, it was argued, here, that 
modularity, marketisation and individual liberalism may not be the essential 
factors for a civil society to emerge beyond kinship, which also serves as the 
foundation of our argument in this thesis that alternative routes to construct a 
civil society may be possible.  
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The non-state social space in Pakhtun culture, informed by cultural and 
religious perspectives, has embedded norms and social structures that 
marginalize certain sections of the society besides encouraging latent violence 
amongst the Pakhtun. These norms and social structures are preserved in the 
name of Pakhtun identity and Pakhtun culture by Pakhtun male members. The 
emergence of KKT was a resistance against such norms and social structures. 
KKT shows how a society, imbued with tribal structures and consciousness, 
could transcend and imagine an alternative form of interactions based on non-
violence.  
While the desire of peace and non-violence kept appearing in individual Pakhtu 
literary masterpieces, KKT was a more collective but organized outburst of such 
desire. The segmented and traditional self showed the potentialities of ‘cultural 
creativity’ (Banerjee, 2000: 208) to imagine new spaces of interactions and 
sociabilities, to actively engage with others in the pursuit of non-violence while 
seeking inspiration from immanent sources.  
It is this empirical example that serves our thesis argument and presents a 
robust challenge to the Gellnerian assumption that ‘non-modular’ people cannot 
create a civil society. KKT explicitly shows that a kind of civil society in the 
sense of a non-state social space emerged in the absence of liberalism and 
market driven conditions amongst the non-modular people.   
As the traditional and segmented self has shown the potentialities to imagine 
and practice civility and non-violence, therefore, the concept of civil society as a 
norm of civility and its application in a non-Western context seems relevant. 
This also coincides with our deployment of the term civil society as a non-state 
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social space where the norms and structures that encourage both violence and 
non-violence may be found and thus is a heterogeneous rather than a 
homogeneous space.   
This chapter has made the readers of this thesis acquainted with the Pakhtun, 
their history and culture, which also serves as the cultural and social context of 
this thesis. The next chapter will focus on the political context and explore how 
violence has originated and spread in Pakistan. In other words, the two 
opposing forces, i.e. an authoritarian state and the Taliban’s violence, which the 
‘emergent civil society’ challenges, will be presented in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4 
4. Exploring the political context and the rise of violent extremism in 
Pakistan  
4.1. Introduction 
Laying out the theoretical framework of the term civil society, and the way this 
thesis deploys it in chapter 1, chapter 2 presented the detailed constructivist 
methodology as employed for this thesis and the details of the two field visits, 
whereas chapter 4 made the readers of this thesis familiar with the Pakhtun, 
their history, and culture.  
While the theoretical framework in chapter 1 may enable us to clearly  
understand the term, civil society, as a theoretical notion, chapter 3 may enable 
us to grasp, empirically, the cultural and social context of our case study. This, 
perhaps, may not help us develop a comprehensive portrait of our context if the 
political context of our case study is not explored. Besides exploring the political 
context of our topic in its entirety, this chapter will also investigate the roots, 
causes, and character of violence in KP. By exploring the political context and 
the Taliban’s violence, this chapter argues that the character of religious 
intolerance and extremism in Pakistan, in general, and in KP, in particular, at 
present, can only be understood if the character and the role of the Pakistani 
state is understood. Building the argument of this thesis further, it is argued in 
this chapter that the Pakistani state can neither be conceived through the 
conventional Western understanding of the state as an institution of civilian-
representative political forces nor did the Pakistani state evolve the way the 
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state evolved, as a distinct sphere, in the West. Having emerged from the 
colonial political milieu, the Pakistani state retained certain colonial 
characteristics.  
However, new regional dynamics also encouraged the state to pursue certain 
policies, such as Jihad in Afghanistan. The Zia regime in the 1980s, in particular, 
tried to Islamise the entire Pakistani society. Such events and polices also 
extracted response from the civic minded people, as the rise of advocacy NGOs 
in the 1980s demonstrated. This chapter, while presenting the political context, 
will show that the critical engagement of the civic minded forces with the 
authoritarian state was triggered by certain political events and the way the 
Pakistani state interacted with the social forces, which form the sociological 
background of the rise of advocacy NGOs in Pakistan.  
The chapter is divided into six sections. The first section deals with the pre-
independence history of Pakistan. The first section explores how the Pakistani 
state has retained some of the colonial traits such as patronising societies and 
social figures to discredit political opposition. Also, this section informs us that 
the religious leadership, which was present at the societal level in the pre-
independence period, was posing reactionary resistance to the British 
supremacy in the subcontinent.  
The second section deals with how a political elitist, but secular, leadership 
emerged since 1857 as the British formally assumed the charge of the Indian 
subcontinent. It was this political leadership which mobilised masses for the 
struggle of a political resistance against the British Raj. However, this political 
struggle was not entirely secular rather used the idiom of Islam to mobilise the 
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Muslim population against other rival political forces. The deployment of 
Islamic lexicon during the Indepedence Movement was to have great 
ramifications for certain political and religious forces in the post-1947 period.  
Section 3 will focus on the processes of the state formation in Pakistan. 
Pakistani state, as a result, assumed highly centralized, authoritarian, and 
exclusionary tendencies, and remained occupied by non-representative and 
non-political forces. This section will explore how the centralized state 
discouraged political processes, thereby, diminishing the possibility of 
democratic forces to grow. It is this power struggle between the democratic 
political forces and the undemocratic, non-political forces, which have led the 
writers of the political history of Pakistan to perceive this struggle as the 
struggle of civil society.  
The centralized state’s deployment of ‘Islam’ as a tool of legitimacy, was yet 
another anomaly that seemed to have contributed to the growth of religious 
forces both within and outside the state. While societal development, provision 
of security and granting fundamental human rights to the citizens were 
neglected by the elitist, authoritarian state, the centralised state also used 
Pakistani society and culture for its own strategic objectives. In particular, this 
section deals with the Zia regime (1978-88) for implementing a particular 
brand of Islam as the policy of the state. His Isalmization encouraged religious 
groups at the societal level, which led to sectarian rifts between Sunni and Shias. 
As the Afghan Jihad began, jihad, as an ideal, soon penetrated deep within the 
social fabric wherein religious groups were patronized by the state and as a 
result a number of militant groups emerged.  
164 
 
The Afghan Jihad and the Zia regime present the sociological background in 
which modern NGOs emerged in Pakistan. Section four will demonstrate that 
civil society despite being suppressed, showed the ability to perform the 
important task of criticizing the state as a number of advocacy NGOs, women’s 
associations in particular, emerged during the Zia regime in the 1980s to resist 
his Islamisation policies.  
Section 5 explores the origin of the Taliban as it emerged in the wake of the 
Afghan war in the 1990s and how the Taliban shifted their operational basis to 
FATA in Pakistan in the post 9/11 period. The Pakistani state played an 
important role by backing the Taliban, which created unforeseen but extremely 
dangerous results both for the state and society. It also explores the meaning of 
the ‘Talibanisation’, a form of violent extremism, as it became popular in the 
local media to describe the Taliban-specific violence. 
While section 4 makes reference to the resistance that emerged from the non-
state social space in the 1980s against the authoritarian central state, section 6 
mentions the peace oriented struggle, which has recently emerged in Peshawar 
amidst violence since 2006-07, which also criticises the state for a number of 
reasons.  
4.2. Pakistan in historical perspective: from the classical period to 1857 
Pakistan is a seat of ancient civilizations58. The region that includes Pakistan, at 
present, experienced continued invasions by different groups as it was explored 
                                                        
58 Indus Valley civilization dates back to 3000 BC to 1500 BC (Kazmi, 2009; Zia, 2009; 
Britannica, 2013). Stone age relics in the Northern Punjab are believed to be 500,000 years old, 
rock paintings in Northern Sind believed to be 25,000 years old and the Mehrgarh culture of 
Baluchistan Plateau dates back to circa 8000 BC to 3000 BC. 
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in chapter 3 in detail. With the appearance of the Muslim conquerors and 
dynasties since the 8th century AD, a new Indo-Muslim culture appeared, 
creating a vast heritage of music, languages, art and architecture. 
One of the important remnants of the prolonged Muslim rule, between the 11th 
and 19th century, was the birth of Jagirdari or ‘feudal’ system. A Jagirdar or 
feudal lord was to ensure tax collection in his area and raise armies for the king. 
This system was revived by the British (1857-1947) to strengthen their rule 
(Mohiuddin, 2007). However, unlike monarchs concerned about geographical 
unity, the British sought the political unity of the subcontinent by embedding 
bureaucracy in different social and political institutions. In order to strengthen 
the ‘social base’ of the British Raj (rule), deployment of bureaucracy managed to 
find new clients at the local level creating new patterns of patronage (Jalal, 
1995: 12). The Pakistani state, after its inception in 1947, had to revive and 
strengthen this trend of patronizing the local elites to create political legitimacy 
and undo political resistance. The Pakistani state’s interference in the non-state 
social space may be seen in the context of these specific historical dynamics. 
However, it was this privileged class of landlords that became influential not in 
the independence movement before the emergence of Pakistan, but also 
emerged as a new economic class of industrialists after 1947.  
Religion, Islam, though an important perspective of the Muslim population of 
the subcontinent, was neither politicised by the Muslim rulers in the post-16 
century period, nor Islam assumed the principle guiding force of the central 
administration for various Muslim rulers. It was the monarch alone, with 
overwhelming powers, whose personal disposition, whether benevolent or 
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ruthless, decided the style of the administration (Zia, 2009). However, outside 
the courts and kingly politics, the realization that Islam needs to be kept un-
contaminated from potential Hindu influences was gaining momentum, at the 
societal level, amongst the Muslim Ulama59 (Kazmi, 2009)60. The emergence of 
these religious figures seems to show that alongside the kings, courts and feudal 
lords, the Ulama had assumed a new leadership of the Muslim community in the 
subcontinent.  While the decline of the Mughal Empire was in full swing in the 
early part of the 19th century, the British were preparing for a century long rule 
of the sub-continent that formally commenced in 185761 (Mohiuddin, 2007).   
As the British political forces were gaining ascendency, the Muslim religious 
leadership, in order to resist their authority, issued a series of religious decrees 
against Western institutions and norms, which some historians believed to have 
contributed to reactionary tendencies among the Muslim population. For 
instance, the use of typewriters and loudspeakers were declared as un-Islamic 
(Ali, 2011). While the Muslim society, in general, was experiencing the rise of 
religious leadership and religious mobilization in some parts of the 
subcontinent against the British, it soon witnessed a new breed of leaders who 
were not necessarily using religion as a tool of resistance against the British 
rule, which is explored in the following section. 
                                                        
59
 Ulama, the plural of Alim, mean Muslim religious scholars.  
 
60
 Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi, known as Mujaddad (1564-1624), Shaikh Abdul Haq Mohhadith 
Delhivi (1551-1642), and Shah Walli-u-Allah (1703-1762) are just a few very important names 
dedicated to the task of purifying Islam in the sub-continent. It was Shah Walli-u-Allah’s grand 
children who had to travel from central India to KP to mobilize Pakhtun for Jihad against the 
Sikh and the British Raj in the 1830s (Kazmi, 2009).  
 
61
 The British had already conquered parts of present day Pakistan. The British annexed Sindh 
in 1843 whereas Punjab including present day KP was conquered in 1849 by the British. 
However it was in 1857 that the last Mughal Emperor was dethroned and imprisoned.  
 
167 
 
4.3. The arrival of new politics in the subcontinent: the post 1857 period 
In the pre-1857 era, politics was the sole domain and personal business of the 
monarchs, princes and their court-men. The arrival of the Western central 
authority with an emphasis on parliamentary forms of politics and the Victorian 
style administration, though overwhelmingly informed by colonial imperatives, 
triggered political mobilization within the local communities (Mohiuddin, 
2007). However, political mobilization was equally assisted by the growing 
realization that the struggle against the British was no more possible through an 
armed struggle62. Here it may be pertinent to point out while recalling 
Mamdani’s (1996) argument that this specific kind of new political struggle, 
emanating from within the masses, aimed at independence is very rarely seen 
as the emergence of civil society. Although both the Muslim and Hindu 
historians call it an independence movement, yet some have recently started 
seeing it as the earliest example of civil society as argued by Sudipta Kaviraj 
who calls it ‘an inchoate civil society’ (2001: 310).  
During the British imperial period (1857-1947), we see an educated Muslim 
secular elite class who successfully generated Muslim separatist politics in the 
pre-independence period (Jalal, 1995) and which, ultimately, led to the creation 
of Pakistan in 1947 (Gardezi, 1983; Kazmi, 2009). Thus the Muslim society, in 
general, which experienced religious leadership in the pre-British times and 
afterwards63, was experiencing secular leadership and was presenting a kind of 
civil society informed by resistance against the colonial enterprise while 
remaining mostly non-violent. However, it does not mean that the religious, 
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 As the battles of Plassy (1757) and Buxer (1764) exhibited.  
 
63 Instances of mobilization in the name religion in KP were referred to in chapter 2.  
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political struggle vanished completely rather it assumed new importance within 
the emerging political dynamics of the sub-continent. Nevertheless, it is the role 
of the religious, political parties after the creation of Pakistan that is relevant to 
our thesis as discussed below.  
A number of political parties slowly emerged amongst the local population 
during this period. The All India Muslim League (AIML), being the most 
important one as it led to the creation of Pakistan in 1947, had been established 
in 1906 (Mohiuddin, 2007; Kazmi, 2009). AIML, moving from its initial position 
of inculcating loyalty amongst the Muslim population for the British to a joint 
struggle with Indian National Congress (INC) against the British and then 
moving further to oppose INC, emerged as an important political party of the 
Muslim community. An important reason for the popularity of AIML was its 
attempt to couch its political struggle in religious terms in order to mobilize the 
Muslim population and compete with other rival Muslim political parties who 
were challenging AIML’s claim to be the sole representative Muslim party. For 
instance, KKT in KP was in alliance with the INC and opposed AIML’s separatist 
politics and the very idea of partitioning of the subcontinent based on religious 
identity.  
AIML’s emphasis on Islam proved to be effective in mobilizing people for a 
separate Muslim state for the Muslim community64 where ‘Islam as a cultural 
force’ was imagined (Kazmi, 2009: 115). The presence of religious politics, 
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 ‘I would like to see the Punjab, NWFP, Sindh, and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state’ 
as the Muslim scholar Iqbal (1978-1938) pronounced  in 1930 (Weston, 1992: 75 as cited by 
Mohiuddin, on p: 64). 
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though overshadowed by AIML and INC rivalries, were to have great 
consequences after the birth of Pakistan (Jalal, 1995). 
Close to the year of independence in 1947 and AIML’s impressive performance 
in the 1946 elections, influential, local landlords in Punjab switched sides from 
other political parties to AIML (Mohiuddin, 2007). However, the division of 
Bengal and Punjab, and the Kashmir issue created deep seated conflicts 
between the newly emerged countries of India and Pakistan, which seemed to 
have great repercussions for Pakistan (Kazmi, 2009).  
4.4. The post-independence period: the arrival of a strong central state  
Pakistan was enmeshed in a number of serious challenges since its inception. 
Although the locus of some of these challenges lies within the event of partition 
of 1947, yet the inheritance and embracement of various colonial legacies that 
found strong expression within the state institutions needs an equal 
understanding (Alavi, 1983; Jalal, 1995). If the arrival of about 7 million 
refugees65 generated impending problems for the newly emerged state, then the 
immediate conflict with India over Kashmir66, besides the division of assets67, 
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 The newly emerged state had neither the administrative infrastructure in place, nor the 
resources to set up one to face the daunting task of settling nearly 7 million refugees from India. 
There were no offices, office furniture or stationery or state machinery in 1947 to carry out the 
daunting task of refugee settlement. Nearly 6,500,000 people came to Pakistan from India 
(Kazmi, 2009: 186).  
 
66 Kashmir, a princely state in the north, still remains the disputed area and a great source of 
tension between Pakistan and India. 
67
 In financial assets Pakistan was initially allotted 5% of the total Indian capital if Pakistan was 
to agree to accept 20% liability of Indian debts. But as negotiation continued Pakistan’s asset 
raised up to 17.5% which was withheld too. Pakistan had to request loan from a Pakistan based 
bank Habib Bank to resolve its financial issues (Kazmi, 2009: 187-88). 
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and water disputes68 led to the prioritization of security concerns within the 
state’s policy.  
These conditions, to a certain extent, deeply impacted the processes of state 
formation that in turn complicated the state’s relations with smaller provinces. 
As a result the state emerged more centralized, powerful, authoritarian and 
exclusionary, tilted overwhelmingly towards non-elected institutions, mainly 
the military while accommodating and benefiting client-elites. Although like the 
colonial state, the Pakistani state also patronized certain social groups within 
the non-state social space, yet different political voices did offer resistance to 
the powerful state, which the state tried to neutralize by mobilizing the idioms 
of Islam.  
4.5. Processes of state-formation: The occupation of the central state by 
non-representative forces 
The very event of independence had hurled both the state and people into a 
unique relationship. Pakistan, in 1947, consisted of two wings, East and West 
(see map in Appendix E). While the Eastern part was ethnically homogeneous to 
a great extent, the Western part was composed of four provinces69 and 
inhabited by four major ethnic groups (see map in Appendix H). On the other 
hand AIML, which was now called ML (Muslim League) in Pakistan, which 
originated from the Muslim-minority provinces in India before partition, was 
led by leaders who also came from those provinces. ML, as such, lacked the 
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 Water dispute with India and tension on its eastern border with hostile Afghanistan that was 
denunciating the Durand line created problems for the nascent state of Pakistan. 
 
69
 Punjabis in Punjab, Sindhis in Sindh, Baluchis in Balchustan and Pakhtun in N.W.F.P. N.W.F.P 
was renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in April 2009. Thos who migrated from India in 1947 were 
known as Mohajirs.  
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organizational base and presence in the West Pakistan and, thus, needed new 
tools of legitimacy in Pakistan (Jalal, 1995). There was no cultural, linguistic, 
and historical homogeneity in the country called Pakistan, more specifically in 
the Western part, which was now led by ML. The ethnic diversity was perceived 
as a serious threat to the creation of a single nation by the then ML’s leadership 
(Samad, 1995).  
The ML’s leadership was, probably, conscious of this challenge. In this regard, 
the head of the new state and the ML, Mr. Jinnah’s address to the first 
Constituent Assembly may be a pertinent example. ‘You may belong to any 
religion, caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the state. We 
are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal 
citizens of one state’ (as cited by Kazmi, 2009: 185). A number of Jinnah’s 
speeches around 1947 clearly show his awareness of the diversity of the people 
of Pakistan and their associational legacies whether religious, ethnic or cultural. 
Deploying the idiom of ‘citizen’ was not without reason for him, which could 
potentially build political unity. Deploying the idioms of citizenship offered new 
possibilities of recasting state-people and people-to-people interactions, which, 
if actively implemented might have led to the creation of an enabling 
environment for the potential emergence of civil society. However, ML’s 
response to the already existing political rivals in Pakistan who showed the 
tendency of retaining independent political opinions seemed discouraging. For 
instance, political leaders of oppositional political party were imprisoned and 
their parties were banned (Samad, 1995). Moreover the ideal of citizenship 
seemed more a rhetoric once seen in the backdrop of certain decisions taken by 
the ML leadership in the immediate context of 1947. One of such decisions was 
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imposing Urdu as a national language that unleashed linguistic and regional 
resistance.  
The ML had chosen a religious ideology to mobilize the Muslim masses during 
the independence movement, which potentially held in check different linguistic 
and ethnic affinities of the Muslim population before the emergence of Pakistan 
in 1947 (Alavi, 1983). However, having achieved a state, the ML leadership 
wanted to devise and implement a monolithic ideology in order to build a nation 
from linguistically and culturally diverse groups. Urdu was spoken by none of 
the majority groups in Pakistan in both wings as it was the language of only 4% 
of the people (Oldenburg, 1985: 711). However, once Urdu was declared as the 
national language of Pakistan, it was soon perceived as a symbol of the state’s 
repressive character by various ethnic groups to annihilate their respective 
cultural identities (Jalal, 1995). The imposition of Urdu also meant that it would 
help only the migrant community to access state resources, which strained the 
relations between the two wings i.e. East and West, but also between the center 
and the smaller provinces in the Western wing. This led to the rise of linguistic 
opposition all across Pakistan, which was strongly repressed by the central 
state. Political grievances of the smaller provinces soon assumed linguistic 
movements such as Bengali, Sindhi, and Pakhtu language movement. These 
linguistic movements helped different linguistic groups to maintain their 
distinct cultural identity (Rahman, 2005). The feeling of marginalization in 
smaller provinces70 is still felt, which our findings bring out in chapter 6.  
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 Punjab was and is still the largest province, population-wise in Pakistan. Baluch, Sindhi and 
Pakhtun nationalist still put up an agenda of their cultural rights before the central state.  
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The idiom of citizenship received another blow, which is revealed in ML’s 
interaction with the already existing political forces in Pakistan. The ML was 
conscious of its weak organizational base in Pakistan as the ML leadership came 
from Muslim minority provinces in India (Jalal, 1995; Ziring, 2005). However, 
the ML having achieved Pakistan, assumed that it had the sole moral authority 
to govern Pakistan and ensure its survival. Any political opposition to ML was 
perceived to be tantamount to opposition to the very idea of Pakistan 
(Oldenburg, 2007). As a result, the growing vocal demand for provincial 
autonomy was perceived to be a serious challenge to the survival of the state 
and the project of nation building (Askari, 2000). In this regard and quite 
relevant to this thesis, is the political oppositional mobilization in KP. KKT’s 
alliance with INC, an arch rival of the ML during the independence movement 
made KKT a rival of ML in KP. KKT was able to win the election in 1946 and 
made their government. However, it was soon dismissed by the ML after 
Pakistan came into being. Ghaffar Khan, the leader of KKT, established a political 
party, All-Pakistan People’s Party, which was renamed later as People’s 
Organization, on March 1948, in order to check the centralizing tendencies of 
the ML and advocate their own political agenda. It included oppositional leaders 
from all provinces except Punjab. Its agenda was diametrically opposite to that 
of the ML i.e. seeking provincial autonomy, good relations with India, and 
cultural freedom (Samad, 1995). Such political mobilization was not allowed to 
grow and led to the imprisonment of political leaders. KKT was banned, ‘Pakhtu’ 
magazine was forcibly stopped and the KKT’s leadership was imprisoned on the 
charges of sedition (Banerjee, 2000). Public opinion was strictly controlled in 
Pakistan as in 1948 three journals were banned, whereas by 1953 in Punjab 
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alone 31 newspapers were banned. Controlling the press became more 
systematic in the 1960s (Niazi, 1986 cited by Oldenburg, 2007: 50-62). A kind of 
civil society or ‘the inchoate civil society’ that had emerged during the 
independence movement as mentioned above, albeit informed by different 
political goals, resorted to coercion and misuse of the state power against their 
political opponents once it came into power. Mamdani’s (1996) and Kaviraj’s 
(2001) argument by calling anti-colonial independence movement a civil society 
seems quite contested, once seen in the backdrop of this development, wherein 
a political party, the ML, that led an independence movement started 
suppressing independent political opinions. At the same time, it also raises a 
fundamental question whether or not a political party is an empirical example 
of civil society. This important theme becomes quite contested amongst the 
respondents of this research also as will be shown in chapter 6.   
Denying political rights to the people, the ML’s leadership did not hold any 
national or provincial elections in Pakistan as they feared that being in minority 
in Pakistan they would be dislodged by the existing political oppositions 
(Waseem, 2005). Soon the discourse of citizenship, which could have generated 
democratic narrative, was replaced by the deployment of an Islamic narrative, 
another important aspect of the construction of a monolithic ideology to build a 
single, unified nation (Ziring, 2005).  
The Pakistani state soon emerged as a state with a stronger center rather than 
investing autonomy in its federating unit as promised during the Pakistan 
Movement for Independence (Samad, 1995) it thus continued with the legacy of 
a centralized state as practiced by the colonials in the pre-independence period 
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(Jalal, 1995). The ML leadership relied heavily on the institution of bureaucracy 
(Sayeed, 1968; Alavi, 1983). Bureaucracy was already invested with immensely 
high powers in the provinces of NWFP (KP), Punjab and Baluchistan during the 
colonial era as a means to curb political resistance (Sayeed, 1968; Jafferlot, 
2002). The ‘...erect figure of a district officer in the middle of an excited 
procession...determination written on his face...’ was used, then, to rig elections 
dismiss parliament and inhibit all possible political processes through coercion 
(Oldenburg, 2007: 38). The evidence of their strong position within the central 
state can be judged from the fact that the Governor General (GG), Ghulam 
Mohammad71, a former bureaucrat, after dismissing parliament twice, installed 
his famous Cabinet of the Talents, which included both military and civil 
bureaucrats in 1954 (Alavi, 1983).  
Soon after 1947, the Pakistan Army slowly emerged as yet another powerful 
institution. The Pakistan military was publicly perceived to be the only 
organized institution capable of fighting the Indian threat. However ML’s 
leadership sought army’s intervention, now and then, to restore order within 
the country as it did after Punjab’s riots in 1951 (Oldenburg, 2007). Besides 
relying on bureaucracy, ML’s leadership heavily relied on army too (Cohen, 
1995; Jalal, 1995). The growing regional security concerns led to the 
prioritization of security imperatives over all other issues, such as creating a 
coherent political narrative (Samad, 1995; Waseem, 2005). The central state 
was soon occupied by the two non-elected institutions, i.e. civil bureaucracy and 
military oligarchy obstructing the chances of a true democracy to grow (Jalal, 
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 He was third GG of Pakistan (1951-55). The office of GG was abolished in 1958 and a new 
office of ‘President’ was introduced.  
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1995; Malik, 1999; Ahsan, 2005). However, this did not mean that the state, 
where the balance of power was clearly tilted towards civil-military oligarchy 
and where in turn the military occupied a well entrenched position, ignored the 
dominant socioeconomic classes or their interests. The central state extended 
all support to the influential individuals such as landlords to patronize and co-
opt them (Alavi, 1983; Jalal, 1995; Talbot, 2000).  
Despite a strong centralized state and attempts to compose a homogeneous 
nation the Eastern wing of Pakistan became an independent country in 
December 1971 after a civil war72 whereas in the West Pakistan’s recurrent 
martial law regimes further strengthened the central state. Unable to resolve 
political power sharing, between different groups, led to the first martial law in 
Pakistan in 1958. General Ayub’s military regime (1958-69) laid the foundation 
of institutionalizing military rule within the state apparatus that was followed 
by General Zia (1978- 1988) and General Musharraf (1999-2007).  
Such a centralized state also affected the way private economy emerged in 
Pakistan. In 1947 the most dominant class was landed elites. However, as Hindu 
traders left Pakistan, the local rural-based landlords, mainly in Punjab and 
Sindh, started dominating the economy by establishing different agricultural 
industries. Although an indigenous bourgeoisie was born in Pakistan in the mid 
1950s, yet they had to work under strong bureaucratic patronage. By 1968 only 
22 families in Pakistan controlled about 66 percent of industrial capital. Unlike 
the landowners who had direct access to the state as they were members of the 
ruling class also, the indigenous bourgeois relied on bureaucracy alone as they 
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 Bangladesh, formerly known as East Pakistan, became independent in Dec: 1971. 
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could not deploy political representations at that time (Alavi, 1983). During the 
colonial period the growth of industrial development in India was hampered by 
the government through a strong bureaucratic control as the Control of Capital 
Issues manifest wherein the private entrepreneurs could not establish their 
respective businesses without a formal approval from the government. This 
feature of the colonial state was retained by the central state wherein 
bureaucracy held the power to issue licenses and permits and controlled access 
to credit and business policies. The government-controlled financial institutions 
such as Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation (PICIC) and 
Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan (IDBP) channelled the foreign funds to 
the favoured ones as 65 percent of the loans delivered by PICIC was given to 
only 37 percent business families (Jalal, 1995: 153). Thus the market was 
emerging, but it benefited only few elites or those who had access to those elites 
and the kind of bourgeoisie that was emerging relied on the state’s patronage. 
So the way the bourgeoisie emerged under specific conditions in the West in 
17th and 18th centuries Europe and led to demands for the rule of law and rights, 
did not happen in the post-colonial context of Pakistan. Mustapha Pasha (2005) 
argues that the potential contribution of the bourgeoisie towards the 
construction of a civil society may not be a valid approach. Referring to the 
relationship of civil society and market economy, within the context of Pakistan, 
he argues that the market economy, in Pakistan, has prevailed within an 
environment where there are no checks and balances and, as a result, has led to 
the emergence of a class, given to personal aggrandizement. The accumulation 
of capital in the absence of a robust framework of citizenship and the rule of 
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law, as Pasha suggests, seems to have created negative repercussions for the 
potential emergence of civil society in Pakistan.  
The ML use of Islam galvanized certain religious, political parties after 1947. For 
instance, Jumath-e-Islami (JI)73 opposed the very idea of Pakistan, during the 
Pakistan Movement, yet after 1947, it started pressurizing the state to 
implement Sharia rule and declare Ahmadi74 as non-Muslims (Ziring, 2005). 
While the non-religious opposition was relatively easy to deal with as both 
coercion and selective patronage were used against them, the religious 
opposition was more sensitive to deal with as it involved religion which had 
inspired ML’s movement for decades as well as being the religion of the majority 
in Pakistan.  
Despite being steeped in the Western-secular traditions, the ruling elites, after 
1947, perceived a specific strategic value in the use of a religious lexicon as a 
rhetoric that offered the possibilities of claiming public legitimacy (Alavi, 1983; 
Jalal, 1995). Religion, as another aspect of monolithic ideology besides the Urdu 
language, was used to neutralize linguistic, cultural and regional opposition 
(Alavi, 1983; Samad, 1995). As the state was using the idioms of ‘Islam’, 
therefore, it seemed to have encouraged further the religious political parties. 
They soon started pressurizing the state that only a Muslim male can lead the 
state as a president or a prime minister as there is no role for women in the 
legislative bodies. Such religious forces, ulitmatley, turned their barrels against 
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 JI is an Islamic political party that maintains a high profile in current Pakistani politics.  
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 Ahmadi are the adherents of Mirza Ghualm Ahmad (1835-1908) who claimed to be the 
divine reformer. 
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the Ahmadi75 by demanding that the state must declare them non-Muslims in 
the early 1950s. They were eventually declared non-Muslims in the 1973 
constitution (Ziring, 2005). The first constitutional document ‘Objective 
Resolution’, produced in March 1949, formally included the discourse of Islam 
as the ideology of the state, which declared ‘Islam’ to be the state religion. 
According to the document sovereignty belonged to Allah (God) and no law that 
contradicts the spirit of Islam is to be passed by the assembly. It seemed a 
curious mix of democratic ideals and faith and was opposed by religious 
minority members in the assembly. Nonetheless, some religious, political 
parties such as JI was still advocating for more Islamic measures (McGrath, 
1998). 
The centralized state captured by the military-civil oligarchy kept these 
religious forces at bay in the first two decades after independence until they 
found a sympathetic ruler to their Sharia-cause in the 1980s (Ziring, 2005; 
Hussain, 2007). The blockade of political processes, tensions with India over 
Kashmir and Zia’s Islamism (1977-88) might have also contributed to the 
radicalization of some religious groups in the 1980s (Synnott, 2009).  Under the 
Zia regime (1977-88), religious minorities and women grew more insecure 
while religious, political parties and religious forces in the non-social space 
were encouraged and, then, started asserting their voices within the state.  
To Islamize Pakistani society, Zia-ul-Haq’s (1978-88) used a particular brand of 
Sunni Islamic ideology, which was also a tool of legitimacy for him (Alavi, 1983). 
Some argue that in the Zia’s military regime the perception that Pakistan does 
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 Ahmadi is a minority sect in Pakistan, who do not share the Islmic belief that Prophet 
Mohammad was the last prophet.  
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not have to ensure the security of its geographical borders, but also to protect 
its religious identity became stronger (Amir, 2011). His selective use of Islamic 
Laws made both religious minorities and women more vulnerable. The Zia 
regime, however, created far reaching implications at the social level. Several 
new so called Islamic punishments as enshrined in his infamous ‘Hudood 
Ordinance76’ were introduced such as cutting the right hand of thieves, stoning 
to death in cases of adultery and public whipping for alcohol drinkers. 
According to ‘Hudood Ordinance’ a woman had to produce two witnesses in the 
case of a rape. It also meant that in the case of failure to do so a rape victim may 
be charged with adultery. ‘Qanoon e Shahadat77’ (Witness law) was also the 
Zia’s regime special feature that further reduced the status of women in 
Pakistani society. The Objective resolution that was passed in 1949 and, which 
remained a preamble to the constitution of 1973 was also made by Zia a 
substantive part of the constitution. Zia also introduced separate electorates for 
religious minorities, which was abolished by Musharraf in 2002 (DAWN, 2012). 
He made special Sharia benches at courts to ensure that all laws are in strict 
accordance with Islam. He also made the blasphemy law stricter. Between 1986 
and 2014, nearly 4000 cases have been reported under the blasphemy law 
compared to only 7 cases between 1927 and 1986. Almost 50 percent of the 
people charged with blasphemy were non-Muslims (DAWN, 2012). For instance, 
amongst the most recent assassination inspired by the blasphemy law carried 
out by the non-state actors are the murder of the Punjab’s governor in 2010 (by 
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 Hudood Ordinance was the criminal law introduced in 1979, which had great repercussion for 
women. Honour killing was also given impunity and women were discouraged to report rape 
case.  
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 This meant the court witness of two women will be equal to the witness of one man. 
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his own bodyguard) and the assassination of a Christian minister of Minority 
Affairs in 2011 who advocated some changes in the blasphemy laws (ICAN, 
2014).  
Zia’s Islamization generated serious implications for the Pakistani society as it 
seemed to have encouraged certain sectarian groups that led to serious violent 
Sunni-Shia rifts. Besides making an attempt to Islamize the country, his regime 
also sought to de-politicize the entire non-state social space in Pakistan. This is 
evident in his strict repression of the Movement for the Restoration of 
Democracy (MRD) that was an alliance of all banned political parties, religious 
minorities and some civil society organizations mainly women and which 
emerged against the Zia’s military regime in the early 1980s. 
However, the rise of religion in Zia’s regime ought to be seen in the context of 
the regional geo-strategic dynamics. The Afghan war (1979-88) changed the 
complexion of Pakistani politics, contributing to a further consolidation of the 
military in the central state as enormous assistance was provided by the US78 to 
back the holy war (Jalal, 1995). Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), an intelligence 
agency, gained enormous power in his regime that played a key role in 
popularizing Afghan Jihad but also manipulating the local political landscape 
(Hussain, 2007). Religion was used for strategic aims in order to mobilize 
people for the holy war. The ideal of jihad soon penetrated deep within the 
social fabric wherein religious groups were patronized by the state and as a 
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 A total of 7US$ billion aid including fighter aircraft and tanks besides the 3.2US$ military and 
economic aid came from US during the war. (Mohiuddin, 2007: 192). Foreign aid reached 2 
billion $ per annum (Mohiuddin, 2007: 110). 
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result a number of militant groups emerged (Hussain, 2007) as discussed in the 
following section.  
The mushrooming of the Madaris (religious seminary) in KP and Baluchistan 
and the growing ‘militant culture’ was to have great consequences for the 
people later in the post 9/11 period in Pakistan (Hussain, 2007: 77). During the 
Afghan war nearly 1000 madaris were opened between 1982 to 1988 in KP and 
Baluchistan (Hussain, 2007:  80). The tribal region in KP became the operational 
ground for Jihad and the ideal of Jihad was popularized to attract common 
people to the ‘holy war’. Islamic political parties, close to the military 
establishment, were patronized by the state as they shared the ideal of both 
Jihad and the implementation of Sharia in the country; The state, however, 
might also have used kinship relations, linguistic and cultural bonds that 
already existed, in order to mobilize local people for the sacred cause of jihad. 
For instance, the Afghanistan’s war was projected by the state as the struggle of 
Pakhtun against the Russians (Rashid, 2010). It was not only the Afghan war 
that extracted Pakistan’s interest, but the unresolved issue of Kashmir also 
acquired a new importance and momentum in Zia’s period. Patronizing 
different Sunni militant groups in Kashmir became a state policy.  
While under foreign aid, the Pakistani economy was improving, black economy 
also emerged in Zia’s regime.  The Black market economy included drug money, 
smuggling, and illegal arms sales, which was mainly conducted across the Pak-
Afghan borders and emerged during the Afghan Jihad. The Balk economy 
formed almost 20-30% of GDP in Pakistan due to Pakistan involvement in the 
Afghan war (Mohiuddin, 2007: 113). 
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Besides leaving behind a more sectarian and ethnically fragile society, Zia also 
left a well entrenched military within the state institutions against which all 
successive governments in the 1990s struggled. Reminiscent of the 1950s79, the 
powerful president80 dismissed three elected governments between 1988 and 
1999 while the fourth one was overthrown by General Musharraf in October 
1999.  
If the Pakistan’s involvement in the Afghan war was an important feature of 
Zia’s regime, then Musharraf’s regime witnessed a new wave of ethnic and 
sectarian tensions in Pakistan as the Pakistani state remained involved in the 
regional strategic objectives by helping the Afghan Taliban in the 1990s to 
pursue their strategic objectives in the region. During his regime, Pakistan 
became a front line state in the War against Terror after 9/11. However, the 
Taliban phenomenon soon shifted its operational base in the Pakistani region of 
FATA, as the fleeing Taliban from Afghanistan in post 9/11 period found safe 
sanctuaries in FATA, where they managed to re-organize themselves and spread 
their influence to other of Pakistan.  
4.6. The arrival of NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) in the 1980s 
The security dilemmas, which emanated from Pakistan-India tension over 
Kashmir, not only prevailed its character, but also consistently claimed high 
chunks of budgets. The national economy underwent further depression due to 
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 From 1947 to 1958, seven Prime Ministers and four Governor General remained part of the 
central state.  
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 General Zia equipped the office of the president with the 8th Amendment that meant that the 
President can dismiss the entire cabinet.  
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rising debts in the late 1980s.81 The government, as a result, failed to invest in 
the social sector, which remained highly marginalized82. Non-investment in the 
social sector meant a high rise in poverty and further dependency of the local 
people on influential groups and individuals. Investment in the social sector, 
mainly education, might have contributed to the emergence of a civil society, 
which could have questioned the legitimacy of the state (Talbot, 2000). An 
alternative to social investment was the redistribution of lands, which remained 
a political rhetoric to mobilize masses (Alavi, 1988). The landed class, owing to 
their political influence and power, managed to subvert any attempt at land 
distribution (Jalal, 1995).  
It was amidst these social and economic conditions that NGOs emerged during 
the Zia regime. However, their emergence was also triggered by the curtailment 
of the political and social rights of Pakistani people. As a result, not only 
associations that focused on service provisions, but given to advocacy of human 
rights also emerged. As Zia introduced the ‘Hudood Ordinance’ and ‘Qanoon e 
Shahadat’ (witness law) it exacted a strong response from women. It was in 
1981 that the Women Action Forum (WAF) was established to resist the inferior 
status of women as enshrined in the Witness law (ICAN, 2014). Similarly, the 
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) also emerged during that period, 
which gained enormous stature, with the passage of time, to advocate the 
fundamental rights of people.  
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 Only 4% was spent on social services whereas 64% of revenues in 1949-50 were allocated to 
defence (Noman, 1990 cited on p: 94 Mohiuddin, 2007).   
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 For example in Zia’s regime, in education, the investment suffered a cutback from 2.1% of the 
GDP in 1976-77 to 1.5% in the early 1980s (Mohiuddin, 2007: 114). Less than 1% was spent on 
health by 1988 (Jalal, 1995: 141).  
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These NGOs were, however, led by urban educated people. Besides the social, 
political and economic contexts, it was the Afghan war that also acted as a great 
impetus to the rise of the NGO phenomenon in order to address refugees-
related issues. These local and regional contexts, then coincided with the rise of 
neoliberal ideology at the international level, that perceived such associations a 
better medium of social development than the state. As a result, NGOs that 
started appearing in the 1980s reached 45,000 in 2002 in Pakistan (ADB, 2009).  
It may be pertinent to point out that NGOs given to the development and 
service-provisions were tolerated and assisted by the state, whereas those 
involved in advocacy campaigns were always pressurized, even by civilian 
government such as in 1990s.  Civil society ‘… in Pakistan has borne the brunt of 
repeated military interventions. The state repression came in many forms, 
including bans on civil society organizations, arrest of civil society leaders and 
political pressure’ (Baig, 2001: 11).  
It is these advocacy NGOs that this thesis focuses, in particular, which include 
NGOs given to the task of criticizing the state for various reasons. As this thesis 
is also about violent extremism and civil society’s potential to contribute to 
peace in Peshawar, the following section will explore the roots of the Taliban 
phenomenon in Pakistan. To understand the phenomenon of the Taliban is 
relevant to this thesis as this thesis draws attention to certain sections within 
the non-state social space in Peshawar that advocate for peace amidst violence. 
Nonetheless, the following section also shows that the violent extremism, which 
assumed a more organized form within the regional geopolitical context, 
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perhaps, may not be understood without understanding the role of the Pakistani 
state.  
4.7. The Afghan Taliban: the arrival of the prototype of violent extremism 
in Pakistan 
Following the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 by the Russian forces, several 
Mujahedeen (holy warriors) groups emerged. Most of these groups belonged to 
the Sunni sect83 and received enormous financial and military support from the 
Pakistani state and other international players interested in the Afghan war. 
However, after the Russian withdrawal in 1988, civil war, amongst the former 
Mujahedeen groups, led to deplorable socioeconomic conditions and 
lawlessness in Afghanistan (Roy, 2001). It was from amidst these contexts that 
the Taliban84 emerged who were young Afghan students in the religious 
seminaries, situated in Pakistan, mainly in the two adjoining provinces 
bordering Afghanistan, i.e. KP and Baluchistan (Goodson, 2002).  
The Afghan Taliban were soon joined by the Pakistani based militant and 
sectarian groups that includes Jaish e Mohammad (JeM)85 and Sipah e Sahaba 
Pakistan (SSP)86, besides a great number of Madaris students mainly from KP 
and Baluchistan, who fought with them in the late 1990s against the Taliban’s 
                                                        
83 It is the dominant sect in Islam, used in opposition to the Shia sect.  
 
84 Talib is an Arabic word meaning a religious student while Taliban is its plural.  
 
85 JeM or the Army of the Mohammad is a Kashmir-focused Jihadist organization. Although it 
was banned in 2002, yet it operates a number of facilities within Pakistan.  
 
86 An anti-Shia, radical Sunni organization founded in 1885 in Punjab.  
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rivals in Afghanistan. These strategic and ideological alliances contributed later 
to the emergence of the Pakistani Taliban (Maley, 2001; Rashid, 2010).  
As the initial rank and file came from the Deobandi Madaris, its conservative 
curriculum played an enormous role in the making of the Taliban world view 
(Maley, 2001a). The religious teachings in these institutions project the early 
period of Islam in the 7th century as the only authentic way of life (Rashid, 
2001).  
The Afghan Taliban presented a new brand of religious extremism, in which the 
sole emphasis was on a conservative model of Sharia (Roy, 2001). The coercive 
imposition of their conservative worldview was freezing the lives of the Afghans 
in time, as they resorted to severe measure against religious minorities, women, 
and held public punishments to intimidate people (Fathers, 2000; Gunaratna & 
Nielsen, 2008). For many commentators, the rise of the Afghan Taliban was 
assisted by the Pakistan’s military whereas financial support came from the 
Sunni Muslim countries (Davies, 1998; Rashid, 2001; Maley, 2001a; Rubin, 
2002). 
However, the arrival of the US led NATO forces in Afghanistan, after 9/11, led to 
their dispersal in Afghanistan and re-emergence and re-grouping inside FATA in 
Pakistan. Besides the strong military support of the Pakistani military, other 
resesons, which created favourable conditions for them to survive, regroup and 
develop a new deadly synergy included: the presence of religious political 
governments in two key provinces, i.e. Baluchistan and KP87 who have been 
                                                        
87
 These provinces were ruled by MMA (Mutahida Majlas-e-Amal) an alliance of six religious 
political parties from 2002 to 2007.  
 
188 
 
strongly supporting both the Afghan Jihad and the Afghan Taliban, the presence 
of the former individual Mujahedeen and Jihadi networks in Pakistan, including 
FATA, who had their roots in the Afghan jihad and Afghan Taliban’s conquests in 
1990s, and the specific administrative status and the characteristic but 
extremely difficult geography of FATA88 (Taj, 2011).  
The gravitation of different Pakistan based militant groups that include Lashkar 
e Taiba (LT), Jaish e Mohammad (JM) and Sepah e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) with 
its splinter group Lashkar e Jhangvi (L J)89 towards foreign fighters was a key, 
but a dangerous development as most of these militant organizations were 
banned, due to international pressure, by the Pakistani state in 2002 (Hussain, 
2010).  
The Pakistani Taliban are neither the Afghan Taliban residue nor a completely 
new phenomenon. Rather the new course of events in the post 9/11 period led 
to the astonishing metamorphosis of the militant phenomenon and, instead, the 
incarnation of a newly deadly nexus appeared soon in the safe havens of FATA 
that was to spread to other parts of KP and Pakistan.  
Some commentators such as Ahmad Rashid (2010) argues that neither 
geography nor the social aspects of FATA would have helped the deadly re-
organization if the Pakistani state had reacted promptly. Their swift 
resettlement in FATA did not invoke any major reaction from the Pakistani state 
and as a result, they managed to spread and created a ‘Talibanized belt’ along 
                                                        
88
 It was already mentioned in chapter 2 that FATA was regulated by FCR wherein Political 
Agent (PA) was directly answerable to the provincial governor as an agent of the president of 
the Pakistan. It was beyond the capacity of PA to stop such incursions. 
  
89
 LeJ was founded in 1996 when it broke away from its parent organization SSP. It was banned 
by the Pakistani state in 2002. 
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the border (p: 270). Ahmad Rashid’s analysis strongly coincides with our 
respondents’ criticism of the state authority as we show in chapter 6. 
Commentators such as Ahmad Rashid (2010), Zahid Hussain (2012) and Farhat 
Taj (2011) identify the role of the state in nurturing the Taliban phenomenon 
and trace the role of the Pakistani state in historical perspective. They argue 
that the Taliban are the non-state actors and there may be other potential 
factors such local linguistic networking and ideological affinities amongst 
different groups besides funding from foreign sources that seem to have 
contributed to the emergence and sustenance of the phenomenon in Pakistan. 
Christiana B. Kittner (2007) argument that the role of social geography as safe 
havens, which potentially enable a terrorist organization to grow and get  
trained is extremely important in our case too.  
Following the footsteps of the Afghan Taliban, in the late 1990s, the local 
Pakistani Taliban in FATA ‘...were banning TV… imposing Sharia punishments… 
and forcing people, particularly women, to adapt to the Taliban dress code and 
way of life’ (Rashid, 2010: 93; Shah, 2010).  
A number of military operations by the Pakistan army, under the US pressure, 
most of which ended in transitory peace deals with the Taliban helped them to 
use FATA as safe havens to organize themselves and their activities. As the TTP 
(Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan or Pakistani Taliban Movement) emerged in Dec 
2007, which is an umbrella organization of about 40 Sunni-militant or like-
minded groups, based in FATA (Arabinda, Bukhari & Sadia, 2009) a wave of 
suicide bombings struck Pakistan.  
190 
 
As the Taliban gained influence in FATA, the Taliban soon spread to the Swat 
valley (see map in Appendix). The Pakistan military had to launch a successful 
military operation against the Swati Taliban in 2009. However, its leader 
Maulana Fazlullah90 survived and is currently heading TTP.  
4.8. Talibanization: a new form of violent extremism  
As the respondents of this research regularly used the term ‘Talibanization’, it is 
important to explain the entire Taliban phenomenon by explaining the term 
here. The term became famous in the Pakistani media in order to capture the 
Taliban’s violence. For many it meant the imposition of an austere Taliban-style 
measure inspired by a rigid interpretation of Sharia law. It is perceived as a 
‘restriction on personal choice—to veil, to keep a beard, to watch “sinful” DVDs, 
to listen to music, to send daughters to school, to allow them to work’ and to 
establish ‘parallel systems of governance, including courts dispensing extralegal 
punishments’ and use of violence to implement such system are important 
features of Talibanization (Rashid, 2010; Shapiro & Fair, 2009: 104-05).  
The respondents of this research consider Talibanization as an important form 
of violent extremism. Extremism can be defined as ‘a radical expression of one’s 
political values’ that is ‘characterized by intolerance toward opposing interests 
and divergent opinions, and it is the primary catalyst and motivation for 
terrorist behavior’ (Gus, 2006: 11). However, some experts may not see 
terrorism or violence being always inspired by radical opinions and instead 
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emphasise on the marginalized background of the Pakistani Taliban leaders91. 
For them violent extremism, in the context of Pakistan, is more about power and 
control (Samad, 2014). While the conditions of social injustices and economic 
inequality in Pakistan makes the argument of the ‘power and control’ pertinent 
yet the Taliban leaders’ radical and conservative interpretation of Islam seem to 
have informed their violence.  
4.9. Death and destruction: the final outcome of the Taliban’s violence  
The Taliban’s violence impacted on the public in multiple ways and created a 
series of serious challenges. It mainly includes: the internal displacement of 
people; killings of security and police personnel, targeted killings of tribal 
elders, political figures and peace activists, including women; suicide bombings 
at religious and  cultural places, bombing video/music shops, bombing schools, 
girls’ schools in particular, and direct threats to officials, NGOs workers and 
artists (Shah, 2010). Violent extremism has created a mass of orphans, widows, 
and disabled-for-life people, over the years since 2006-07 as people lost their 
lives. Those who survived, including those who experienced violence indirectly 
suffered extreme shocks and needed immediate counselling (JPI, 2012).  
The internal displacement of local people emerged as a major crisis. People had 
to leave their homes either because of Taliban’s fear and violence or due to 
military operations. Contrary to official figures, which places the number of 
Internally Displaced People (IDPs) as 1.4 million, the actual number is far higher 
as the World Health Organization records 1.8 million by mid 2010 (IDMC, 
                                                        
91 The leader of the TTP, Baitullah Masood, who was killed in a drone attack in 2013, 
was a shopkeeper. Mullah Fazlullah the leader of the Swati Taliban was a lift-operator.  
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2012). In the year 2009 alone, the number of IDPs reached a record level of 6.5-
7.5 million people due to military operation in Swat (IDMC, 2012).  
Reminiscent of the harsh measures taken by the Afghan Taliban against women, 
the Pakistani Taliban also attempted to deny them their fundamental rights as 
human beings and discouraged their presence in public life. The in-public 
beating, lashing and target killings of women artists and NGOs workers, 
bombing girls’ schools, and forcing women to give up schooling and to observe 
strict veiling, were some of their measures against women that contributed to 
their further oppression (Shah, 2010).  
Ignoring the religious, political parties and religious clerics who did not disagree 
with them, they openly targeted the political leadership and workers of secular 
political parties, for instance Awami National Party (ANP) and PPP (Pakistan 
People’s Party). About 750 workers of ANP, including some of their ministers 
were killed by TTP (Shackle, 2013).  
4.10. Challenges and the desire of ‘Aman’ (peace)  
The violence of the Taliban, besides military operations, created great impacts 
on the entire Pakhtun society in KP. It seemed as if the Taliban were targeting 
the local cultural aspects of the Pakhtun culture by bombing local shrines and 
killing musicians and artists. The associational life, in particular, was also deeply 
influenced. As many associations in Peshawar were involved in a number of 
community projects in rural areas, their mobility was restricted. This was 
expressed by one Pakhtun woman civil society activist from a woman's 
organization: 
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‘First, we used to travel to remote areas but now we cannot think of that’. 
This in turn might have affected the clients and recipients of these projects and 
programmes. However, it did not lead to the ‘culture of silence92’ which the 
Taliban wished to create. Instead a number of organizations embraced peace-
oriented activities and started opposing the Taliban’s violent extremism.  
It is amidst this death and destruction that a peace-oriented struggle emerged 
from amongst common people; the Pakhtun in Peshawar. Amidst intense fear 
and violence in which no security is guaranteed by the state, ordinary non-state 
people emerged and made associations in the name of ‘aman’ (peace). This 
thesis draws attention to such civic voices of peace in Peshawar, which assumes 
extreme importance when seen in the backdrop of certain stereotypes labelled 
against the Pakhtun as wild and cold murderers. The emergence of ‘Aman 
Tehreek’ (Peace Movement) in 2009 in Peshawar amidst violence is one 
instance.  
Various associations and individuals embraced peace in Peshawar as their 
peace consciousness is explored in chapter 6, which shows two important 
features, i.e. criticality and a deep reflexivity. The first trait implies critiquing 
the state for failing  - to deliver to its own people, to ensure the rule of law and 
security, whereas reflexivity is focused on understanding the roots of 
extremism, assessing the role of the different religious groups and imagining 
different ways to overcome extremism. These tasks are performed by a number 
of civil society organizations in Peshawar by conducting regular seminars, 
                                                        
92
 This term has been borrowed from the Brazilian educator Paulo Freire (1921-97) who used it 
in his book ‘Pedagogy of the Oppressed’ (1968).  
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workshops, research work, holding public rallies and public campaigns. While 
registered associations in Peshawar quickly assumed peace-related activities, a 
number of informal associations also showed immense awareness of how 
violent extremism is taking over their culture. For instance, there are 500 
literary groups throughout KP that regularly arrange peace-poetry conferences 
(BBC, 2014). The very idioms of ‘aman’ (peace), ‘aman mushaira’ (peace-
poetry), ‘aman-jirga’ (peace jirga), ‘aman-walks’ (peace-walks) were 
popularized by such associations amidst violence.  
Alongside this discourse of ‘aman’ amidst violence, registered associations at 
the urban level are engaged to address various issues and challenges emanating 
from the persistent violence. Provision of services to the victims of violence, 
protection to the internally displaced people, monitoring the situation, 
reporting frequently the abuse of human rights, and initiating new 
socioeconomic development programmes are some of the key areas that such 
associations in Peshawar are performing.  
So far media discussions, analysts and researchers both in Pakistan and outside 
have focused on the origin of both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, their nexus 
with the al- Qaeda terrorism, their threats to the national, regional and 
international security and the counterterrorism strategies. While this has 
produced an extremely important literature to understand better the Taliban 
phenomenon yet no serious attempt has been made to understand how the 
Taliban’s violence has exacted a peace-oriented response, if any, from the non-
state people in a given context. This thesis draws our attention to such peace 
oriented struggle, which despite being overshadowed by the Taliban’s violence 
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and affected by it, still seems to remain an important phenomenon in Peshawar 
that needs recognition.  
4.11. Conclusion 
The post-Hegelian conception of civil society conceived civil society as a 
differentiated realm, distinct from the state, family, and market. In the liberal 
conception of civil society, both the state and civil society can mutually co-exist 
as corresponding sources of strength. Civil society can potentially play a key 
role in strengthening democracy, whereas the state provides favourable 
conditions that may include citizenship, the rule of law, constitutional 
protection and security and shows sensitivities to the voices emanating from 
the non-state associational realm. This relational trajectory assumes a more 
conflictive underpinning within the alternative conception of civil society.  
 
As civil society and the state are perceived in a relational trajectory, whether 
complementary or conflictive, it was important to explore, analytically, the 
nature of the Pakistani state in this chapter. To understand and explore how the 
Pakistani state organized itself in relation to the civil society in Pakistan was 
one key objective of this chapter.  
 
This chapter has shown that the power oriented transactional relationships 
between powerful groups in the central state diminished the hopes of a possible 
democratic start in 1947 that might have encouraged the potential emergence 
of civil society in Pakistan. Some of the Western liberal concepts were known to 
the early ML’s leadership such as citizenship and, which were invoked but not 
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with any serious intent to implement them. On the contrary, religion was 
invoked to compose a homogeneous Muslim nation from different and 
heterogeneous ethnic groups. Such an invocation was resisted by different 
linguistic groups, whereas on the other hand the use of religious discourse 
encouraged religious forces both political and non-political.  
The state’s attempt to Islamize the entire society while applying a specific Sunni 
interpretation of Islam, which emerged as a state’s policy in Zia regime, seemed 
to have contributed to the rise of religious groups that grew intolerant towards 
difference, mainly towards other religious minorities or Islamic sects. The 
spread of Jihad-culture in Pakistan due to the Afghan war and then Afghan’s 
Taliban backing in 1990s by the Pakistani state seemed to be of crucial 
importance in creating the Taliban phenomenon in KP in the post 9/11 context.  
While Zia’s regime experienced the rise of resistance against the authoritarian 
state as a number of advocacy groups emerged in Pakistan, it is in the context of 
the violent extremism in Peshawar at present that a number of ‘aman’ 
associations emerged from amongst non-state people, which demonstrate peace 
consciousness.  
As this thesis also argues that the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar tend to 
build peace from local cultural and religious perspectives rather than liberal 
individualism, it is important to show how the empirical data support this 
argument. However, taking an alternative route by the ‘emergent civil society’ in 
Pesahwar is not without uncertainties and tensions. These issues are explored 
in the next two chapters, which present a detailed analysis of the empirical data, 
generated during the two field visits.  
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 CHAPTER 5 
5. The alternative discourse of Peshawar’s ‘emergent civil society’ and 
the tension with masculine resistive forces 
5.1. Introduction 
It was argued in chapter 3 that experts and thinkers have challenged Gellnerian 
perspective as ‘an oriental prejudice’ (Keane, 1996: 11), some questions, 
however, remain unanswered, such as, how alternative value systems can 
provide the philosophical foundation to the discourse of civil society and how 
alternative value systems can be normatively perceived around the notion of 
civil society in the non-Western contexts.  
While grappling with these questions, the objectives of this chapter are four: 
first, this chapter will demonstrate how the empirical data support the 
fundamental argument of this thesis, i.e. the ‘emergent civil society’ tends to 
seek an indigenous persona. The desire of seeking a local cultural identity, 
however, triggers certain antithetical forces, which seem to impact upon this 
desire; second, this chapter will demonstrate how the data reflect the 
conceptual framework of the alternative civil society, which was drawn in 
chapter 1. The empirical data will demonstrate in this chapter that the 
‘emergent civil society’ emerges as a battleground of clashing opinions and 
perspectives reflecting Gramscian perspective of civil society; third, this chapter 
will introduce our respondents to the readers by presenting their quotes, life 
experiences and some mini-biographies, including their ethnic, gender (age and 
sex), and professional backgrounds; and last, by introducing the voices of the 
respondents directly to the readers, this thesis manifest the discourse of civil 
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society, which the scarce Pakistani literature on civil society seems to omit, thus, 
making a contribution to the literature on Pakistani civil society.  
This chapter is divided into 10 sections. Section 1 presents a brief overview of 
the Pakistani civil society and identifies certain gaps, which this chapter intends 
to fill. It was argued in the Introduction that empirical case studies conducted in 
the non-Western context fail to inform us about the philosophical foundation of 
civil society. The scarce literature on Pakistani civil society also seems to suffer 
from a similar theoretical shortcoming.  
Section 2 and 3 prepares the general framework for this chapter. Section 2 
highlights how respondents conceived civil society in spatial terms, imbued 
with heterogeneity, rather than restrict the term to a specific associational form, 
which helped us deploy civil society as a non-state heterogeneous social space, 
filled with competing perspectives, in this chapter, as explored in chapter 1.  
Section 3 explains three reasons for focusing on respondents’ ideas of ‘peace’ 
and ‘violence’, which include: what alternative perspectives are informing their 
respective sense of peace; how their perspective of peace is helping them to 
draw a line at the empirical level between what is civil and what stands in 
opposition to civility; and lastly, to highlight civil society as a potential arena, 
which like the state and other international peace groups, may contribute to 
peacebuilding. Focusing on ‘peace’ and ‘violence’ help us see civil society at the 
normative level, which helped us deploy civil society in the normative sense, as 
explained in the first chapter. 
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Section 4 introduces the readers of this thesis to our data. Based on their 
respective worldviews, three main clusters, i.e. Traditionalists, Religionists and 
Reformists, are introduced as this section explores how respondents embrace 
alternative philosophic foundation to express their respective ideas of civil 
society and how different perspectives experience frictions and tensions. It is 
also argued in this section that tensions and uncertainties between different 
perspectives do not negate the main argument of the respondents that the 
‘emergent civil society’ tends to embrace an indigenous base and character. 
Deviating from the mainstream liberal perspective of civil society, the ‘emergent 
civil society’ seeks alternative philosophical foundations. While their respective 
ethnic, professional, regional and gender backgrounds are cited with their 
quotes throughout this chapter, this section also includes some mini 
biographies of our respondents. 
Section 5 deals with the question: If civil society is perceived as embedded in 
local traditional and religious perspectives by our respondents, then how do 
tensions between different worldviews appear, at the empirical level, and 
impact upon the desire of embedding the discourse of civil society? This section 
introduces the reader to the frictional encounter between feminine voices, 
which represent human agency for cultural change and conservative traditional 
forces, which represent masculine structures, and, which ultimately seem to 
disrupt the desire of embedding civil society in local cultural perspectives.  
Sections 6 and 7 highlight the frictional encounter between conservative forces 
of the Pakhtun culture and feminine voices. Conservatives come from previous 
two clusters, i.e. traditionalists and religionists and stand in opposition to 
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feminists’ demand of women’s rights. Perceiving Pakhtun culture as a 
sacrosanct structure, conservatives are more communitarian and prioritise 
Pakhtun culture over any attempt to embed human rights, whereas women put 
up their agenda of rights and challenge conservatives. These two sections also 
demonstrate that unequal power relations, which permeate the ‘emergent civil 
society’ in Peshawar in subtle ways in which the social division between men 
and women is either challenged or defended.  
Section 8 presents how the ‘emergent civil society’ experiences serious fissures. 
Conservative masculine forces tend to sustain their privileged social positions, 
whereas women assert their rights and challenge masculinity as a form of 
domination. Informed by this power struggle, this section presents how the 
abstract discourse of indigenising the ‘emergent civil society’ in alternative 
traditional and religious perspectives takes an empirical format in which all the 
discussions of the respondents revolve around the institution of NGOs, advocacy 
NGOs in particular. While other clusters protest that the entire idea of civil 
society cannot be NGOised, women justify the inclusion of women’s NGOs as 
important empirical examples of cultural change and challenge the masculine 
hegemony.  
It is argued in section 9 that exploring the ideas of ‘peace’ and ‘violence’ 
enhances the frictional encounter between conservative forces of tradition and 
women reformists. Words and phrases that describe men’s perceptions of 
‘peace’ and ‘violence’ are vehemently challenged by women respondents. 
Women expose the partiality of men’s conception of peace and violence and 
argue that the culturally reproduced roles of women are latent forms of 
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violence, which lie deep within certain norms and social structures of the 
Pakhtun culture. It is amidst such contestations with conservative forces that 
women’s perceptions of ‘peace’ and ‘violence’ attain a gendered outlook and, 
which ultimately yields the discourse of civil society a feminine character.  
The last section 10 introduces another important cluster, i.e. ‘culturalists-
moderators’, who moderate this frictional encounter and accept the possibility 
of deeply embedded, biased norms and structures. The tendency of looking 
towards the state, amongst women in particular, gains further intensity 
amongst the moderators, in which the state is seen as an important entity, 
which can resolve these tensions by improving the conditions of social justice 
and security. However, ‘culturalists-moderators’ also suggest that to resolve the 
internal tensions, the ‘emergent civil society’ requires to create sustainable 
dialogic spaces, reflecting the Habermasian thread of civil society as an arena of 
dialogues.  
5.2. A brief overview of civil society in Pakistan: limitations and gaps  
Literature on civil society in Pakistan is scarce as explored in the Introduction 
and chapter 3, as such studies focus more on the political mediation between 
democratic forces, labelled broadly as civil society, and the Pakistani state. 
However, some briefs and short overviews do focus on the associational life in 
Pakistan. Historicising the associational life in Pakistan, it is argued that the 
tradition of civil society has a long historical lineage in which Islamic concepts 
of khairat (charity), zakkat (offering to the poor), and haqooq ul ibad (human 
rights) have played a key role (ADB, 2009). Perhaps, like other colonies, a new 
layer of registered, legal and specialist bodies also emerged here in the 
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subcontinent in the 19th and 20th centuries. A number of educational 
institutions, welfare associations, trusts and lawyers’ associations emerged in 
the first of half of the 20th century that participated in the independence 
movement. It is precisely this voluntary sector that Alan Fowler (1996) 
mentions when he refers to colonialism as an important period that injected a 
new layer of ‘civicness’ within those societies where indigenous forms of 
interactions and associations already existed in response to their social and 
cultural needs. While association, women in particular, continue to grow after 
the birth of Pakistan, it was during the 1980s that a large number of relief 
NGOs93 and some women's advocacy groups emerged (Hasan & Sabir, 2011).  
It was argued in chapter 1 that as our respondents argued that civil society 
needs to be embedded within the local traditional and religious resources, 
therefore, this thesis uses, in this chapter in particular, the term ‘informal’ civil 
society, in addition to formal, to capture their understanding of civil society. 
Counting informal networks as part of civil society does not mean only a spatial 
shift from the registered to the unregistered for our respondents, but also a 
temporal shift, which connects the concept of civil society to those historical 
processes, which has been shaping the associational life in Peshawar. However, 
the word ‘informal’ as argued by Alan Fowler (1996), does not mean a loose 
association, but in informal associations and networks, there is a general agreed 
upon consensus about the rules that condition the behavior of its members. 
Here the culturally nurtured norms and values are considered sufficient for 
their interactions rather than requiring written rules as is the case with formal 
association (p: 15). The following are the three empirical examples of informal 
                                                        
93 The rise of NGOs, advocacy NGOs in particular, has been explored in chapter 4.  
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civil society amongst others that were personally visited by the researcher 
during the fieldwork in Peshawar and, which some respondents, in the coming 
sections, count as the empirical forms of civil society.  
1. A shrine located in the inner Peshawar city, Dabgari, has a committee led 
by the spiritual heir of the shrine and includes about 12 elderly male 
members. The spiritual leadership runs in the specific family while 
others, associated with the shrine, become voluntary members. It looks 
after the affairs of the shrine and the adjacent mosque, arranges cultural 
events for men and women separately, resolves disputes amongst 
members and arranges daily meals (langar94) that can be joined by 
anyone irrespective of his caste, ethnicity or religious background95.  
2. ‘Sahu leekonko maraka’ (the association of great writers) is a Peshawar 
based literary association that holds weekly discussions on Pakhtu 
literature. However, discussion on a particular genre of literature and its 
context, then spreads, as observed by the researcher, to the prevailing 
social, political and cultural issues. There are about 500 such literary 
associations, mostly unregistered in KP that regularly hold ‘aman-
mushaera’ (peace-poetry) (BBC, 2014). Such associations work for the 
progress of Pakhtu language and culture.  
3. ‘Peshawar Jirga’ is an unregistered network that uses social media, both 
print and electronic to pressurize the state on governance issues and 
holds regular conferences at various places aiming at social cohesion. 
                                                        
94
 ‘Langar’ is a common custom of delivering food on daily basis to the visitors of the shrine.  
 
95
 The researcher personally visited the shrine many times and on one occasion saw two Sikh 
male visitors.  
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Jirga, however, is a specific Pkahtun social institution, which potentially 
performs a number of activities that range from conflict resolution to 
development activities.  
Formal, in this chapter, refers to the registered, non-state, non-profit 
organizations, with visible structures, which address various developmental 
and peace related issues. However, the researcher could focus only on the NGOs 
due to certain limitations, explained in chapter 2. A brief list of such NGOs is 
given in Appendix G, which were personally visited by the researcher. While 
informal associations remain hidden and invisible, the data about formal 
associations is unreliable and incomplete, which creates a great methodological 
problem. For example, there is no database or source, which can inform us of 
the exact number of registered CSOs in Peshawar. According to the provincial 
government portal, the total number of non-governmental associations was 355 
in Peshawar District in June 2003 (KP, 2013).  
However, the use of formal and informal also attempt to fill minor, but very 
important gaps in the extremely scarce literature on Pakistani civil society. 
Besides popular media in Pakistan, that invokes the term in an extremely 
restrictive sense wherein only NGOs are considered as the mainstream civil 
society, some experts in Pakistan have also been focusing on the urban based 
modern NGOs as the mainstream civil society (Malik, 1997) and evaluating their 
performance (Baig, 2001).  
While Adnan S R Baig (2001) does mention ‘folk society’ without defining or 
explaining it, Mohammad Qadeer (1997) has been presenting the informal civil 
society as a dormant space that was always mobilized by the political society 
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either in favor or against the state. Some refer to the informal civil society 
submerged in ethnic and religious consciousness (Qadeer, 1997; Zaidi, 2006). 
These writers have been using the term ‘informal civil society’ quite frequently 
without exploring the character of the term.  
Also, studies of Pakistani civil society inform us of the total number, activities 
and various projects of civil society organisations, but it is not entirely known 
what the internal discourses within various associations are, how these 
discourses enable them to communicate with one another.  
5.3. Civil society as a non-state, heterogeneous social space of competing 
perspectives 
Some experts of civil society (Goody, 2001; Kaviraj, 2001) argue that civil 
society as a theoretical concept is a relational term and is defined in opposition 
to the state whether perceived within liberal or alternative perspective. 
Informed by such arguments the unit of state was chosen, in my interviews, as 
an oppositional point of reference, while asking questions, such as what is a civil 
society and where is it located, at the empirical level. Such questions enabled 
the respondents involved in this research to articulate their respective 
understandings of the term civil society as a non-state social space. 
Consequently, several questions were asked about the two key themes, i.e. civil 
society and the state and their respective nature and interrelation in the context 
of Pakistan. It was from amidst such exploratory questions that respondents 
showed their ability to imagine, conceptualize and identify the state, at the 
empirical level, as a different structural unit, whereas civil society was 
perceived in spatial form rather than associational form only as words, such as 
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‘arena of social relations’, ‘social space of public debate and cultural and social 
arrangements’ were used by the respondents. The deployment of civil society as 
a non-state social space in this thesis was encouraged by respondents’ 
perceptions. In other words, the respondents of this research were not inclined 
to restrict the notion of civil society to certain specific institutions, such as NGOs 
and instead wanted to include the entire non-state social space, which, they 
thought, is imbued with a number of informal networks and associations.  
While our respondents recognized civil society as a differentiated structure, 
underneath this understanding of civil society laid an entire complex hybrid of 
different worldviews, as explored in the coming sections, which, perhaps, might 
not have been explored if in-depth interviews were not deployed as a data 
collection tool.  
Using prompts and allowing new questions to emerge during interviews, it was 
observed that the non-state social space does not have a singular designation 
and instead is a heterogeneous space, informed by conflicting worldviews. 
Different respondents were pointing out different value systems as the potential 
philosophical foundation that may inform their respective but particular sense 
of a civil society. Local traditional perspectives informed by Pakhtunwali, 
religious perspective informed by Islam and liberal perspective informed by 
human rights provide the alternative philosophical foundation, which renders 
the discourse of civil society in Peshawar heterogeneous in character. The 
tension between these perspectives appears at two levels: first at the abstract 
level, when respondents bring in competing alternative perspectives and 
second, at the empirical level, when respondents try to locate civil society at the 
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empirical level. While these conflicts are revealing and show the unresolved 
dilemmas and challenges of the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar, they occur 
within the overarching proclivity of the civil society in Peshawar that is 
demonstrated in the search for an indigenous character. The coming section 
explores these contested and competing voices in detail.  
5.4. The rationale of focusing on ‘peace’ and ‘violence’: exploring the 
normative perception of civil society 
In order to develop a comprehensive understanding of how Pakhtun in 
Peshawar can imagine and conceptualize civil society at normative level, 
respondents’ ideas of ‘peace’ and ‘violence’ were explored in detail during my 
interviews with them. ‘Peace’ and ‘violence’ were central to this research as it 
explores whether or not civil society can contribute to peace and minimize 
violence in Peshawar. Here, in this chapter, ‘peace’ will be synonymously used 
with ‘civility’ and ‘nonviolence’ and in direct opposition to ‘violence’ as our 
respondents posited. Also, as it was mentioned in the first chapter that civil 
society is deployed, in this thesis, at the normative level, i.e. as a norm of civility 
and peace, therefore, empirical engagement with the respondents’ sense of 
‘peace’ helped us explore this normative sense of civil society.  
The exploration of respondents’ ideas of ‘peace’ and ‘violence’, during my 
interviews, was informed by three key objectives. First, this thesis tried to 
investigate what alternative value systems are invoked, which inform 
respondents’ ideas of ‘peace’ that they were counterpoising with ‘violence’.  
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Second, how their normative perception of civil society as a norm of civility was 
helping them to draw a clear line of distinction at the empirical level from the 
‘violent’ groups such as the Taliban, which will be explored in chapter 6 in 
detail.  
Lastly, unlike civil society’s potential role in democracy and development, civil 
society’s potential role in peacebuilding amidst violence is an under researched 
area. Research on peacebuilding seems to be focusing on the role of the state or 
international groups such as the United Nations Organization (UNO) 
(Paffenholz, 2010). By focusing on civil society and peace, this thesis intends to 
contribute to the scarce literature on civil society and peacebuilding.  
5.5. Making sense of the data 
Respondents in and outside Peshawar demonstrated a strong tendency to 
indigenize the very concept of civil society by rooting the discourse of civil 
society in local cultural and religious perspectives. Nevertheless, underneath 
this generic perception of civil society, we explored several symmetrical lines 
that, at times, run in the opposite direction to each other. To enable the readers 
of this thesis to grasp the complex portrait of the ‘emergent civil society’ in 
Peshawar, we break the data into various themes and clusters.   
Respondents’ respective worldviews and backgrounds were key factors that 
helped us divide them into various clusters. Coming from specific ontological 
positioning and having specific respective social and political backgrounds, 
respondents of this research were showing a regular trend of using, quite 
frequently, specific terminologies, phrases, and examples during their 
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interviews while answering various questions related to civil society, peace, 
violence and the state. Our data analysis revealed that the deployment of a 
specific lexicon and the choice of specific, but corresponding, empirical 
examples by our respondents led to the identification of defined trends of 
thoughts amongst them about ‘civil society’ ‘peace’ and ‘violence’.  
To deepen our understanding of respondents’ ideas of ‘peace’ and ‘violence’ 
several questions, which included a number of prompts also, were asked from 
each respondent about core themes. It was amidst such discussions with our 
respondents that the following clusters emerged. Besides introducing different 
clusters to our readers, some mini-biographies are also included, at appropriate 
places in the following sections, to make our readers familiar with our 
respondents.  
5.5.1. Traditionalists 
This cluster includes writers and poets of Pashtu literature, respondents with 
deeper consciousness of Pakhtunness or those who give Pakhtun identity a 
primary importance, admirers of Pakhtun culture and traditions or people who 
tend to give immense importance to the potential role of local cultural 
perspectives in day to day interactions such as Pakhtunwali. Labelled as 
traditionalists in this thesis, they stress more the cultural images, symbols and 
customs, such as dress, and traditional norms and values. Most of them count 
informal civil society as the real form of civil society. The following mini-
biography will demonstrate the worldview of the traditionalists, though it is not 
claimed that it is the representative sample of the traditionalists.  
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Mini biography of ‘Interviewee no 48’ (Pakhtun Male, Aged 46)  
Interviewee no 48 belong to a remote district in the north of KP. He is one of the 
famous contemporary Pakhtu poets. He has published Pakhtu poetry books and 
writes regularly in local newspapers and Pakhtu magazines. He regularly 
attends various local Pakhtu literary association’s meeting in which different 
genres of Pakhtu literature are debated and issues related to society and politics 
are discussed. He argues that Hujra is an important empirical example of civil 
society. He shared some of his experiences as given below:  
‘I have obtained an MA in Pakhtu Literature. When I was a student, I was in the 
Pakhtun Student Federation, but there was another student group ‘Democratic 
Student Federation’ and we used to had great debate. I liked Marxism, but some of 
my Comrades started attacking religion in a very emotional way. I think they 
didn’t display cultural sensitivity. They should have indigenized the class struggle. 
I along with my friends established a local organisation for the promotion of 
culture, arts and protection of heritage. We used to go to Hujras to revive them. 
The problem with Hujra was that Hujra became associated with individuals and 
not considered as community centers. It is an institution’. 
Mostly men, traditionalists also included women. However, as identified in the 
methodology chapter, it was extremely difficult to reach an equal number of 
women in Peshawar due to a number of factors, it may not be suggested that 
traditionalists were necessarily men only. Nonetheless, as explored in this 
chapter, women seem to perceive Pakhtun culture differently. Mostly Pakhtun 
from Peshawar, they also included Pakhtun from other parts of KP such as Swat 
and other parts of Pakistan such as Baluchistan. However, unlike their ethnic 
background, their professional backgrounds were much diverse as they 
included academics, journalists, civil society activists, government employees 
and political workers. They, however, did not belong to a specific age group 
rather included both young and aged people.  
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Traditionalists argue that the discourse of civil society can be rooted in 
alternative perspectives rather than liberal individualism and, thus, their 
discourse diverges from the mainstream liberal perspective. They consider that 
civil society as a norm of peace and civility is embedded within the local culture, 
people’s consciousness, and their practices. Such an understanding, then enable 
them to argue that civil society as an indigenous phenomenon has enabled the 
Pakhtun to create collective arrangements in the form of Hujra96, Jirga, shrines, 
different neighbourhood associations, writers’ groups, and other informal and 
formal networks.  
They argue that the locally emerged, indigenous spaces and institutions have 
enabled people of various professions, castes, and religions to associate with 
one another as such spaces are regularly used for various events and functions. 
They also argue that such spaces and institutions are made easily accessible to 
and owned by common people. ‘The ordinary people’, said a 52-years old male 
Pakhtun writer from Peshawar, ‘find these spaces more natural like their own 
respective families. These collective spaces do not need advertisements or 
external actors to promote them’. Referring to shrines, a Pakhtun male, aged 46, 
who was a member of ‘Aman Tehreek’ (Peace Movement) and was based in 
Peshawar said: 
‘Show me a single space where she-males can socialize in Pakistan? Have you ever 
seen them in schools, colleges, business or politics? Because they live without rights 
                                                        
96 Hujra, in Pakhtun culture, is a space where men socialize and arrange various events and 
activities such as marriage ceremonies, funerals, musical events and discussions related to 
various community issues.  
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as human beings? It is these shrines where they can come, participate, and 
socialize’. (Interviewee No. 31, March, 2012)  
Referring to Hujra, a 46-years old male Pakhtun poet who was a member of 
‘Saahu Leekonko Maaraka’ (The Assoication of Great Writers), based in 
Peshawar said: 
‘Hujra was more than an interactive space for Pakhtun. It was an informal 
academy for arts and music where the songs were written and artists were born’. 
(Interviewee No. 53, April, 2012). 
With respect to violence and peacebuilding, they specifically quote Jirga as a 
conflict resolution platform. Referring to violent extremism, a 50-years old male 
Pakhtun writer and academic said: 
‘No wonder the Taliban are bombing our Hujras, shrines and Jirgas because they 
are the spaces of pluralism and togetherness....just see how everyone was 
welcomed to hujra and how a guest was respected irrespective of his religious or 
ethnic background’. (Interviewee No. 56, April, 2012). 
A 32-years old male Pakhtun who was an active member of a nationalist 
political party also said:  
‘One way to build peace is to start reviving these spaces and start celebrating 
them’. (Interviewee No. 43, March, 2012). 
He used a term ‘cultural peace’, which meant: 
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‘Look! You cannot build peace as you build a wall. All you need to do is to revive 
your own Pakhtun culture and that would mean regenerating the spirit of 
pluralism and mutual cooperation’. (Interviewee No. 43, March, 2012). 
A 38-years old male Pakhtun poet, who was an employee of a Western donor 
agency, pointing to a Pashtu literary gathering attended by the researcher in 
Peshawar during field work, said:  
‘This is the only place wherein you can find the true civil society. You will not find 
any dispute over religion here’. (Interviewee No. 47, March, 2012). 
While these indigenous spaces are seen as informal forms of civil society by 
traditionalists, they bring forth an additional supportive argument from the 
Pakhtun history. They specifically quote KKT as evidence and argue that the 
Pakhtun nation had previously demonstrated to the world that they cannot only 
imagine non-violence but can practice it too. With respect to KKT, they 
specifically argued that it was an indigenous movement that emanated from 
amongst the common people. Alongside KKT, they quoted the Roshanaya 
Movement in the 16th97 century as an important instance of Pakhtun 
renaissance and cultural change that emanated from within the Pakhtun culture. 
They also quote a number of verses from Pakhtun literature that show, 
according to them, the Pakhtun desire of peace and non-violence. In other 
words, they do not only count various empirical examples of civil society, but 
also make an attempt to knit them within the overall historical perspective of 
the region.  
                                                        
97 Both KKT and Roshanaya Movement are explored in chapter 3.  
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5.5.2. Religionists 
Religionists, unlike traditionalists, deploy different terms and choose different 
examples and, thus, use a different alternative perspective to express their 
perception of civil society as a norm of civility. Religion, Islam, and Islamic 
identity inform their worldview. Religionists, like traditionalists, are Pakhtun 
and come from different gender and professional backgrounds. Including both 
young and senior people, some of them either worked in civil society 
organisations, or were government employees or belonged to religious political 
parties. What makes them distinct from other clusters is that they all were 
Muslims by faith. They tend to count mosque, madrasa, and shrine as informal 
forms of civil society, informed by the Islamic concepts of khairat (charity), 
zakkat (offering to the poor), and haqooq ul ibad (human rights).  
However, this cluster has two sub-clusters, i.e. reformists and revivalists. 
Reformist-religionists, disagreeing mildly with the Pakhtunized world view of 
the traditionalists, argue that the religion, Islam, is deeply embedded within 
Pakhtunwali and, thus, inseparable. A 53-years old male Pakhtun who was a 
leading a civil society organisation and is based in Peshawar said:  
‘Islam has reformed Pakhtunwali. They do not contradict each other’. 
(Interviewee No. 3, February, 2012).  
For them Islam’s ageless principles of social justice and equality and Islamic 
human rights, can potentially provide as immanent value system wherefrom 
civil society may emerge. They, however, are different from revivalists because 
they think Islam is interpretable and seem to acknowledge the complexity of the 
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modern day life. They also do not seem to be adhering to the revivalist assertion 
that only a fundamental Islamic identity must be prioritized over the local 
culture in order to build civil society. However, unlike traditionalists they give 
equal importance to religion and do not seem to support the secular, nationalist, 
and socialist tendencies as exhibited by some culturalists.  A 56-years old male 
Pakhtun civil society activist based in Peshawar said: 
‘Islam offers radical solutions to some of our gravest issues like poverty, inequality 
and social injustices. Pakhtunwali is our identity, but Islam connects us with the 
rest of humanity and is a way of life’. (Interviewee No. 9, March, 2011). 
A 59-years old female Pakhtun poet and academic, based in Peshawar said: 
‘The basic principal of Koran is justice, but because of erroneous interpretation of 
Islam we have failed to understand this simple message... but remember! It is 
justice for all...not for a specific class or group’. (Interviewee No. 66, April, 2012). 
Islam perceived as a tolerant religion by the reformist-religionists, however, 
receives an orthodox underpinning with the revivalists. The revivalists do not 
seem to be endorsing the culturalists’ nationalist inclinations also and, instead, 
advocate Islamic political ideals. They emphasise that Pakistan was achieved in 
the name of Islam and it has to be ideologically an Islamic country. For them 
Islam is an essentially political system and the Pakistani state needs to 
implement that system in its original form. They also perceive the nationalist-
socialists inclinations of some of the culturalists incompatible with the Islamic 
ideals of a single Ummah. The clash between the revivalists on the one side and 
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other clusters on the other side, which presents the second part of our 
argument, is examined in the next chapter in detail.  
5.5.3. Reformists 
Like traditionalists and religionists, reformists are also mainly Pakhtun and 
have age, gender, and professional variations. However, some the reformists 
were non-Pakhtun and Non-Muslims as well. The reformists bring in the 
discourse of citizenship and consider human rights as an important value 
system. The following mini-biography, shows how some of the reformists have 
embraced the agenda of human rights.  
A mini-biography of ‘Interviewee no 68’ (A Pakhtun female, Aged 52) 
Interviewee no 68 belongs to a remote rural area in KP and was educated in 
extremely hard conditions. After the death of her husband, she was not allowed 
to seek a job. She decided to challenge that decision. She was already aware of 
the poor conditions of women in her neighbourhood. Dedicated to the cause of 
women’s rights, she established her own organisation in Peshawar, which 
operates for the last 18 years in different parts of KP. During my interview with 
her, she shared the following incident.  
‘Once we had a dinner in local malik98 house and I saw a young girl with her child, 
sitting on the stairs and crying silently. She was holding a baby who had fever. So I 
asked her why she is crying and she said that she is not allowed to take her child to 
a doctor because of guests and she can’t go alone...she said the decision was with 
her mother-in-law who will give her some money and ask an adult male member 
to accompany her once all things are over and guess what, she was the daughter-
                                                        
98
 ‘malik’ is a local title that shows the influential social and economic status of a person in the 
Pakhtun society.  
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in-law of that malik...see?...she couldn’t go to the hospital not because they were 
poor but it is this system that withheld her’ (May, 2012)  
An emphasis on individual human rights, perceived as Western by some 
respondents with cultural and religious background, then place reformists in 
opposition to both traditionalists and religionists. While remaining in mild 
tensions with traditionalists and reformist-religionists, their main encounter 
occurs with revivalist-religionists as explored in the next chapter. In other 
words, in addition to the acceptance of Pakhtun culture and Islam as an 
important alternative philosophical system, they introduce a strand of 
individual rights. Civil society, among the reformists, receives a new shift.  
An emphasis on individual rights, by the reformists, seems to resonate with the 
Western ideal of human rights. However, this does not mean embracing the 
entire liberal project of the West but some of its aspects are recognized as 
important, in this case human rights, because they resonate with conditions of 
certain social groups, as they argue. They also argue that the notion of human 
rights is not entirely unfamiliar to Islam or Pakhtunwali, but the discourse of 
human rights, political and social, has to be constituted within the local culture.  
These clusters in conjunction with other sub-clusters, as discussed below, 
inform us of the anxieties amidst different worldviews that occur within the 
overarching desire of embedding the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar in 
alternative perspectives. Unlike civil society in the West, liberal model in 
particular, that challenged both religion and tradition and rejected pre-defined 
roles and obligations, the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar demonstrates the 
possibility of retaining them as important sources of civility and tolerance. In 
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other words, the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar tends to retain a cultural 
identity and collective spirit and resists the individualized mindset. The 
‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar aligns itself with the alternative 
perspective, which, unlike the liberal mainstream model, does not perceive 
religion, tradition, ascriptive identities or any predefined value system as 
antithetical to the potential emergence of civil society.  
However, an extremely important sub-cluster, that of women-reformists, soon 
emerges where tensions amidst different worldviews becomes more frictional 
as explored in the next section.  
5.6. The nemesis of frictional encounter 
However, respondents’ tendency towards immanent value-systems and 
retaining them as the potential philosophical foundation of the ‘emergent civil 
society’ may not guarantee a problem-free trajectory towards the construction 
of civil society. As the data analysis proceeded, we observed that there are 
deeper issues involved that are closely linked with the very desire of embedding 
the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar in immanent value systems. If civil 
society was seen embedded in local cultural and religious perspectives by our 
respondents, then how do these tensions between different worldviews impact 
upon the desire of embedding the discourse of civil society?  
As we asked questions about empirical examples of civil society from our 
respondents and unpacked their ideas of ‘peace’ and ‘violence’, our data analysis 
revealed that the friction between feminine voices and conservative forces of 
tradition problematize the very desire of embedding the ‘emergent civil society’. 
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Feminine voices include both women and men. While we have labelled women 
respondents as ‘women-reformists’ and men respondents as ‘moderators’ in 
this chapter, they collectively represent a strong orientation towards a cultural 
change. The feminist voices, representing cultural change and human agency, 
challenge culturally reproduced roles and responsibilities of women. 
Conservative forces of tradition protect masculine structures and tend to 
sustain their hegemony at cultural level. 
Women’s voices, however, help us understand this frictional encounter better. 
Women’s voices not only spell out this encounter better by drawing on the 
experiences and conditions of women in the Pakhtun society, but are also 
helpful in drawing our attention to the latent forms of violence, which is 
pertinent to our main research question. It is here that the entire idea of the 
‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar attains a feminine outlook.  
While advocating cultural change, women’s perspective of cultural shift, 
however, does not seem to be rejecting the overarching tendency of finding an 
indigenous persona for the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar, as posited by 
other respondents. Women, in Peshawar, seem to be concerned about certain 
aspects of tradition and not the entire culture as one senior female Pakhtun civil 
society activist based in Peshawar said: 
‘I don’t want to change my identity or my culture. I am leading this voluntary 
organization today because my identity as a Pakhtun woman and as a Muslim has 
encouraged me to do so. I know that my religion and my culture has taught me 
principles that I am proud of today...I am not against Jirga as most of male 
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colleagues say...but we have problems. As a Pakhtun and Muslim woman, all I 
want is to secure a better place for women’ (Interviewee No. 65, April, 2012). 
The following section explores this frictional encounter and presents two new 
clusters to provide an empirical evidence of the encounter between feminine 
voices and the conservative forces of tradition.  
5.7. Conservatives: preserving the Pakhtun tradition  
Conservatives come from previous two clusters, i.e. traditionalists and 
religionists and they consider local traditional and religious perspectives as 
important sources of civility and peace that inform sociability amongst the 
Pakhtun. They refer to and count a number of informal associations as 
important examples of local structures such as Hujra, Jirga and neighbourhood 
associations that promote peace and civility within society. Besides, such 
examples of indigenous mechanisms that maintain internal social order and 
social cohesion, they count norms and values both from Pakhtunwali and Islam. 
For instance ‘melmasthiya’ (hospitality), ‘qadr’ (respect), ‘ithbar’ (trust), 
‘Pakhtu’ (decency), and ‘wrorwali’ (brotherhood) are quoted from Pakhtunwali, 
whereas ‘sulh’(resolution), ‘muslamani’ (truthfulness), ‘insaf’ (justice), and 
‘masawath’ (equality) are quoted from Islam by them. They also quote KKT as 
an empirical example of non-violence amongst the Pakhtun. Conservatives 
perceive individualism and the discourse of women’s rights as a threat to their 
cultural identity and aim to retain a more communitarian and collectivist 
approach of sociability. It is this structural udnerstandign of the Pakhtun culture 
of the conservatives that alert them to the women’s rights as a Western agenda 
as advocated by women’s association in Peshawar.  
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5.8. Women-Reformists: the rejection of masculine hegemony 
Rejecting the structural understanding of the conservatives, women question 
and challenge conservatives’ description of Pakhtun culture. Dismissing it as too 
masculine and male dominated, one Pakhtun woman poet, aged 54, from 
Peshawar said: 
‘Women do not have any interactive space beyond their respective families. 
Outside families, it is a man’s world where only men can tell what is right and 
what is wrong’. (Interviewee No. 66, April, 2012). 
Women express and caution the conservatives that the ‘emergent civil society’ 
in Peshawar if indigenized in such a ‘man’s world’ will remain biased. They, 
however, do not wish to dismantle the entire approach to indigenize civil 
society and instead attempt to modify it by injecting their voices. In other 
words, they seek to retain their cultural identity, but resist the tendency 
amongst men to preserve tradition because the latter marginalize them and take 
their voices away.  
For women the ‘emergent civil society’ must unveil, challenge, and reject the 
masculine structures in the Pakhtun society, which have produced certain 
cultural practices and perceptions about females and, which have sustained a 
secondary status of women, both within families and in the social space. It is the 
feminist emphasis on the women’s conditions in families, which blur the 
boundaries between civil society and family, as pointed out in the first chapter.  
It was observed that the voices of women-reformists emanate from registered, 
formal associations that most respondents have been referring to as ‘NGOs’. 
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This runs in parallel with the conservatives’ argument that civil society needs to 
be indigenized within the informal civil society. Respondents’ perception of 
formal and informal civil society runs in parallel with their desire to embed and 
indigenize the ‘emergent civil society’ within immanent value systems.  
5.9. Moving from abstract discourse to concrete examples of civil society: 
the rise of a frictional encounter  
It is argued in the above section that this thesis has operationalised the notion 
of civil society using the idioms of formal and informal, which is based on the 
views of the respondents. Formal and informal civil society, at an empirical 
level, shows where respondents are trying to locate and embed the ‘emergent 
civil society’ in Peshawar. However, the prime objective, here, is not only to 
show how pressure is built between the desire for cultural change as 
represented by feminine agency and the conservative forces of masculine 
structures, but also to show how the abstract discourse of indigenizing civil 
society takes an empirical format.  
Besides referring to other informal associations, such as Jirga and Hujra, 
respondents’ discussions mainly revolved around the institution of NGO, 
advocacy NGOs in particular, when they were finding empirical examples of civil 
society in Peshawar. New clusters, however, emerged when NGOs are brought 
into discussion. For instance, respondents with strong a political background, 
i.e. ‘politicalists’ argue that the central state is a strong entity and political 
parties are in a much better position to negotiate with the state. Political parties, 
therefore, can mobilize people effectively. They also argue that political parties 
have emerged from within the cultural habitat and NGOs neither are in fact in a 
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position to challenge the government, or mobilize people. Nor have they 
emerged from within the culture, so therefore to count NGOs as a mainstream 
civil society may not be justified.  
Traditionalists argue that NGOs, being a Western phenomenon, represent 
neither the local issues nor the local cultural consciousness. ‘Hujra is a our main 
civil society organisation in which we gather regularly to promote art and 
culture and enhance our community cohesion’ remarked one male Pakhtun poet 
from Swat Valley.  
Both traditionalists and politicalists share their reservations about NGOs and 
argue that NGOs are fiscally dependent on foreign donors and rely, for the legal 
support, on the state. Both traditionalists and politicalists argue that NGOs are 
sources of employment for the unemployed or educated urban class only. One 
senior male Pakhtun political and peace activist based in Peshawar used a term 
‘organic civil society’ in contrast to NGOs, which he explained as: 
‘These NGOs have not organically originated from the local cultural soil. They are 
mechanically planted here’. (Interviewee No. 44, March, 2012). 
Carrying Western attributes, mainly capitalist and neo-liberalist, NGOs perceive 
the local culture as ‘tribalistic and primordial’ in character as one male Punjabi99 
speaking male said: 
‘Unaware of their history and culture, the NGOs’ professionals are working against 
their own culture’. (Interviewee No. 71, May, 2012). 
                                                        
99 Punjabi is another linguistic group in Pkaistan, mainly residing in Punjab province.  
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Looking for financial opportunities, with serious charges of corruption against 
them and their dependence on donors, their argument questions the 
independence and strength of NGOs. A male Pakhtun with political background 
and running an NGO in Peshawar said:  
‘Just imagine if all the donors disappear one day, the entire NGOs-market will 
crash’. (Interviewee No. 29, March, 2012). 
Thus the criticism of NGOs helps various clusters to articulate their respective 
argument. Politicalists, for instance, assume political parties to be the 
mainstream civil society, whereas culturalists look for internally located 
cultural institutions, such as Hujra and Jirga as the prime examples of civil 
society. They perceive NGOs as top-down associations, brought from an external 
intellectual domain, with an agenda that is perceived antithetical to the local 
culture. The notion of ‘organic civil society’, including or excluding political 
parties, emerge as an important thematic thread from the data and is contrasted 
to NGOs, perceived as modern associations that work against the ‘organic civil 
society’. Thus words like NGO-bazaar, NGO-industry, NGO-mafia, NGOs as local 
contractors, and NGO-Textiles appear frequently in their discourses.  
Perhaps it is not the formal features per se that are opposed as most of the 
informal associations in Peshawar are voluntary in character too. It is the 
perception that these NGOs promote a foreign agenda of change, which is 
antithetical to the local cultural values. However, the acronym NGO enjoys 
neither a good reputation amongst donors (Rooy & Robinson, 1998 p: 35) nor 
within other non-Western contexts (Maina, 1998; Borchgrevink and Harpviken, 
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2010) and the case of Peshawar NGOs does not seem to be an exceptional 
phenomenon.  
The charges of corruption both in NGOs and the donor community and NGOs’ 
extreme reliance on Western donors are not completely denied by the 
respondents working within formal associations in Peshawar. Some 
respondents working in various NGOs in Peshawar shared their experiences of 
personally witnessing instances of corruption both within NGOs and donors. A 
senior male Pakhtun, working in an NGO, based in Peshawar said: 
‘I do not have any project these days, but we do not want to get one by bribing 
someone in the donor agency as I personally know who get their percentage’. 
(Interviewee No. 7, March, 2011). 
However, women seem to be presenting a different perspective of NGOs, 
advocacy NGOs in particular, and seem to be moderating this critique. Women 
respondents from Peshawar emphasise that the role of modern associations 
which usually are dubbed as NGOs cannot be dismissed. Women, nevertheless, 
do not seem to disagree with the charges of corruption against NGOs as one 
female Pakhtun civil society activist, aged 46, leading a woman’s association in 
Peshawar said: 
‘Yes the charges of corruption are true and there is a lot of mismanagement too’. 
(Interviewee No. 59, April, 2012). 
They, nonetheless, argue that the potential role of these modern associations in 
social and political movements in the history of Pakistan cannot be denied. 
Women count a number of examples and identify the positive role of NGOs. For 
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instance, they refer to the role of women associations during the Zia regime, as 
explored in chapter 4, which resisted and protested against the discriminatory 
laws, NGOs’ participation in the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy 
(MRD) in the early 1980s to restore constitution, NGOs supportive role in the 
recent Lawyers’ Movement (2007-09) at the national level that aimed at 
independent judiciary in Pakistan and more importantly women refer to the 
participation of NGOs in the Peace Movement (PM) in Peshawar that emerged in 
2009 against the Taliban’s violence.  
While moderating NGO-critique, women respondents in Peshawar seem to be 
adding a feminine dimension to the discourse of civil society in Peshawar, which 
manifests women’s struggle of cultural change, which is opposed by other 
clusters.  
Women in the Pakhtun society are perceived as the ‘service-deliverers’ as one 
Pakhtun woman, aged 39, employed in a women’s organisation from Peshawar 
put it in her discussion about NGOs. Leading a woman’s organization, she said: 
‘We, as women, are supposed to clean, cook and look after our children in homes. 
As “service deliverers”, our roles are accepted if we are working in any NGO that is 
given to service delivery. But the moment we step outside our prescribed role as 
“service deliverers” and start demanding our rights, we are declared agents of 
Western ideals’. (Interviewee No. 72, May, 2012). 
If ‘Gender refers to the social division between men and women’ (Walby, 2012, 
p: 18), then women in Peshawar challenge such social divisions. 
227 
 
However, women-reformists also challenge the critiques of formal associations 
dismissed under the rubric of NGOs when they count empirical examples of 
formal civil society organizations in Peshawar that have emerged primarily 
from organic informal civil society. Association of Knowledge and Behaviour 
Transformation (AKBT) and Khwendo Kor (KK) are two such women 
associations in Peshawar that were transformed over a long period of time into 
formal associations. Such associations blur the boundary between a modern 
association, usually discredited in the name of NGO, and a local organic group. A 
Pakhtun woman, aged 41, leading a women’s organization, from Peshawar said: 
‘I don’t call my association an NGO because we emerged from a rural local group. 
We work within the cultural parameters because our language and our dresses 
are local’. (Interviewee No. 70, May, 2012). 
They also argue that these modern associations are led by local people and 
focus on local issues. A 45 years old female civil society activist from Peshawar 
responded:  
‘We go to the rural areas and train teachers. What is anti-cultural or Western in 
it? Is women-education not our priority’? (Interviewee No. 67, May, 2012). 
Thus, discussions around NGOs seem to build our argument when women 
reformists challenge NGOs-critique as presented by men. Again, while women 
perceive NGOs as important spaces of interactions beyond family, some men 
also seem to challenge this feminist perspective. Thus the communicative 
interaction experience serious fissure as it is informed by unequal power 
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relations. For instance, a senior male Pakhtun civil society activist, leading his 
own voluntary association said: 
‘It is wrong to say that Pakhtun women do not have a space to interact. They do 
interact in schools and colleges and within families’. (Interviewee No. 74, May, 
2012). 
Women-reformists responding to such thinking, argue that criticism against 
women’s associations given to women’s-rights is mainly constructed in order to 
keep them under men’s yolk. According to such feminine voices in Peshawar 
women can also participate in the process of cultural change by inserting their 
voices.  
Women consider formal civil society organisations, NGOs in particular, as great 
opportunities to connect, socialize and assert their rights. They think that 
women have no spaces to advocate their rights, whereas these formal 
associations have provided them with new opportunities to connect and 
register their voices. Such an understanding remind us of the feminist 
perspective on civil society as examined in the first chapter that women find 
civil society as an important and useful realm beyond family to project their 
voices and assert for their rights in patriarchal set up (Phillips, 2002).  
While Pakhtun men identify family as an important space of women’s 
interaction, a 54-years old female Pakhtun women’s rights activist, based in 
Peshawar, respond in the following manner:  
‘Sometimes the outlook of an NGO is taken for granted, like women’s open hair or 
smoking by some women but people don’t pay attention to the internal discourse 
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within women’s associations. If they blame NGOs as Western agents then these 
men should discuss our issues and local realities and if they ignore them then how 
can they blame our associations? We want help from men and we wish the 
religious clerics to see our problems, recognize them and come up with solutions 
rather than a blame game’. (Interviewee No. 68, May, 2012). 
As it was argued above that the notion of civil society attains a communitarian 
tone with conservatives, with women reformists, the notion receives a streak of 
women’s rights and thus a feminine perspective of the ‘emergent civil society’ in 
Peshawar emerges very clearly. Thus, by challenging the very criticism leveled 
against women-NGOs, they challenge the very tendency of embedding civil 
society within local cultural and religious perspectives as women reformists in 
Peshawar find some perspectives discriminatory and thus advocate cultural 
change.  
5.10. Frictional encounter between masculinity and cultural change: the 
gendered outlook of ‘peace’ and ‘violence’ 
The debate about NGOs provides the initial instance of the frictional encounter 
between conservative forces of masculine structures and the agency of women 
reformists in Peshawar. The encounter between them, however, assumes more 
frictional form when several questions were asked about ‘violence’ and ‘peace’ 
(civility) from all respondents involved in our research. This section will show 
how men’s perceptions about ‘peace’, ‘violence’, implicitly, sustain the gendered 
division between men and women, which is challenged by women.  
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Words and phrases such as ‘peace’, ‘non-violence’, ‘tolerance’, ‘peaceful 
interactions’, ‘respecting differences’, ‘democratic behaviour’, ‘collectivism’, 
‘self-help’, and ‘a deep sense of security’ were frequently used by male 
respondents while describing civility. Such words and phrases were contrasted 
with the violent extremism, wherein the state and international players have 
played a key role, as they argue. They believe that if the state is willing to assist 
the organic civil society, then such violence can be eliminated. For them the 
sources of violence are external whereas that of civility is internal. In other 
words, violence was brought from external sources and is not a Pakhtun 
phenomenon.  
By external they mean that the roots of religious violence in KP are unfounded 
as it was imported and imposed on the Pakhtun community. Perhaps it may be 
useful to provide some quotes from our male-respondents to see how they 
conceptualize peace and violence.  
Peace is generally understood as the opposite of violence by our male 
respondents in Peshawar as demonstrated by the following quotes.  
 ‘Peace is the fulfillment of our basic needs and our protection’. (A male Pakhtun 
civil society activist, based in Peshawar, March, 2012) 
‘Peace is the happiness of all and non-interference in someone’s personal affairs, 
or when we do not feel the threat of violence from others. But if someone is 
disrupting the community’s peace, then it is the duty of the community to correct 
him because he is a threat to the entire community and we Pakhtun have been 
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doing this all our history. (A senior male Pakhtun writer and civil society activist, 
based in Peshawar, February, 2012) 
 ‘Peace means I am mentally and physically at peace and let others be at peace’. (A 
male Pakhtun academic, based in Peshawar, February, 2012) 
 ‘It is the ability to resolve difference through discourse and in non-violent way’. (A 
male political activist Pakhtun, based in Peshawar, February, 2011) 
 ‘After food it is the most important thing. If peace is there, then life is great. I 
mean security of all and rights. Previously we had hujra which acted like 
community centres etc and all were protected but now I cannot go to the mosque 
even because I am scared. Things were good in the past’. (A senior male Pakhtun 
academic and civil society activist, based in Peshawar, May, 2012) 
‘Peace is all about equality and social justice’. (A Pakhtun male lawyer from 
Peshawar, March, 2012) 
These few but brief excerpts from the interviews of our male respondents 
demonstrate the capacity of Pakhtun to imagine and describe peace according 
to their own respective worldviews and understandings. These excerpts show 
that our male respondents are aware of the positive and negative peace as 
propounded by Johan Galtung (1975) and our male respondents can articulate 
their understandings of peace. An important, but a very relevant aspect of such 
expressions about ‘peace’ is that men respondents also express their respective 
understandings of ‘peace’ as akin to social justice, equality and human rights. 
Again, some of our respondents showed an ability to place such an 
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understanding of ‘peace’ within the current context in Peshawar while referring 
to the Taliban’s violence.  
In the following section we will present how our male respondents are 
imagining and describing violence. These excerpts will show multiple but 
extremely illuminating understanding of violence as we noticed in the case of 
peace. Words such as ‘discrimination’, ‘deprivation of rights’, ‘physical or mental 
harm’, ‘social injustices’, and ‘suppression’ appear very frequently used during 
interviews by male respondents irrespective of their respective background.   
‘Violence is an intentional act to harm someone, whether physically or mentally’. 
(A male Pakhtun civil society activist from Peshawar, April, 2012) 
‘Violence is the marginalization and exploitation of the poor by the rich’. (A male 
Pakhtun with socialist background from Peshawar, April, 2012) 
 ‘Violence is when you take something from someone against his will’ (A male 
Pakhtun peace activist from Peshawar, March, 2011) 
‘For example, if we are five people in this room and I am trying to dominate the 
discussion, then it is also a form of violence too because I am taking your voice 
away’. (A male Pakhtun poet from Peshawar, March, 2012) 
 ‘I mean it is only not taking someone’s life away, but any mental torture that 
remains invisible unlike murder that is visible’. (A senior male Pakhtun civil society 
activist from Peshawar, March, 2012) 
So far these voices seem illuminating and it seems that civil society has brighter 
prospects in Peshawar. Perhaps it might have been an important conclusion of 
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our thesis if we had not explored women’s voices on similar issues. 
Underpinned by a masculine mindset and utopian in character, ‘peace’ and 
‘violence’ seem to be a ‘man’s job’. Men’s perception of ‘peace’, for instance, 
expressed as akin to social justice and equal rights do not seem to lay an 
emphasis on women’s rights as a key area, which was identified by women 
respondents. Women reformists challenge such perceptions of ‘violence’ and 
‘peace’ as offered by men. 
The following section shows some quotes that contradict men’s perceptions of 
‘peace’ and ‘violence’.   
‘If we consider women’s situation in our Pakhtun society, then there was no peace 
here’. (A female Pakhtun civil society activist based in Peshawar, May, 2012) 
‘Peace is not the absence of gunshots or a dead silence that we see in villages. Our 
men so proudly refer to the so-called social order in villages, but miserably fail to 
see what happens to women there. It is about the security of women in all 
situations’. (A female Pakhtun poet based in Peshawar, April, 2012) 
‘Whether it is peace or violence, we women always suffer first. During violence, we 
are double exposed to violence as we have the Taliban now on the one side and a 
culture that silences us on the other side... when it is peace then men stand first its 
as recipients. We as women have to be content with the leftovers only’. (A female 
Pakhtun Lawyer based in Peshawar, April, 2012) 
‘How can there be peace if almost 50% women do not have rights and access to 
education. (A female Pakhtun academic based in Peshawar, May, 2012) 
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 ‘Peace means access to education, open mobility of female, equal opportunity for 
them in all affairs of public life’. (A young female Pakhtun civil society activist, 
writer and academic based in Peshawar, May, 2012) 
As Sylvia Walby’s (1990) has argued that discouraging women from seeking to 
enhance their status is also a form of violence, women in Peshawar stretch the 
definitional spectrum of violence as offered by men, and emphasise more the 
internally situated layers of violence by bringing out their respective 
experiences as members of the Pakhtun society. For them latent violence, lying 
deep within certain norms and social structures of the Pakhtun culture, mainly 
Pakhtun male honour and badal (revenge) deeply impact their interactions. 
Such norms and structures inhibit them from imagining and contributing to the 
creation of a new framework of interactions based on tolerance and respect for 
all members of society, irrespective of their social status and gender 
backgrounds. Such feminine voices bring a gendered dimension to the very the 
conceptions of peace and violence, which exposes the partiality of men’s 
conceptions of peace and violence. To share some of women’s perceptions of 
violence may be pertinent here: 
 ‘Any conception of violence has to include violence against women’. (A female 
Pakhtun civil society activist based in Peshawar, April, 2012) 
‘Violence against women is a source of pride and honour for our men here’. (A 
female Pakhtun academic based in Peshawar, April, 2012) 
‘For me violence is resistance to changes in the conditions of women’. (A female 
Pakhtun civil society activist based in Peshawar, May, 2012) 
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 ‘Honour killing is never accepted as a crime or an important form of violence’. (A 
female Pakhtun writer, academic based in Peshawar, May, 2012) 
‘It is a kind of violence if we (women) are stereotyped as week, feeble and less wise 
than men’. (A female Pakhtun poet, academic based in Peshawar, April, 2012) 
‘Domestic violence against women is never accepted as violence and instead is 
dismissed as a private affair. Women cannot dare to report it to the police. It is 
beyond any possibility that Jirga would intervene to stop such violence against 
women in the private sphere’. (A female Pakhtun civil society activist based in 
Peshawar, May, 2012) 
While these quotes are highly illuminating, some women shared their 
experiences also, which perhaps may be fruitful to be brought out in detail for 
the readers of this thesis.  
‘We were eight sisters and one brother and all of them were born at home rather 
than at hospital. I would always see that my mother despite so many children 
would look after 10 or 20 guests all the time and I would see that she used to make 
trays and fill them with tea and other things. Sometimes there used to be 
processions in our hujra or some gathering and I used to see my mum that she 
would cook tea in a large pot but still she got beaten by my father. I know that 
women like my mother struggled a lot and suffered a lot but they stay silent but no 
one gives them space or the right to speak and they live, suffer and die. I know it is 
happening daily to a majority of women in my society. I personally know that for 
most women, here, life is a painful experience but what makes me uncomfortable 
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is that they have accepted this as natural and destined’. (A 35 years old Pakhtun 
female, working in a women’s organisation, based in Peshawar, May, 2012) 
‘When I go out, I face so many troubles. I am stared at as if I am a commodity for 
men. I feel harassed. Then, even here, in this organization, I face similar problems 
as outside in the street. People will pass remarks about us working in NGOs...Here 
in KP all issues revolve around women. People say what kind of Pakhtun is he? 
Look he is sending his daughter or sister to an NGO?  (A 26-years old Pakhtun 
female employee in a civil society organization in Peshawar, April, 2012) 
‘I arranged a workshop on women, but it was very hard to get permission first and 
even I was told by my manager what should I say during the workshop and what 
issues to discuss. When I started talking on women’s rights I started receiving 
small chits by men saying that if Allah (God) has not made us equal then how you 
can make them equal to men’. (A 27-years old Pakhtun female civil society activist 
based in Peshawar, May, 2012) 
These excerpts from women’s personal accounts, then may be seen in contrast 
to some of the quotes from men respondents that stereotype women as fickle 
and feeble. It is these socially and culturally reproduced gendered divisions, 
which women challenge.  
‘A true Pakhtun will never be ready to change his values. He would not like to see 
his daughter somewhere that will bring him shame and dishonour’. (A senior male 
Pakhtun poet and academic based in Peshawar, March, 2012) 
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‘Women are less wise than men because she is very emotional by nature and gets 
deceived by many... she needs our protection’. (A 26-years old male Pakhtun 
academic based in Peshawar, April, 2012) 
 ‘Women are a liability for men, whether it is war or peace’. (A 54-years old male 
Pakhtun civil society activist based in Peshawar, April, 2012) 
This develops the dilemma of whether or not the ‘emergent civil society’ has to 
be indigenized within the local cultural and religious perspectives as proposed 
by different clusters that may take into account the feminist perspective 
informed by a  strong strain of women’s rights. For women reformists the 
organic civil society may be inspired by the local traditional consciousness, 
which they perceive as biased against women and may, further, marginalize 
them. They argue that the Pakhtun society with its patriarchal mindset and 
highly masculinised concept of male honour will further restrict their mobility 
and may withhold their basic human rights wherein the cultural contents i.e. 
Pakhtunwali and Islam, may be used to subdue and dominate them. Women will 
remain ‘captives of Pakhtun male honour’, as one young female social activist 
asserted.  It is precisely these issues that have been actively taken up by 
women’s associations based in Peshawar and for which they have to face fierce 
opposition, wherein both NGOs and women’s-rights are perceived as a foreign 
agenda. It is then understandable when women in Peshawar show their 
concerns that women’s issues do not seem to be a priority for men here as a 
senior female Pakhtun civil society activist based in Peshawar said: 
‘I think it is our failure that we could not mobilize our men for the women’s cause’. 
(Interviewee No. 67, May, 2012). 
238 
 
It is such women’s associations based in Peshawar who consider that modern 
association, mainly in the form of an NGO, have provided them not only with 
financial support, but also a platform to highlight women’s issues and problems 
both to the state and to the community. Women’s associations not only inform 
the state to introduce women friendly legislations, but also inform women about 
their constitutionally protected rights. However, these women’s associations 
have also focused on the local culture and social structures that has sustained 
bias against women. A female Pakhtun women’s rights activist based in 
Peshawar said:  
‘What our elders do inside our homes are adopted and internalized by our young 
and thus such tendencies are reproduced. So we are trying to create women 
friendly spaces both within and outside the family’. (Interviewee No. 63, May, 
2012). 
Thus the argument of the conservatives, culturalists and religionists, wherein an 
emphasis on the organic civil society emerges clearly seems to be challenged by 
the women reformists. The latter group of cluster clearly articulates what 
civility is for them. For women reformists change in social collective behaviour, 
mainly towards women, is an important version of civility. A 36-years old 
female Pakhtun women’s rights activist based in Peshawar said:  
‘Civil society can only be civil if it promotes it’. (Interviewee No. 62, May, 2012). 
The discourse of the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar, which shows the 
tendency to embrace an alternative philosophical value system and retain a 
local cultural identity also triggers certain antithetical forces. To resolve these 
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tensions and dilemmas, respondents, women-reformists in particular, look 
towards the state, to improve the rule of law and ensure social justice. A senior 
female Pakhtun civil society activist based in Peshawar said: 
‘I believe that only women can represent women’s concerns. That’s why we want 
women in politics, so that they can bring in women-friendly bills and work for the 
betterment of women’s conditions’. (Interviewee No. 66, May, 2012). 
A strong rule of law is seen as an important condition that can help them secure 
the a better social status and ensure their safety.  
5.11.  Moderating the frictional encounter and finding a way out 
However, another cluster, that of culturalists-moderators emerges from the data 
that appears to be moderating this frictional encounter and accept the 
possibility of deeply embedded biased norms and structures that potentially 
encourage violence. Placing violence in direct opposition to peace or civility, 
they attempt to see violence in a broader social context. For instance: 
‘Violence is the suppression of one’s rights’. (A young male Pakhtun civil society 
activist from Peshawar, March, 2012) 
‘Peace is the freedom of expression’. (A Pakhtun male writer and academic from 
Swat Valley, May, 2012) 
‘Peace is the end of poverty’. (A male Pakhtun civil society activist, based in 
Peshawar, April, 2012)  
They do not necessarily see local cultural and religious perspectives responsible 
for violence against women and broaden up the analytical spectrum of violence 
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by including the conditions of extreme poverty, unemployment amongst youth, 
poor governance and deteriorating situation of law and order. An important 
characteristic of moderators is that they do not think that the struggle against 
the masculinised mind set is not insurmountable. However, like women-
reformists they also look towards the state to create conditions of social justice 
and security for all that may discourage violence against women such as honour 
killing.  
Culturalists-moderators also suggest that the internal tensions within the 
‘emergent civil society’ cannot be resolved by improving the rule of law alone. 
Instead, they identify that the ‘emergent civil society’ needs to be proactive to 
create conditions of open dialogue. In other words, they suggest new spaces of 
communicative interactions.  
It is from amongst these culturalists-moderators that we encounter the 
suggestion that the idea of civil society needs to be ‘communitized’ in order to 
generate opportunities to engage the community at large scale and may create 
sustained and open opportunities for communicative interaction and debate. 
Without eliminating the distance between formal and informal civil society in 
Peshawar, NGOs and the women’s agenda will be perceived as a foreign injected 
scheme.  
5.12. Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that the deployment of civil society as a spatial, 
normative tool, as mentioned in chapter 1, was based on the respondents’ views 
about civil society. However, civil society as a social space and as a normative 
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tool does not mean that civil society has a homogeneous discourse rather is 
imbued with conflicting and competing perspectives.  
By introducing respondents to the readers, this chapter has shown that the 
empirical data strongly suggest that the discourse of civil society in Peshawar is 
aligned towards the alternative perspective, despite tensions and uncertainties, 
which fluctuate within it. Deviating from the mainstream liberal model of civil 
society, the discourse of civil society tends to retain its local cultural persona 
and character. The tendency of retaining local cultural persona, however, 
triggers certain antithetical forces, which seem to impact upon this tendency. 
The antithetical forces are mobilised at two levels: first, when respondents refer 
and count the empirical examples of civil society in Peshawar; and second when 
respondents’ ideas of peace and violence are explored. These two accounts 
make the tension between conservative forces of masculinity and feminine 
voices visible, which unveils the unequal but invisible power relations between 
different segments of the Pakhtun society.  
While feminine voices also reinforce the argument of the thesis that the 
‘emergent civil society’ needs to have its own cultural identity, they also alert us 
of the potential risks to embed civil society in local culture, which according to 
them, is imbued with masculine mind set and unequal power relations between 
men and women. 
Informing us of the frictional encounter between cultural change and the forces 
of masculinity, the discourse of civil society exhibits not only the changing 
geometry of human relations and resistance to such change, but also 
demonstrate that the struggle for cultural change is taking place outside the 
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state, within the non-state social space, which reflects Gramscian perspective of 
civil society also. The chapter concludes that to resolve these tensions 
respondents look towards the state and pressurise it to improve social justice 
and the rule of law. However, to resolve internal tensions, the importance of 
dialogue between actors and associations within the ‘emergent civil society’ is 
also emphasised.  
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CHAPTER 6 
6. The indigenization of civil society and its frictional encounter with 
extremist forces and the state 
6.1. Introduction 
The ‘emergent civil society’s’ in Peshawar that undergoes through a frictional 
encounter between an aspiration for cultural change and the hegemonic 
masculinity seems to experience a new friction. The ‘emergent civil society’s’ 
contribution to build peace amidst violence comes into friction with violent 
extremism and religious orthodox forces, as this chapter demonstrates.  
While previous chapter showed how the frictional encounter has occurred 
within the cultural context between feminists and masculine conservative 
forces reflecting important theoretical thread of the ‘alternative’ civil society, 
this chapter will demonstrate how the frictional encounter is occurring within 
the political and religious contexts between the desire of peace and 
conservative religious forces.  
The objectives of this chapter are three: first, to demonstrate that the discourse 
of civil society in Peshawar reflects another theoretical thread of the 
‘alternative’ civil society by exhibiting criticality as its dominant feature in 
which the Pakistani state is criticised for multiple reasons, such as underming 
peace and encouraging violence. However, the entire critique of the state is 
informed by a strong desire of embracing peace, which has been undermined by 
the state for its own political and strategic reasons; second, the discourse of 
peace acquires a reflexive dimension when it assumes an inward trajectory and 
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grapples with the religious conservative forces, inhabiting the non-state social 
space and, which creates another frictional encounter; third, to explore why the 
tendency of looking towards the state is stronger than the much needed 
tendency of looking inwards, as suggested by some respondents.  
This chapter is divided into seven sections. Section 1 explores that the 
‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar demonstrates criticality as its prime feature 
by generating a strong critique of the Pakistani state. This section shows that 
the critique of the state is holistic as it criticality evaluates the historical, 
political and social causes, which led to the creation of a strong, authoritarian 
and exclusionary state and, which ultimately undermined local indigenous 
political forces, which were oriented more towards democratic pluralism. 
Respondents’ critique, however, is informed by a peace consciousness which 
they think was inherent in the indigenous political forces.  
While criticality is presented in a political context in the first section, it assumes 
a religious dimension in the section 2 when respondents identify the 
instrumental use of the religion by the state to neutralise political opposition 
and seek new grounds of legitimacy. While the state’s efforts to undermine the 
indigenous political forces is mainly pointed out by respondents with strong 
Pakhtun nationalist backgrounds, the state’s use of religion for instrumental 
purposes is identified by traditionalists and reformists in particular as section 2 
shows their quotes. Both these sections show that by denying the right of 
political diversity to its own people, the Pakistani state deployed the idioms of 
the religious Right to silence the opposition. This section, however, also points 
out that the instrumental use of Islam by the state soon acquired an ideological 
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stance under the Zia regime in the 1980s, which received further impetus as the 
Afghan war started.  
Section 3 deals in detail with the voices of the respondents and shows how the 
communication interaction presents a shared sense of criticality, which is, 
however, underpinned by a strong strand of reflexivity as critical voices, 
inspired by a commitment to peace, debate the roots, causes and consequences 
of violent extremism. The reflexive dimension of peace consciousness is evident 
when voices of peace in Peshawar try to embed peace consciousness within 
local cultural history by quoting instances and norms of peace from the Pakhtun 
and Islamic history. Peace consciousness not only rejects the violent extremism 
of the Taliban in KP, but also stands up against religious fundamentalism or 
what our respondents called ‘mullaeeath100’ or ‘Talibanization’. Some sections 
within the non-state social space in Peshawar are standing up against this 
Talibanizing tendency, which is perceived by them as imported.  
 Section 4 offers a detailed account of the social background of the ‘religious-
revivalists’, which include references to their ethnic, gender and associational 
backgrounds. This section also includes one mini-biography. Highlighting the 
frictional encounter that occurs between ‘religious-revivalists’ and all other 
clusters, this section shows that a strict Sunni version of Sharia is the only 
acceptable perspective for them as they reject other respondents’ assertion of 
the importance of local cultural identity.  
                                                        
100
 ‘Mullaeeath’ is deduced from ‘Mullah’, which means a male religious cleric. ‘Mullaeeath’ then 
refers to his orthodox and conservative world view. As the world view of a ‘Mullah’ is difficult to 
be disengaged from the world view of the Taliban, therefore, our respondents used them as two 
synonyms. Both the Taliban and Mullah share a strict adherence to Islamic Sharia.  
246 
 
Section 5 presents the argument of other respondents that the conservative 
religious narrative is potentially diminishing all the possibilities of considering 
religion a dynamic force of social cohesion and peacebuilding. Religious-
reformists, in particular, also perceive Islam as an important aspect of Pakhtun 
life that can contribute to organic relationships based on mutual respect. For 
them, Islam is a progressive religion that can bring social justice and equality to 
their society. Different clusters see the threat of religious orthodoxy in distinct 
ways, though not entirely opposing to one another nor neatly separated from 
one another. In all cases, the presence of orthodox sections is perceived by them 
to be inhibiting the progressive and liberal role of Islam.   
Section 6 explores why the tendency of looking towards the state and 
pressurising it is strong than the tendency of inward trajectory in the emergent 
civil society in Peshawar. In this section it is argued that the inward looking 
tendency in the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar remains weak and need 
attention and its weakness is associated with certain internal dynamics by the 
respondents.  
Section 7 concludes the chapter by showing that the ‘emergent civil society’s’ 
emphasis on communitising the civil society and strengthening the dialogical 
spaces, as expressed by some respondents, needs to be focused if the project of 
embedding civil society in local cultural perspectives is to be realised and if the 
tensiosn that emanate from such desire are to be resolved.  
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6.2.  ‘Emergent civil society’s’ criticality and the identification of the dark 
role of the state 
This thesis argues that respondents’ in-depth critique of the Pakistani state is an 
important aspect of the ‘emergent civil society’ because in the Western debate 
of civil society and democracy, civil society, whether liberal or alternative, is 
perceived to be an important player. Civil society can play an important part in 
exposing sites of decision making and power within the state because civil 
society is influenced by such decision making (Warren, 2013). However, the 
alternative discourse of civil society, which is informed by the Critical Theory 
tradition, it is this criticality that emerges, quite prominently, as an important 
feature of civil society (Chambers, 2002). The ‘emergent civil society’ in 
Peshawar also demonstrates this criticality as respondents’ voices of peace in 
Peshawar are attempting to expose the way the Pakistani state has unfolded in 
the post colonial period and demonstrate how society was affected by 
promoting a specific brand of Islam.  
This section will present how voices of peace in Peshawar protest against the 
biased role of the Pakistani state that curtailed their respective political, cultural 
and human rights and instead tried to superimpose a specific brand of Islam on 
entire Pakistani society. It was explored in chapter 3 that Pakistan after its 
inception in 1947 has experienced limited democratic periods, and the military 
has ruled the country for decades. Thus, retaining our clusters of culturalists, 
religionist-reformists, women-reformists and politicalists, as elaborated in 
chapter 5, the empirical data inform us that these groups strongly criticize the 
role of the ML’s leadership and military in the state politics. Respondents argue 
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that military interventions, in particular, stalled political processes that were 
emerging from the non-state social space and which could have contributed to 
democracy.  
They101 show a strong consciousness of the fact that the Pakistani state in the 
post-colonial period was occupied by the un-elected forces that resorted to the 
discourse of the Right102 while repressing plural, secular and democratic voices. 
A male Pakhtun academic, aged 57, from Peshawar University referring to the 
early years of Pakistan after 1947 said: 
‘Legitimacy comes from people...when they vote you and send you as their 
representative in the parliament. But they were not chosen people... so they looked 
for a slogan that can be used as a tool of legitimacy and befool people’. 
(Interviewee No. 2, February, 2011). 
Our respondents demonstrate a tendency to see the exclusionary orientation of 
the Pakistani state after its inception in 1947 as the denial of democracy. 
Politicalists, with strong Pakhtun nationalist backgrounds, for instance, argue 
that people in the subcontinent were not familiar with the Western idea of the 
state. Nevertheless, political forces amongst the Muslim population did emerge 
during colonial times in opposition to imperial rule. They argue that indigenous 
political forces in the present day Pakistan existed, but after the birth of 
Pakistan in 1947, such indigenous political forces were not recognized as valid 
political voices in KP by the then ML leadership and, thus, were excluded from 
entering the state. Shutting the state to such indigenous political voices 
                                                        
101 By ‘they’ we refer to all clusters, here, with the exception of ‘religious-revivialists’ as explored 
in the coming sections. 
102
 ‘Right’ here means the deployment of religious idioms.  
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contributed to an enormous gap between the state and society. A senior male 
Pakhtun academic, aged 54 from Peshawar University said: 
‘The modern state emerged in the West according to the needs and experiences of 
their societies. Here, in the third world, colonialists introduced their state 
structure and it came from the top and was not produced in response to the needs 
of the local society. So you see a disconnection between society and the state. 
Unfortunately, this disconnection was intentionally sustained after the emergence 
of Pakistan’. (Interviewee No. 13, February, 2012). 
Another senior male Pakhtun, aged 56, government employee, associated with a 
Pakhtun nationalist political party said: 
‘I think the dilemma from the very first day here in Pakistan is that there is a big 
gap between the state and society. Rulers of the country acted as if people are the 
subjects and not citizens’. (Interviewee No. 11, February, 2012). 
However, it does not mean that the Pakistani state and the non-state social 
space worked separately in neatly separate spheres. Instead, our respondents 
argue that the Pakistani state did intervene within the non-state social space for 
instrumental objectives. On the one hand, nationalist/socialist, secular and 
democratic political forces were suppressed and marginalized by the central 
state. On the other hand, the state resorted to selective patronage within the 
non-state social space in order to neutralize political oppositions. Some 
respondents argue, as shown below, that the military-bureaucratic-elite forces 
at the centre used the discourse of the religion to legitimize their rule and 
discredit their political opponents who aspired for democratic ideals. In the 
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opinion of such respondents, the state, while denying all the fundamental 
principles of democracy, has behaved with prejudice towards political forces 
that were trying to create a secular and plural political order. A male academic, 
aged 43, from Peshawar University shared his concerns about the centrist state 
in these words: 
‘Then we have a centrist state which pretends and presents itself as one nation and 
does not acknowledge any diversity. The nature of the state is highly un-
democratic and anti-pluralist even if we have a parliament. Then religion has 
historically evolved as its important tool of policy’. (Interviewee No. 12, March, 
2012). 
A male Pakhtun academic, aged 44, from Peshawar University with journalistic 
background said: 
‘If I were to write the history of the early years of Pakistan after 1947...I will 
definitely label that period as “neo-colonialist era” rather independence...civil 
bureaucracy was used to lure local influential people to support the state and to 
malign the political opposition as we saw during the British colonial period’. 
(Interviewee No. 14, March, 2012). 
Nonetheless, while some respondents were critical of the Pakistani state in the 
post 1947 period yet they were able to place their respective critique within the 
context also. For instance the same male respondent with journalistic 
background said: 
‘While the regional context of 1947 placed very heavy constraints on the state...yet 
I assume that the solution to those issues should have been sought by the political 
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leadership, which was weaker rather than military establishment that grew more 
powerful’. 
A constitutionally regulated political order was something that did not happen 
after the arrival of Pakistan in 1947. Instead, the state was captured by the very 
powerful to secure their positions and draw out maximum benefits from the 
state and distribute them amongst those who could be incorporated in ruling 
elites. In other words, civil society that was potentially countering the 
hegemony of the state in Pakistan, was intentionally kept at the periphery and 
suppressed consistently by the central state.  
6.3. Prioritizing the discourse of ‘Religion’: the state’s instrumental use of 
religion 
Our respondents, culturalists and reformist in particular, both from Peshawar 
and outside, argued that the central state perceived the ethnically informed 
political opposition as a rival and to neutralize their opposition the central state 
attempted to create a single homogeneous Pakistani nation.  
However, the creation of a homogeneous Pakistani nation was also in resonance 
with the objective of the independence movement. As explored in chapter 3 that 
the independence movement aimed at the creation of a Muslim state, which held 
in check the ethnic differences amongst the Muslim population. Nevertheless, 
such ethnic differences emerged and started asserting once Pakistan was 
achieved in 1947. 
These multiple ethnic identities were then perceived as potential threats by the 
central state. Denying the right of political diversity to its own people, the 
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Pakistani state deployed the idioms of the religious Right to silence their 
opposition.  However, the state’s ‘undemocratic and prejudiced actions’, as one 
non-Pakhtun male respondent, aged 48, from Punjab mentioned, against 
culturally-grown, local political voices created empty political spaces which 
were gradually filled by the religious forces within the non-state social space, at 
times, extreme and intolerant towards others. A senior male Pakhtun, aged over 
60, with a socialist political background said: 
‘The suppression of local culture and leadership didn’t help the state at all...The 
suppression of the nationalist-secular voices encouraged the religious forces both 
at political and social levels. Not only nationalist but socialist and communist 
political spaces were hunted and chased’. (Interviewee No. 22, March, 2012). 
Culturalists, and reformists, politicalists in particular, argue that the newly born 
Pakistani state could have resorted to positive or liberal nationalism instead of 
negative or illiberal nationalism, wherein the local voices or political groups 
embracing different political ideals, perhaps, would have contributed to 
diversity and pluralism within society also. A non-Pakhtun male, aged 48 from 
Punjab mentioned: 
‘Society had been already religiously plural and did not entertain any religious 
extremism. The local political opposition represented such secular and plural 
spirit because they emerged from the same society...and accommodating such 
local political groups within the state would have resolved many issues’. 
(Interviewee No. 79, May, 2012). 
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They argue also that the suppression of the democratic, nationalist, socialist and 
secular political forces in the last 60 years since the inception of Pakistan in 
1947 and the use of the discourse of the religion by the Pakistani state 
contributed to the emergence of the religious political forces or political forces 
of the religious right. At the same time, the state’s encouragement of a particular 
brand of Islam, strengthened the institutions of mosque and madrasa. As two 
powerful institutions, some mosques and madaris were used by different 
religious political groups in the Afghan Jihad and which valorised the ideal of 
Jihad at the social level. However, this happened under the patronage of the 
Pakistani state as we explored in the third chapter. A senior male Pakhtun 
socialist activist, aged over 60, who became active in politics in the early 1960s 
in KP said: 
‘After 1947, we heard that Pakistan ka mathlab kiya lailaha illalah103… but we 
knew it was a political ploy only...the Pakistani state mentions neither local 
culture, nor people or gave any vision of social and economic development…now 
you tell me? Who was going to implement the rule of Allah (God) in Pakistani?...Of 
course mullahs (religious clerics) and see what have they done with the society’. 
(Interviewee No. 30, March, 2012). 
The legitimacy of the state, according to our respondents, culturalists and 
reformist in particular, was to come from people’s participation in the state 
rather than excluding them. They refer to the state’s deployment of religion to 
seek undemocratic legitimacy. The specific use of a Sunni-brand of Islam during 
                                                        
103
 This slogan was popularized during the independence movement and retained later after the 
inception of Pakistan in 1947. It means the objective of Pakistan is nothing else but to 
implement the rule of Allah (God). The first kalmia (recitation) of Islam was used to propagate 
this objective.  
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Zia’s regime created great implications for the civil society in Pakistan as it 
emboldened orthodox sections within the non-state social space.  
6.4. A shared discourse of criticality  
It was argued in the previous chapter that different perspectives are invoked by 
the respondents to provide the philosophical foundation of the ‘emergent civil 
society’ in Peshawar. While rejecting violent extremism and criticizing the role 
of the state, our respondents invoke different perspectives and we encounter 
the interplay of the same multiple legacies as we observed in the previous 
chapter. Different clusters launch their respective critique of the state according 
to their particular worldviews. As a result, we can observe a mild difference 
rather than a tension between different worldviews. However, the difference in 
worldviews is not insurmountable and respondents, at times, develop a shared 
criticality.  
In other words, the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar presents a discourse, 
which is oriented more towards criticality. However, this criticality is 
underpinned by a strong strand of reflexivity. Critical voices become reflexive 
also as they trace the origin and debate the causes of the violent extremism. The 
reflexive strand demonstrates that Pakhtun were not religious bigots but under 
particular political conditions, religion was used to promote violence in the 
region, which has created dangerous repercussions for people.  
Tensions, nonetheless, soon become more frictional between all clusters on the 
one side and religious revivalists on the other as shown in the coming sections. 
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The following section will demonstrate how criticality invokes different 
legacies.  
While politicalists emphasise more on minimizing the distance between the 
state and society, culturalists argue that the cultural needs of the Pakhtun 
society were ignored by the centrist state. A male academic Pakhtun poet based 
in Peshawar said: 
‘We never had a state of our own. The mother tongue is the soul of a culture, but it 
was never promoted and now young Pakhtun generations neither can write 
Pakhtu nor know their 5000 year old history.’ (Interviewee No. 36, March, 2012). 
A male Pakhtun journalist from Peshawar said:  
‘The state was not sensitive to our institutions and ways of life. Our social 
institutions of Hujra and Jirga have also declined as a result...our Pakhtun live on 
self-help base’. (Interviewee No. 40, March, 2012). 
A male Pakhtun lawyer from Peshawar said: 
‘Language is our cultural identity and connects us with the past but we were told 
to speak another language and we have to consider that language as our national 
language...now see what is the education rate here and Punjab?...because we had 
to learn a new language first’. (Interviewee No. 45, May, 2012). 
The reformists, on the other hand, bring in the discourse of citizenship, which, 
they argue, was never a priority of the centrist state. A male Pakhtun civil 
society activist based in Peshawar said: 
256 
 
‘When I sleep at night I make sure that I keep a gun under my pillow to protect my 
family...because police is not going to protect me it is only for the elites here. 
(Interviewee No. 46, May, 2012). 
Both culturalists and reformists seem to be endorsing the positions of the 
nationalist/socialist and reformist religious politicalists. Culturalists, for 
example, argue that the promotion of a specific brand of Islam by the state in the 
1980s further damaged Pakhtun culture and social structures and created 
spaces for the violent non-state religious actors at the cultural level. They argue 
that the arrival of Islam in the 9th and 10th centuries AD did not make the entire 
Pakhtun nation, religious bigots rather Islam coalesced with the Pakhtun 
culture. A male Pakhtun writer aged 37, from Swat Valley said:  
‘Pakhtun were Muslims, but we were never fanatics’. (Interviewee No. 66, May, 
2012). 
Respondents with different worldviews oppose religious-revivalists, as 
discussed in the coming sections, who mainly come from Deobandi-Salafi104 
madaris or some religious political parties that claim that Islam has to exist in 
original and pure form, which then lead them to embrace a non-pluralist 
religious positioning. Opposing such fundamentalist voices, they blame the 
state’s involvement in the Afghan Jihad in the 1980s and its backing of the 
Afghan Taliban in the 1990s. Thus, they argue that it has strengthened the 
                                                        
104
 Salafi means the followers of the first generations of Muslim. It is sometimes synonymously 
used with Wahabsim or Ahle-e-Hadith (Valentine, 2014). In the context of Pakistan Deobandi, is 
also sometimes used to refer to Salafis.  
 
257 
 
Wahhabist105 religious strand which threatens both the Pakhtun culture and the 
tolerant Islam as it existed amongst Pakhtun. A female Pakhtun poet aged 40, 
from Peshawar protesting the biased role of the state said: 
‘We were very backward or kept backward…first religion was thrust down our 
throats…we were told “Pakhtun are Muslims...and very pious”, Pakhtun were told 
that you are Islamic and very great fighters and then encouraged to go and fight 
jihad to help the Afghan Pakhtun Muslim brothers and sisters’. (Interviewee No. 
68, May, 2012). 
This realization emerges very clearly from amongst the reformists also, that the 
state promoted a specific brand of Sunni political Islam and backed Jihadist 
groups during 1980s, which has potentially contributed to the current religious 
extremism, intolerance and sectarian violence in the country. A non-Pakhtun 
woman activist, aged 38, from a woman’s associations located in Peshawar said: 
‘The state’s backing of religious forces strengthened the religious conservative 
strands within the society as the mullah started to play a stronger role, emerging 
as more powerful at the social level. Mullah relied on community members for his 
survival, but all of a sudden the entire state machinery was there to back him up 
and assign him an important role. He was inflated by the state’. (Interviewee No. 
72, May, 2012). 
The reformists, who focus more on the non-state ‘social’ space, argue that the 
state’s promotion of Jihad and backing of non-state Jihadi groups generated 
serious implications for civil society. General Zia’s regime in the 1980s was 
                                                        
105
 The followers of Wahab, an 18th century preacher in Arabia, who wanted to clean Islam of un-
Islamic practices and make it compatible with the original teachings of Islam during 6th century 
(Valentine, 2014).   
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consistently pointed out by reformists as the turning point, when policies and 
constitutional amendments were introduced to Islamize the Pakistani society. 
One of such orthodox steps, was his introduction of a ‘Blasphemy Law’. A 
Hindko-speaking woman aged 36, human rights activist from Peshawar while 
referring to the implications of blasphemy laws on society said: 
‘The Murder of Punjab’s governor106 by a non-state actor in the name of religion is 
just one instance and how civil society has kept quiet. See? Now religious groups 
are more organized, well structured and well resourced. They think that their 
violence is legitimate and it has instilled fear in us. We cannot protest even an 
unlawful murder’. (Interviewee No. 58, May, 2012). 
The communicative interaction, inspired by a commitment to peace, assumes a 
shared sense of critically amongst the ‘connectors’. ‘Connectors’, however, also 
show a deeper layer of reflexivity as the origin and causes of violent extremism 
are traced. ‘Connectors’ are respondents, which include men and women, 
Muslims and Non-Muslims, and Pakhtun and non-Pakhtun as they cross-cut 
different clusters. With the exception of the religious-revivalist, the connectors 
help us clearly see the shared critique, which emerge from the empirical data 
and, thus, offer the possibility of some cross cutting themes. The most relevant 
to this research amongst these cross-cutting themes, is: the democratic role of 
the state is immensely important and the Pakhtun culture is tolerant in 
character. Connectors also reflect the main argument of the thesis that the 
‘emergent civil society’ is seeking an indigenous persona. The following example 
                                                        
106
 Punjab’s governor was shot dead by his own bodyguard in 2011 when he proposed changes 
in the blasphemy law.  
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from our respondents’ interviews will demonstrate how different connectors 
cross-cut certain relevant themes.   
A male socialist respondent aged 28, acting as a connector, stretches out 
theoretically, to the culturalists while referring to the religious politics: 
‘The religious forces have been there for 60 years since 1947, so of course they 
created some impacts on the society. Yet they could not demolish Pakhtun values 
of tolerance that we built up over centuries. We still interact with our religious 
communities and never gave importance as to who is Shia or Sunni’. (Interviewee 
No. 47, May, 2012). 
A senior Pakhtun woman, human rights activist from Peshawar acting also as a 
connector endorsed the culturalists’ concerns that Pakhtun were never 
intolerant said: 
‘We were not radical but we were made so. Our religious parties, Saudi Arabia and 
Iran have been using our land, but we criticize the USA. Why is Saudi Arabia 
making madaris here and why don’t they make it there in their own countries? We 
have to change our foreign policy. Their involvement in our country must be 
discussed on the media’. (Interviewee No. 63, May, 2012). 
A young Pakhtun social activist with no background in political activism acted 
as a connector also and endorsed the politicalists’ and culturalists’ perspectives 
when he pointed out the hegemonic role of the biased state.  
‘If you turn good values into vices and then spread it to the entire society, then 
what will you expect? The states demonized local heroes and valorised Jihadists 
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just to attract innocent people for strategic objectives’. (Interviewee No. 50, May, 
2012). 
The radicalization of some sections within the society by religious forces, 
whether political or non-political, with a clear backing by the state, comes out 
very clearly as an important cross-cutting theme. 
The data collected outside KP, a total of six interviews, also, seem to reflect 
these themes too. A male academic and social activist, aged 40, from Punjab 
said: 
‘In post 9/11 when the Taliban started pouring to FATA, they started targeting 
Pakhtun social structures and started killing local elders, especially in FATA so 
that they can create a vacuum to fill. They knew that the traditional structures 
like Jirga can still resist them, so they consciously destroyed them’. (Interviewee 
No. 78, May, 2012). 
Here, the connectors’ voices seem to support the desire amongst the 
respondents that the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar must come from the 
organic, local cultural and religious perspectives as discussed in the previous 
chapter in detail, because, they argue that these perspectives do not inspire 
violent extremism rather discourage it. However, here they seem to frame their 
argument within a broader political context and demonstrate that the desire of 
embedding the ‘emergent civil society’ within immanent perspectives depends, 
to a certain extent, on the responsible role of the Pakistani state. In other words, 
to actualize the project of embedding the ‘emergent civil society’ certain pre-
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conditions, including citizenships, social justice and security need to be 
provided by the state.  
These connectors amongst the politicalists, culturalists and reformists, recalling 
respective ‘political’, ‘social’, and ‘cultural’ implications of a hostile and 
hegemonic state, seem to exhibit a shared perspective and argument that the 
state has denied ‘political’, ‘religious’ and ‘cultural’ diversity. The state’s attempt 
to control and suppress the nationalist-secular political forces, discouragement 
of the Pakhtun culture, and the promotion of a specific brand of political Islam, 
while promoting involvement in the Afghan jihad and backing the Taliban in the 
1990s, contributed to the emergence of the current wave of violent religious 
extremism.  
However, this cross cutting emergent theme is narrated differently as the three 
clusters of the respondents deploy different terminologies based on their 
experiential backgrounds and their specific perceptions of the state and the 
Pakhtun society. Using their respective frame of references, they all count the 
responsibilities of the state vis-à-vis civil society differently.  
Politicalists, using a political lexicon and examples, wish to see a strong 
democratic state so that the state delivers social justice, remain responsive to its 
people, and ensure equality and, thereby, contribute to the emergence of a 
peaceful society. Politicalists argue that people or society, then, through political 
participation can make the state a functioning entity. They recognize a 
politically-informed dialectical relationship between the state and society. In 
other words they argue that a just and peaceful society is possible if the state 
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guarantees citizens’ political rights. For instance a male Pakhtun political 
activist based in Peshawar said:  
‘If everyone’s rights are protected and the state remains impartial towards 
different social and cultural groups and treat them on equal terms then it can 
bring peace’. (Interviewee No. 12, March, 2012). 
Reformists do not seem to disagree with politicalists when they identify the 
issues of governance, human rights, and basic needs provision as essential 
responsibilities of the state. The discourse of a weak state that has failed in 
protecting the rights of its citizens and improving the rule of law emerges very 
clearly from amongst reformists. However, reformists, also, argue that their 
individual liberties are equally important and therefore the real domain to 
protect their liberties is civil society. The state’s role is to provide them a 
favourable environment. A female Pakhtun civil society activist based in 
Peshawar said:  
‘I think we as common people have a role. You just cannot leave everything to the 
politicians. You need to keep them under some checks...but we also need to talk 
about different issues loud and clear in such platforms’. (Interviewee No. 63, May, 
2012). 
Culturalists, whilst sharing their respective concerns, argue for the possibility of 
cultural progress and evolution, which is to be ensured by the state and which 
could potentially contribute to the creation of a tolerant society.  
Politicalists and culturalists talk more about the denial of the political and 
cultural rights of the Pakhtun while reformists refer more to human rights. 
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While criticizing the state, they identify and regularly refer to the implications of 
such policies over society. However, here, society appears to be more general in 
character, denoting ‘the people’, inhabiting the non-state social space. The 
shared criticality underpinned by a reflexive strand, however, is soon checked 
by opposing, antithetical voices as shown in the following section.  
6.5. The rise of the frictional encounter: opposing the spectre of religious 
conservatism  
However, the difference between different worldviews, which remained mild in 
spirit, develop into a frictional encounter as religious-revivalists contest these 
voices. This reminds us of the frictional encounter between conservative 
traditional forces and feminists as discussed in the previous chapter in detail.  
The religious-revivalist do not seem to be endorsing these desires of a tolerant 
Pakhtun society and the aspirations of citizenship and human rights which they 
recognize as Western in essence and, thus, incompatible with Islam. Our 
revivalist-religionists respondents mainly come from three religious political 
parties, i.e. JI (Jumath e Islami), JUI-F (Jameeath Ualam e Islam-Fazal u Rahman 
Group) and JUI-S (Jameeath Ualam e Islam-Sami ul Haq Group)107. However, 
they also include some Deoband-madrasa students and prayer leaders (imam). 
These three religious political parties have their strong presence in KP and 
some other parts of Pakistan and regularly contest provincial and national 
elections. While the exact number of mosques is unknown, in KP, the number of 
madaris is also uncertain. Again, not every madrasa is affiliated with Deobandi 
                                                        
107
 These three political parties made an alliance and remained in government at KP and 
Baluchistan from 2002 to 2007. If JI is considered to be in the forefront of the Afghan Jihad 
during Zia regime then the most of the afghan Taliban emerged from Deoband madaris affiliated 
with JUI-F and JUI-S.  
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school of thought as other madaris such as affiliated with Barelvi108 sect also 
exist. However, it was during the Afghan Jihad in the 1980s and the post Afghan 
period in the 1990s that these religious political parties and Deobandi school of 
thought received prominence. They advocate Islamic political ideals and 
emphasise that Pakistan was achieved in the name of Islam and it has to be 
ideologically an Islamic country.  
Nevertheless, the researcher also interviewed some individuals who neither 
belonged to these religious political parties nor were the students of any 
particular madrasa. They, however, endorsed the Deobandi or Wahhabi school 
of thought and accepted Jihad as the most viable and meaningful struggle. The 
following mini-biography, followed by quotes, will illustrate their worldviews 
and social positions. However, quotes in the following section also show 
respondents’ ethnic, gender and associational background.  
Mini-biography of ‘Interviewee no. 45.’ Male, Pakhtun aged 32 
‘Interviewee no. 45’ is an educated male and belong to a well-off family. He 
suspended his education few years ago and went to join a training camp in 
Punjab to receive military training. After receiving military training, he went to 
Kashmir for Jihad. While he did not disclose which Jihadi group he was affiliated 
with, he shared the detail of how was he trained and what did he do in Kashmir. 
He also claimed to know some local Taliban leaders as he offered the researcher 
the opportunity that if the researcher wishes, he can arrange interviews with 
some Taliban. He regularly claimed, throughout his interview, that the Sunni, 
                                                        
108 Barelvi sect in Pakistan represent the mystical aspects of Islam and consider shrines as 
important sacred sites.  
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puritan Islamic version is the only true version of Islam, which must be 
defended. When he was asked about the Taliban’s presence in KP, he 
responded:   
‘No matter what these so-called liberals and secularists say about Pakhtun... KP is 
an Islamic province and Pakhtun are chosen people because we love Islam and 
know how to fight’. 
A male Pakhtun prayer leader and a graduate of a Deoband madrasa aged 38, 
located in KP said: 
‘The only aim of Pakistan’s creation was that we raise the flag of Islam here 
because it was achieved in the name of Islam’. (Interviewee No. 38, March, 2012). 
For them Islam is a political system and the Pakistani state needs to implement 
that system in its real form. In response to a question related to what is the real 
Islam, a religious cleric and a graduate of Deoband Madrasa, aged 41 said: 
‘Look, there is only one Islam. It is a propaganda against Islam and we need to 
discourage this...Mohammad (Peace Be Upon Him) gave us the real Islam and we 
need to practice that only. There are so many rituals and customs which must be 
banned’. (Interviewee No. 41, March, 2012). 
When a young Pakhtun student of a Deoband madrasa, aged 27 was asked about 
the Taliban’s bombing of different shrines in Peshawar, he replied:  
‘Have you gone to a shrine? Just go there and see what these innocent people do 
there. They bow there and pray. It is idolatry, which Islam has forbidden...and we 
have learnt them from Non-Muslims’. (Interviewee No. 39, March, 2012). 
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They also perceive the nationalists’ and socialists’ ideals of nationalism and 
secularism to be incompatible with the Islamic ideals of a single Ummah109 that 
transcends all nationalist claims and perceive these ideals as Western in spirit. A 
male Pakhtun aged 32, trained in a religious seminary for Jihad in Kashmir said: 
‘These concepts have been given to us by the West. You know during the early era 
of Islam when our non-Muslims opponents did not know how to defeat us they sent 
us books on philosophy to corrupt our minds and our religion...Pakhtun, Punjabi, 
Bengali are just men made identities but God has given us just one identity and 
that is “Muslim”. (Interviewee No. 45, March, 2012). 
However, on the question of what Islam could be and how it will find expression 
within the state institutional set-up, their interpretation differs from one 
another. This is one reason one of our respondent with a socialist background 
called religious political parties of Pakistan as ‘sectarian’ rather than ‘religious’. 
Nonetheless, on the question of Sharia as the only formative source of 
interactions, they seem to be offering a united challenge to the ‘emergent civil 
society’ and thus stand in opposition to other respondents such culturalists, 
reformists and religious reformists. Such an understanding of Islam amongst 
our respondents who have a strong religious background remind us of the 
Deoband’s reaction to the British institutions in the 19th century as identified in 
chapter 3.  
These religious revivalists seem to be different in their articulation about Islam 
from the religious-reformists who seem to acknowledge the complexity of 
                                                        
109 Ummah is an Arabic word and means community and, which is for all Muslims irrespective of 
their local or ethnic identities.  
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modern day life and emphasise the re-interpretation of Islam in the newly 
emerged contexts in Pakistan and KP. Thus religious-reformists come very close 
to the national, socialist politicalists on the question of the importance of 
democracy and political diversity in Pakistan. They also do not seem to be 
adhering to the revivalists’ assertion that only a fundamental Islamic identity 
must be prioritized over the local culture in order to build a Pakistani nation. A 
male Pakhtun doctor of medicine, aged 42, from Peshawar said: 
‘Look the word Ummah was used during the Prophet’s time for all those religious 
groups who inhabited the city of Madina110 and it included Jews, Christians and 
Muslims. Islam is very open to others and tolerant.’ (Interviewee No. 32, March, 
2012). 
6.6. Religion as an opportunity to build civil society and the threat of 
religious conservatism 
The discourse of peace, then emerges as an important verifiable theme that 
grapples with the orthodox sections of the non-state social space, which they 
think was patronized by certain policies of the Pakistani state and grew 
stronger within the context of regional politics.  
The presence of orthodox sections in the non-state social space in Peshawar is 
alerting the peace-oriented sections, who think that the conservative religious 
narrative is potentially diminishing all the possibilities of considering religion a 
dynamic force of social cohesion and peacebuilding. For instance, a 39 year old 
                                                        
110 Madina was the capital of early Islam, where the Prophet migrated and settled and is situated 
in the Western part of Saudi Arabia.  
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Pakhtun male member of a shrine committee located in Peshawar city shared 
his experience: 
‘They (the Taliban) know that we do not share their strict version of Islam. For us 
Islam is peace and unconditional love...when we arranged a spiritual musical 
event here, we received threats from them, so we started patrolling our streets and 
shrine and after bombing Rahman Baba’s shrine111, most of the shrine committees 
in KP have arranged their won security’. (Interviewee No. 74, May, 2012). 
Peace oriented sections, then opposes the religious orthodoxy and 
fundamentalism that seem to share the Taliban’s version of Islam. They, 
however, do not reject the value of religion in public affairs as the above quote 
reveals. For them, Islam can be interpreted in different ways and does not pose 
a threat to others. This comes out very clearly from amongst religious-
reformists who think that Islam, if rightly interpreted, can mobilize people for 
the Islamic ideals of social justice and equality. A 31 years old Pakhtun female 
poet and academic from Peshawar said: 
‘Trust me Islam will transform you first and make a better human being first. It is 
all about bringing justice to everyone. The theme of the Koran is “justice” but these 
Mullahs will never discuss it’. (Interviewee No. 58, May, 2012). 
Respondents’ perspective of religion resonate Macmurray’s approach to religion 
as he argues that religion can potentially contribute in building organic relations 
within a given community (as cited by McIntosh, 2012: 11-28). Religious-
reformists also perceive Islam as an important aspect of Pakhtun life that can 
                                                        
111 Rahmab Baba (1650-1711) was a mystic poet whose tomb, located in Peshawar, was bombed 
in March 2009 by the militants.  
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contribute to organic relationships based on mutual respect. Religious-
reformists believe that Islam can be interpreted positively, but we need to take 
into account the complexities of our contexts. For them, Islam is a progressive 
religion that can bring social justice and equality to their society. A 36 years old 
male Pakhtun civil society activist said: 
‘I regularly go to the Rumi Foundation because there you see how people with 
different backgrounds engage in the interpretation of Islam. I think we need such 
spaces, so that we can tolerate difference of opinions...I do not see anything wrong 
if someone has a different version of Islam until he remains respectful towards 
others also’. (Interviewee No. 10, Februarys, 2011). 
Different clusters see the threat of religious orthodoxy in distinct ways, though 
not entirely opposing to one another nor neatly separated from one another. 
Culturalists, for instance, perceive the conservative orthodox sections in the 
non-state social space as a direct threat to the cultural pluralism that has 
indigenously grown from within the Pakhtun culture. Pakhtun culture for them 
was a seat of religious pluralism. A 37 years old male Pakhtun political activist 
based in Peshawar said: 
‘For centuries we have been living with Hindus, Sikhs and Christians here in KP. 
They have been free to build their worship-places. We never demolish their places 
of worship. We never stopped them from worshipping. We never pressurized them 
to convert to Islam’. (Interviewee No. 26, March, 2012). 
A old female Pakhtun writer based in Peshawar said: 
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‘We Pakhtun have respected religious diversity here. But now they (the Taliban) 
are harassing them as if the entire Pakhtun nation is bigot’. (Interviewee No. 56, 
May, 2012). 
Women-reformists see it as a direct threat to their agenda of women-rights. 
Fearing the orthodox religious class, they avoid public exposure as was noticed 
during my field work. A senior female Pakhtun women-rights activist while 
addressing a conference in Peshawar said: 
‘Even in the hot weather of 48c...women are asked to wear burka (veil) to go to 
toilets in the IDPs (Internally displaced People) camps. Is this what our religion is 
all about? To add miseries to the lot of women?’  
For politicalists with a socialist-nationalist background, religion was part of the 
Pakhtun culture and assimilated local cultural influences. Under Muslim world, 
they claim that the rise of orthodox religious class bent on purifying Islam here 
in KP is an imported phenomenon. A 44 years old male Pakhtun academic from 
Peshawar University said:  
‘I think it is the strength of Islam as a religion rather than a weakness that it 
assimilated various cultural influences in different parts of the world. It came here 
in the sub-continent and took a more a mystical colour, which is different from the 
one that we find in the Saudi Arabia. For me it is normal that things may be 
different’. (Interviewee No. 13, March, 2012). 
In all cases, we see the tendency amongst our respondents according to which 
Islam can be seen as an ideal that can contribute to social justice and equality. 
The presence of orthodox sections is perceived by them to be inhibiting the 
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progressive and liberal role of Islam. To imagine a peaceful society wherein 
religion is perceived as a positive force is inhibited by the conservative sections. 
Creating sets of ‘Islamic’ and ‘Un-Islamic’ matters as two binary opposites, the 
rising religious class remains dismissive of anything that is couched in a-
religious vocabulary promoting their so called ‘authentic’ Islam that is used as a 
‘whip against all liberals’ (Hanafi 2002). The religious revivalists’ interpretation 
of Islam leaves very marginal space for anything new or the analysis of religion 
in the changed context as religious reformists advocate, diminishing the chances 
of a liberal interpretation of Islam that may take into account the complexity of 
current conditions.  
The arguments of various clusters against religious conservatism then is not 
entirely different from our argument that we built in the previous chapter as we 
suggested that the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar is seeking an indigenous 
persona. Religious conservatism threatens, according to them, the very organic, 
plural Pakhtun life. Pakhtun society offers the possibility of togetherness, to use 
Hannah Arendt’s famous term (1973), by providing spaces wherein conflicts 
may be resolved, for instance Jirga. Hannah’s conception of ‘civilian life’ seems 
to illuminate the concerns of peace-oriented sections in Peshawar. By ‘civilian 
life’ Hannah means a realm where ordinary people make opinions, build 
relations, ask question, explore and assume identities and thus civilian life 
remains dynamic, allowing new members join in (as cited by Mustafa & Brown, 
2010). The peace-oriented sections in Peshawar are concerned about Pakhtun 
civilian life. They see this Pakhtun civilian life in opposition to the religious 
conservatives’ totalizing tendency that tries to consume the richness of civilian 
life. If totalitarianism  means a tendency to present a single version of human 
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reality as the only authentic form and eliminate everything that may oppose 
such a version (Mustafa & Brown, 2010: 182), then peace consciousness’s fear 
and concerns about conservative religious sections is understandable. A 
Pakhtun male academic and peace activist said in a seminar in his presentation 
on violent extremism in the region: 
‘We need such spaces to reclaim our pluralism and religious diversity. We want to 
be what we were and what we are. These religious extremists cannot be our 
representatives...and they cannot change our humanity’. 
Our women respondents bring in their own concerns as women in the Pakhtun 
civilian life were already marginalized unlike men and oppose religious 
orthodoxy that they think have further marginalized women. A Pakhtun female 
civil society activist based in Peshawar said:  
‘As ‘Aman Tehreek’ (Peace Movement) emerged in Peshawar in 2009, a number of 
women associations in Peshawar welcomed it and joined it because we knew we 
have to stand up with our men to bring peace and we could clearly a new 
threatening spectre was rising’. (Interviewee No. 64, May, 2012). 
Opposition to religious orthodoxy and the Taliban’s violence do not come as two 
separate reactions. The Taliban’s fundamentalist and radical Islam, inspired by 
the Afghan’s Taliban regime (1999-2000) that favour the strict implementation 
of Sharia is seen as the violent expression of religious orthodoxy. Referring to 
the orthodox religious section in the society, a Punjabi-speaking male 
researcher said: 
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‘We have either the Taliban or the Taliban-without-violence...such extremist 
pockets in our society prove to be their nurseries. They have become so strong that 
no one can speak openly about any changes in blasphemy law or we cannot even 
propose to debate it’. (Interviewee No. 79, May, 2012). 
While the peace-oriented sections fear that the plurality and diversity within 
Pakhtun civilian spaces are threatened by the totalizing tendencies of religious 
orthodoxy, the Taliban have actually targeted such spaces. All important sites in 
the non-state social space whether formal or informal, have been targeted 
including Jirga, shrines, cultural heritage, tombs of poets, educational sites and 
public gatherings in order to disrupt the togetherness and plurality of life. While 
the Taliban targeted the informal section in the non-state social space, they did 
not spare the formal sector too. The Taliban’s attacks on polio workers, NGO 
workers and offices also led to fear in the formal sector.  
By focusing on the peace-oriented voices in the region amongst the Pakhtun, 
this thesis challenges the hastily-generated superficial analysis of the Pakistani 
society at the international level. It was perceived that the religious militancy in 
Pakistan is due to the popularity of the Sharia rule and love of Islam amongst 
ordinary people and thus the trend need to be reversed by economic aid112 
(Jacob & Fair, 2010). The scale of the Taliban’s violence and the state’s support 
of such violent forces, misled the international community that ‘…Pakistanis are 
more receptive to militancy’ (Fair et al., 2010:497). Rejecting such crude 
                                                        
112 U.S. Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke argued that Washington should “target the economic 
and social roots of extremism in Western Pakistan with more economic aid.” (Cited by Jacob & 
Fair, 2010: 80).  
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analysis, this thesis draws attention to the indigenous peace-oriented struggle 
in Peshawar that seems to have emerged amidst violence.  
6.7. From resistance against masculinity and extremism to social action 
It is argued in previous and current chapters that the ‘emergent civil society’ in 
Peshawar navigates between cultural change and forces of hegemonic 
masculinity on the one hand and between peace consciousness and religious 
violent extremism on the other hand. However, civil society’s multiple 
engagements with antithetical forces is occurring within an overarching 
tendency of indigenizing civil society within local cultural and religious 
perspectives, where, nevertheless, tensions amidst different perspectives exist. 
While grappling with different antithetical forces does demonstrate that some 
sections within the non-state social space in Peshawar exhibit the potential and 
ability of people to build civil society yet these multiple tensions pose certain 
questions. For instance, to what extent can these sections emerge as an 
organized form of civil society that is capable of resolving the dilemmas of 
tensions between different worldviews, is both an important and relevant 
question? Such questions, however, also became part of my interview questions.  
It appears from the empirical data that the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar, 
in order to resolve these tensions and emerge as an organized arena of social 
action, is looking more towards the state and pressurising it rather than taking 
an inward trajectory where key challenges need immediate attention.  
By looking more towards the state (researcher’s italics), it is suggested here that 
the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar is focused more on the state and has 
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launched a sustained critique of the state. The objective of the sustained critique 
is to pressurise the state to create conditions that may ensure the safe operation 
of civil society, including implementation of citizenship and ensuring social 
justice and equality regardless of people’s religious, ethnic and gendered 
background. It was observed in the previous chapter that civil society in its 
engagement with the masculine social structures considers the implementation 
of citizens’ rights (women’s rights in particular) as an important step towards 
resolving this tension. Women’s associations, in particular, assign immense 
importance to the rule of law so that it may discourage violence against them. It 
was also observed in the above sections that peace consciousness in its struggle 
with violent extremism and fundamentalism, expects the state to ensure 
religious pluralism and provide security.  
It is this looking towards the state and pressurising it, which comes out very 
clearly from the data. However, looking inward was also of interest to the 
researcher and several questions were asked to explore to what extent 
members of the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar are aware of the internal 
issues, such as the charges of corruption and poor management in the 
registered associations and how are they going to address them. 
The following section will examine how the inward-looking tendency within the 
‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar is taking place and whether or not it has 
taken any observable form.  
In order to understand the character of this inward-looking tendency, some of 
the internal dynamics of the non-state social space were explored. However, 
instead of exploring the entire internal dynamics in detail which is beyond the 
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scope of this study, most relevant key aspects were focused. Foremost amongst 
such issues and quite relevant to our thesis is the presence of Western 
international donors that provided immense economic support mostly to the 
registered sections of the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar. The following 
section will show how the provision of an economic base by external donors, 
mostly of Western origin, generates certain implications for the entire 
‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar.  
International donor countries and agencies work not only with the provincial 
governments but also fund formally registered associations in variety of 
projects. Foreign funding seems to become the only available choice for such 
registered associations that include women NGOs in particular. However, 
reliance on foreign funding generates new complexities and dynamics.  
In the transaction between the formal civil society and the donors, the 
autonomy of the civil society becomes contested as formal civil society may 
design projects that donors may wish to see or buy. Reliance on foreign funding 
is seen by members of the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar as a serious 
constraint as some respondents believe that it acts as a check on their 
independence. A senior male, Pakhtun, civil society and peace activist said:  
‘They (donors) have their own mandate…there was a UNO project for IDP’s 
wherein they used the word ‘shura’ instead of Jirga because the UN thought that 
Jirga is not suitable because of a number of allegations labelled against it. I asked 
them why you are confusing these local people as once they go back they will use 
Jirga again. I personally see this rhetoric of independency as a joke’. (Interviewee 
No. 11, February, 2012). 
277 
 
Another Pakhtun male politicalist based in Peshawar protested: 
‘If our people can donate to mosques and madaris then why we are unable to 
mobilize these indigenous sources...you will do what they (donors) tell you’. 
(Interviewee No. 21, March, 2012). 
However, women associations in Peshawar do not seem to share this concern 
rather argue that donors’ presence have actually enabled them to project their 
voice. A Pakhtun woman leading a civil society organization in Peshawar said: 
‘Our men do not share our agenda, so how can they fund us’. (Interviewee No. 66, 
May, 2012). 
Reliance on foreign funding creates a complex scene of intense competition 
within formal civil society to get funding, thereby, affecting their potential 
mutual collaboration. A senior male Pakhtun civil society activist compared the 
formal associations with ‘sunflowers’ that would always try to track the funder. 
The desperation to get funding may also involve illegal deals, as some 
respondents from the formal civil society in Peshawar claim to have witnessed. 
The charges of corruption within the formal civil society and donor community 
seem to have created a negative image of the formal civil society mainly NGOs in 
Peshawar. For some people such associations are given to profit. Some 
respondents also argued that it is easy for the donors to push their agenda and 
assert against individual led organizations rather than organic informal civil 
society that owes responsibility to the entire community. Well skilful to use the 
modern lexicon of development and peace, formal civil society’s proximity to 
278 
 
the international donors mostly Western, then creates the impression that they 
are the advocates of Western values and work on their agendas.  
Such charges, at times, take a more serious form. For instance, in recent election 
held in May 2013 in Pakistan, a religious political party in KP was denouncing 
another political party as an NGO and thus a Western agenda. Sometimes 
opposition to NGOs attains a violent form as workers involved in polio 
vaccination campaign have come under attack in Peshawar. The charges of 
carrying an anti-Islamic agenda against the formal civil society has led some 
NGOs to abandon certain programmes or restrict their activities in Peshawar as 
women respondents from women associations based in Peshawar mentioned.  
Thus the presence of foreign donors seems to generate complex internal 
dynamics that seem to influence their potential collaboration and, which seem 
to eclipse the inward looking tendency.  
In the case of informal civil society, donors’ financial assistance seems to 
disappear. As informal civil society emerges from within the community, 
therefore, the community bears the cost of such associations as for example the 
cost of Jirga is born by the parties involved in conflict. A male Pakhtun member 
of a literary association based in Peshawar said: 
‘Look, we have been holding these sessions for three decades without reliance on 
foreign funding but can an NGO even imagine to do it’. (Interviewee No. 48, May, 
2012). 
While subscription fees and small community donations may be an important 
source of contributions suitable for small scale work, they may not be sufficient 
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for the major developmental challenges that the formal civil society has 
embraced.  
On the other hand it also generates unequal relations between formal and 
informal civil society informed by a deep mistrust in Peshawar, wherein the 
former remains defensive and tries to rationalize their agenda, whilst the latter 
remains suspicious and protective of its culture. This is reflected in the formal 
civil society attempt not to take the acronym of NGO when it goes out to interact 
with the informal civil society. These misperceptions and mistrust also find its 
best articulation in the distrust of the women-led associations, whose agenda is 
perceived as unfamiliar not only by the informal civil society but also some 
sections within the formal civil society. 
Strongly related to this is the lack of coordination and networking between 
formal and informal civil societies. The only connecting point between the 
formal and informal civil society is Community Based Organizations (CBOs) 
wherein CBOs act as their B teams or a means to undertake a specific project. A 
young Pakhtun and a member of a local CBO in Peshawar said: 
‘To say that we work with NGOs is wrong, we work under them in reality...they 
come here with a specific mindset that we are poor and know nothing’. 
(Interviewee No. 31, March, 2012). 
The jargon of ‘capacity-building’ is invoked by the formal civil society when 
connecting with the informal civil society through CBOs that imply that the 
formal civil society is lacking the skills and potentials to do a community job. 
Focusing, for example, on the relationship between a well established formal 
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association and a rural based CBO power may take an invisible form. The 
stronger group or an individual may exercise power by setting the agenda or 
norms wherein the latter that is powerless, marginalized and poor have to take 
positions and situate themselves or what Bacharch and Baratz, called limiting 
the ‘scope of decision-making’ of others (cited by Haugaard 2002 p: 26).  
During this transitory transaction, the possibility of imagining the informal civil 
society as a potential site of democratic and peaceful norms and values is lost. In 
this relationship rationalized by ‘capacity-building programmes’, the formal civil 
society emerges as a powerful association with enormous technical, intellectual, 
and economic strength and informal civil society as a backward forum that 
needs investment. However, this lack of coordination both within formal civil 
society and between formal and informal civil society in Peshawar is also due to 
the different world views that is pointed out above.  
Nonetheless, some respondents came up with different notions of working with 
the informal civil society as one young civil society activist leading a youth 
organization said: 
‘I remember once we had a conference and a man leading an NGO started talking 
about how to raise the capacity of rural people and change their perceptions of life 
and I stood of and said “you need to go and sit with them and learn what life is and 
what is humanity”. (Interviewee No. 49, May, 2012). 
The perception of formal civil society as individual run associations is also very 
common in Peshawar. This reminds us of Wachira Maina’s (1998) description of 
‘NGIs (Non Governmental Individuals)’ in the Kenyan context (p: 163) or our 
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respondents’ use of ‘NGO Enterprise or Industry’. Such descriptions perhaps 
capture the control of associations by a specific individual. The internal 
governance becomes more difficult if the formal association is led by a person 
with a military or bureaucratic background or has close relations with them or a 
political authority as is the case with some formal associations based in 
Peshawar. Upon my visit to one such association, I asked the administration 
officer as to why your organization is using a government official landline 
number and he replied: 
‘Do you not know? Our boss was a former civil bureaucrat.’ 
While, here, it is not proposed that foreign funding is essentially the only source 
that creates such dynamics and is responsible for them, yet we intend to show 
that there are deeper complexities within the non-state social space in 
Peshawar. An understanding of such internal complexities then may require the 
‘emergent civil society’ to develop a robust inward looking or more reflective 
tendency.   
6.8. Desires and realizations: Imagining hopes 
The ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar seems to be caught within a hybrid of 
highly complicated problems. It is not only the state that civil society needs to 
focus on, but a range of serious issues and problems within the ‘emergent civil 
society’ in Peshawar needs serious attention. Alongside such inhibitions that has 
infringed and ensnared the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar from different 
dimensions, there are shared desires and sets of realizations amongst some of 
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the respondents that provides rays of hope and some sense of direction that 
may perhaps resolve some of the complex tensions pointed out above.  
6.9. Communitizing civil society and seeking dialogical spaces 
It was argued in the last section of the previous chapter that some respondents, 
‘culturalists-moderators’, realize that the distance between formal and informal 
civil society seems to have divided the civil society not only spatially but also 
ideologically. To fill this gap, such respondents realize that civil society need to 
be autonomous and well embedded in the community. The desire of 
communitizing the civil society reflects respondents’ understandings that the 
entire concept of civil society needs to be indigenized within the local cultural 
and religious perspectives and thus made an organic process. However, words 
such as ‘community’, ‘people’, and ‘local culture’ were frequently used by 
respondents belonging to other clusters also as synonymous with the term ‘civil 
society’.  
Embedding within the community would entail getting closer to informal civil 
society and creating robust but equal relationships. While still utilizing the 
material base provided by foreign aid, the formal civil society can still 
endeavour to identify and institutionalize those indigenous peacebuilding 
aspects of the culture, to use Galtung’s term (1975), that would be recognized as 
familiar by the common public and generate ownership of those ideals that may 
include mutual trust, emphasised both by Pakhtunwali and religion, respect of 
women and the elderly, and the willingness to associate with others to address a 
specific community need rather than consider it a primordial residue. The 
desire of communitizing the civil society, perhaps indicates civil society’s desire 
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to generate a civil narrative. Perhaps this means, again, a nexus of formal and 
informal civil society. 
Strongly interlinked with the desire of communitizing the ‘emergent civil 
society’ as expressed by some respondents, is the desire and importance of 
debate. However, in all cases the emphasis on dialogue flows from the desire of 
encouraging different sections of the ‘emergent civil society’ to question their 
ways of life, generate new local solutions to complex problems and more 
importantly to understand each other’s worldview that may contribute to 
tolerance and civility.  
Perhaps the dialogical desirability is also about establishing validity claims in 
non-coercive ways to understand each other position and reach mutual 
consensus through speech acts as Habermas (1983) argues in his theory of 
communicative action. However, establishing validity claims may involve the 
use of reason, which is contested. The liberal reason, being instrumental and 
incapable of evaluating ends, perceives tradition as irrational (Nicholas, 2012). 
Such reason-based communication may also be incapable of evaluating power 
relations contrary to what Habermas hoped (Flyvbjerg, 1998).  
Human reason is also perceived, as argued by Alasdair MacIntyre (1981), as 
embedded within the social argument of a tradition and strongly interlinked 
with the moral question of what is good (in our case civil) for the society. The 
various versions of the good in a given tradition may bring the social members 
into conflict besides coming into conflict with the external members and their 
sense of the good which may be rejected or partially or totally accepted. Thus, 
reason is not only constituted within a specific tradition, but also constitutes 
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tradition. Perhaps it is this MacIntyrian version of reason and tradition that 
resonate in our context better when respondents show a tendency to dialogue 
not only amongst them but also with the external alternative discourses. A 
desire that is strongly anchored on the cultural identity and use the traditional 
reason of what is civil, while still aspiring to learn from external discourses, 
perhaps, demonstrate respondents’ aspiration for a civil world. A Pakhtun male 
academic from Peshawar University said: 
‘Look our problems are not beyond solution. All we need is to sit and debate them. 
What we do in Hujra? We debate issues that influence us. So we already have the 
culture of dialogue in our culture’. (Interviewee No. 25, March, 2012). 
The desire of communitizing the ‘emergent civil society’ by bringing formal and 
informal civil societies closer, in sustainable relationships and the desire of 
creating spaces for mutual dialogues does show, to a certain extent, an inward-
looking tendency of the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar. However, it is 
extremely difficult to provide an empirical evidence that may capture such 
aspirations taking an observable form. For instance, there are some NGO forums 
such as the Pakistan NGOs Forum but such forums do not seem to be active. 
There are some associations that have managed to emerge from informal civil 
society and have managed to work as formal associations and there are also 
instances of associations that are led by people with rural backgrounds. Such 
associations such AKBT, KK and JPI work regularly with the informal civil 
society. However, such instances are very few.  
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6.10. Conclusion 
Building on the argument presented in the previous chapter, this chapter has 
extended and completed the argument of the thesis by presenting empirical 
evidence. The ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar demonstrates a commitment 
to peace and non-violence, which has led some sections to reject conservative 
masculine forces and violent extremism. As the ‘emergent civil society’ in 
Peshawar tends to retain an indigenous local cultural identity and embrace local 
cultural and religious value systems, this tendency also triggers certain 
antithetical forces, which create frictional encounters, which act as limitations 
on the  ‘emergent civil society’s’ commitment to peace, as these two chapters 
have demonstrated. 
The ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar, in order to minimise these limitations, 
seems to be looking more towards the state and pressurising it to provide 
favourable conditions rather than develop an inward looking tendency to 
address some of the internal complexities that need attention as well. 
While a number of dilemmas and tensions surround the ‘emergent civil society’ 
in Peshawar, yet our primary data demonstrates that the alternative perspective 
of civil society seems to resonate in our non-Western conditions. The ‘emergent 
civil society’ in Peshawar, as a case study, shows the possibility that an 
insistence on ‘modularity’, as the work of Ernest Gellner shows, may not be the 
only route to construct a civil society. Civil society may be built within an 
alternative socio-cultural context. Civil society, however, conceived within an 
alternative context may have problems and challenges of its own.  
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 CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has argued that a peace oriented struggle has emerged within the 
non-state social space in Peshawar amidst violence, which rejects violence and 
embrace peace. By analyzing the peace oriented struggle in Peshawar, this 
thesis has drawn attention to the potential role of civil society in contributing to 
peacebuilding in Peshawar, which has generated the discourse of peace, rooted 
in the local traditional and religious perspectives. By embracing the local 
traditional and religious perspectives and a local cultural identity, the ‘emergent 
civil society’ not only provides a philosophic base to its peace oriented struggle 
but also reflects certain theoretical threads of the ‘alternative’ discourse of civil 
society, Gramscian in particular. In other words, the ‘emergent civil society’ 
reflects Gramscian perspective of civil society in which it becomes a 
battleground of clashing opinions and perspectives and in which social 
inequalities and unequal power relations, rooted within local structures, are 
challenged. The ‘emergent civil society’ becomes an arena of cultural 
reproduction and identity formation in which the questions of whose identity is 
to be prioritised and whose version of peace must prevail are contested. 
By retaining tradition and religion rather than rejecting them and by assuming a 
feminist dimension, our case study, however, also demonstrates that the 
‘alternative’ discourse seems to assume a specific character whereby the 
‘alternative’ understanding of civil society seems to take a further deviation. 
This deviation, nonetheless, reflects the overall ‘alternative’ discourse rather 
than mainstream liberal discourse of civil society, which is criticised for its 
gender and liberal assumptions.  
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The peace oriented struggle reflects Pakhtuns’ desire of taking the Pakhtun 
society in civic, non-militaristic directions as expressed by our respondents. 
However, as this desire is rooted in local traditional and religious perspectives, 
the tendency of retaining a cultural identity triggers certain antithetical forces, 
which ultimately impact upon this desire. While explicitly recognising the desire 
of embedding the ‘emergent civil society’ in local cultural resources, feminine 
voices highlight masculine hegemony, which have produced and sustained 
unequal social divisions between men and women. The historically sustained 
masculinised hegemony is somehow accepted as ‘natural’ and the agency, which 
challenges such order, as exhibited by women associations based in Peshawar, 
is resisted. The frictional encounter between feminist voices, representing 
cultural change and conservative traditional forces occurs when respondents’ 
ideas of ‘peace’ and violence are explored.  
On the other hand, the ‘emergent civil society’s’ contribution to build peace 
amidst violence comes into friction with violent extremism and religious 
orthodox forces. The ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar grapples with the 
religious fundamentalism that is perceived by the respondents of this research 
as a serious threat to their pluralistic understandings of society and religion. In 
both cases religion is perceived by them as a positive source that can contribute 
to peace and non-violence rather than violence. It is this specific understanding 
of religion as demonstrated by our respondents that challenges Gellner’s 
understanding of Islam, which is discussed in detail further on in this 
conclusion.  
288 
 
To analyse the peace oriented struggle and examine the character of the limiting 
forces, this thesis designed a prime research question: can civil society in 
Peshawar contribute to peacebuilding? However, to answer such question was 
both complex and problematic.  
The complexity pertains to the very contested and complex debate about civil 
society as various ideas of civil society, summed up as ‘liberal’ and ‘alternative’ 
prevail in the literature on civil society. The degree of complexity receives a 
further intensity, when the Western born concept of civil society is applied in a 
non-Western context, such as Peshawar, which is the focus of this thesis as 
different ideas of civil society prevail in the literature. To examine what specific 
ideas of civil society resonate in our context, this thesis had to grapple with 
certain philosophical questions, such as, what value systems inform the 
philosophical foundation of civil society in Peshawar. However, to answer such 
philosophical questions also required a deeper understanding of the social, 
cultural and political context of our case study.  
To grapple with the philosophic questions on the one hand and with the 
exploration of socio-political context on the other hand helped us see clearly 
that certain theoretical threads in the ‘alternative’ perspective of civil society 
resonate in our case study. Answering the prime research question, however, 
was problematic as this thesis developed its main argument that the ‘emergent 
civil society’ is oriented more towards the ‘alternative’ conception of civil 
society and shows the tendency of retaining its local cultural identity and 
persona rather than individual liberalism, which is the fundamental feature of 
the mainstream ‘liberal’ civil society. However, the retention of local cultural 
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resources is highly problematic as it triggers certain antithetical forces, which 
seem to impact upon the peacebuilding desire.  
This thesis has focused on certain desperate voices, which appear to have 
developed a strong commitment to peace within the non-state social space. 
Mostly assuming the associational form beyond the state within the non-state 
social space, these voices demonstrate a desire to build peace and reject 
violence, both visible and latent violence, and place an agenda of human rights 
before the state. Focused more on the state to pressurise it, this thesis also 
argued that the ‘emergent civil society’ also needs a strong inward looking 
tendency to resolve its internal tensions and challenges.  
The following section will sum up the argument of the thesis.  
Summing up the debate 
As pointed out in the Introduction, the genesis of this thesis lies deep within the 
researcher’s personal experiences of living in Peshawar as a member of the 
Pakhtun society. Perhaps it may be pertinent to briefly mention an excerpt from 
an email that was sent to the researcher by a male Pakhtun friend, based in 
Peshawar, on 22nd December 2006.  
‘I went for a short presentation to X113 University...it took me one and half hours 
to explain to the students that we (Pakhtun) are not Taliban’. 
Following a series of conversations in which the researcher and other men and 
women from KP participated, Aryana Institute of Regional Research and 
Advocacy (AIRRA) was established in May 2007 as a civil society organization to 
                                                        
113 He referred to a University based in the capital of Punjab.  
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undertake research and connect people concerned about violence in KP. This 
was followed by the emergence of ‘Aman Tehreek’ (Peace Movement) in March 
2009 that acted as a networking platform for various associations in Peshawar. 
However, besides the emergence of such associations in Peshawar, the 
researcher’s personal knowledge of a large number of enmities amongst the 
Pakhtun and incidence of honour killings in the Pakhtun society also inspired 
this research as pointed out in the Introduction.  
Such personal experiences triggered a strong interest to understand the 
Pakhtun community, the society of ordinary people and their inter-relations on 
the one hand and to understand the rise of peace oriented associations in 
Peshawar on the other hand. A normative and analytical tool was needed to 
enable the researcher to conceptualise, understand and examine these 
community relations and the rise of associations in Peshawar outside the state 
structure. 
The term ‘civil society’ was already gaining currency in Peshawar and was used 
for platforms such as AIRRA. The concept of civil society, therefore, was 
perceived to be a useful conceptual tool to examine the character of sociability 
amongst the Pakhtun and the rise of peace oriented associations in Peshawar 
beyond the state.  
While initially the conceptual framework of civil society was found to be useful 
yet the realization, after an in-depth literature review, emerged that civil society 
is a Western concept and its application in the non-Western context, may 
generate certain theoretical problems. In order to examine the emerging 
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theoretical problems, this thesis sought to address the following main research 
objectives.  
 To examine the concept of civil society and explore what ideas of civil 
society may resonate in non-Western context 
 To examine and understand the social context of our case study, i.e. 
Pakhtun and their culture  
 To understand the character of the state, the state’s role in violent 
extremism and the state’s relation with civil society in Pakistan 
 To investigate and understand the character of the associational life in 
Peshawar and examine whether or not the discourse of civil society can 
be used to frame the peace oriented struggle as exhibited by the 
associational life 
However, this thesis does not claim to have found a new theory of civil society. 
This thesis also neither claims that the ‘emergent civil society’ is capable to end 
violence and build peace, nor this thesis intends to prove that the ‘emergent 
civil society’ in Peshawar can be equated with any particular perspective of civil 
society in the West. Instead, it focuses on how the concept of civil society can 
help us understand the peace-oriented struggle, which has emerged in 
Peshawar amidst violence and which need attention. 
It is argued in this thesis that the discourse of the ‘emergent civil society’ in 
Peshawar is oriented more towards certain theoretical thread in the 
‘alternative’ perspective of civil society, in which the local cultural and religious 
perspectives are counted as important philosophical foundation and important 
normative sources of civility and peace. However, the alternative trajectory is 
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not without problems and crates its own implications as demonstrated by 
certain limitations.  
The following section will show how a number of theoretical issues were 
addressed. Foremost amongst such issues was unpacking the contested notion 
of civil society. In the following section the main points of the debate will be 
revisited.  
The relevance of civil society in the non-Western context and the 
attributes of the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar 
This thesis starts with clarifying the confusion that surrounds the notion of civil 
society and investigates the theoretical debate of civil society. Tracing the origin 
of the Western concept of civil society, chapter 1 explored how the post-
enlightenment conditions, mainly the rise of commercial activities and 
liberalism, contributed to the emergence of the concept of civil society in 
Europe. Chapter 1 was primarily focused on understanding civil society at the 
theoretical level and explored how the term kept changing in different contexts 
and conditions amongst different thinkers. It is important, for example, to 
understand why the perception of civil society, during the Scottish 
Enlightenment, was different from that of the Greeks’ and why Marx rejected 
the term as bourgeois society, which was, later, retained by some post-Marxist 
thinkers as an important sphere of contested hegemonies. However, the term 
still retained gender biases and remained oriented more towards the white, 
male urban, elites, which is why it was suggested in the first chapter that a 
feminist’s perspective of civil society is both important and relevant at present. 
In other words, chapter 1 demonstrates that the Western concept of civil society 
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may be invoked differently in different contexts and a conception of civil society 
that considers ‘family’ as a private institution and excludes it from the realm of 
civil society may sustain gender biases. It was also argued in the first chapter 
that some experts have investigated the Western notion of civil society in 
alternative traditions, such as Islam, and have argued that such alternative 
traditions also have the discourse of civil society, albeit in different forms and 
using different idioms.  
Chapter 1 also formulated how this thesis has deployed two different but 
overlapping usages of civil society as informed by our data and how we have 
operationalized the concept of civil society as formal and informal civil society 
in this thesis to capture the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar at the empirical 
level. The first chapter concluded that the ‘alternative’ perspective of civil 
society does not tend to reject the application of the Western concept of civil 
society in the non-Western context because it does not consider individual 
liberalism as the necessary pre condition of civil society. However, the liberal 
model, as the work of Ernest Gellner shows, whereby certain pre-defined 
conditions, such as religion (Islam in particular) and cultural identity, are 
perceived antithetical to the very idea of civil society seemed to problematise 
the application of civil society in the non-Western context.  
It was suggested in the Introduction that this thesis draws attention to the peace 
oriented struggle in Peshawar, which has been rendered invisible by the 
Taliban’s violence, therefore, an in-depth exploration was required to know the 
character of this struggle and to render it observable. It was extremely 
important to understand, examine and record respondents’ understanding of 
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the term civil society and know what ideas of civil society prevail in Peshawar. It 
was also important to explore respondents’ interpretations of peace and 
violence in the region and develop an in-depth understanding about which 
value systems were potentially informing their perspectives of peace. 
Employing qualitative research, the field work was conducted in two parts as 
explained in chapter 2, whereby in-depth interviews and some participant 
observation were used to collect primary data in Peshawar and some other 
parts of Pakistan, KP in particular. Chapter 2 also presents the ontological and 
epistemological position of the researcher, which informed this research and 
various ethical issues that created implications for this research. Foremost 
amongst such issues was the alarming security conditions in Peshawar and the 
challenge of how to ensure researcher’s personal safety and that of my 
respondents during the field work. While important measures were taken to 
mitigate potential risks, an important challenge was how to access women 
respondents. Despite belonging to the region, snowball sampling was used to 
access respondents, women respondents in particular, in Peshawar. However, 
every effort was conducted to mitigate the adverse impacts of snowball 
technique, such as interviewing like-minded individuals only. It is argued in 
chapter 2 that this thesis does not make a claim that the data generated during 
two field visits is representative of the entire population in Peshawar yet every 
effort was made to ensure representativeness of the local population such as 
collecting data in two adjacent cities, the inclusion of non-Pakhtun and non-
Muslims in the data sample and the use of participant observation.  
An approach to civil society whereby modularity is perceived as the pre-
requisite of civil society, generates serious theoretical problem, which were 
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discussed in chapter 3. Referring to some theoretical and empirical research 
such as the work of Varshney (2005) and analyzing the Non-Violent Movement 
amongst the Pakhtun, chapter three argues that religion, Islam, which Gellner 
focuses on in particular, was invoked by the Pakhtun to mobilize people for non-
violence and it is not religion per se that is a potential hurdle. Instead religion, 
Islam, was used as an important value system for the potential emergence of 
civil society by the Pakhtun that enabled them to work with people of different 
faiths. It is, however, within a specific political and social context that religion is 
interpreted differently, as for instance the Taliban have also used religion to 
justify their violent extremism.  
Chapter 3 also discussed that the non-state social space in Pakhtun culture, 
informed by traditional and religious perspectives, has certain embedded norms 
and social structures that marginalize certain sections of the society besides 
encouraging latent violence amongst the Pakhtun. These norms and social 
structures are preserved in the name of Pakhtun identity and Pakhtun culture 
by Pakhtun male members. The emergence of KKT was a resistance, to a certain 
extent, against such norms and social structures, whereby the very masculine 
conception of Pakhtun honour was challenged by its members. Revenge, for 
instance, was discouraged amongst the Pakhtun and non-violence was 
advocated. Pakhtun women, in particular, challenged masculinity by bringing 
out their respective experiences of subjugation within the Pakhtun families.  
However, religion can become a tool of manipulation also, as chapter 4 
discusses the role of the Pakistani state that used a specific brand of religion, 
which under specific regional political conditions contributed to violent 
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extremism. While chapter 1 presents a detailed theoretical framework of the 
Western concept of civil society, its specific deployment in this thesis, and 
chapter 3 explores the social and cultural context where the concept is to be 
applied, chapter 4 investigates the political context and the origin of violent 
extremism. Chapter 4 argues that the Pakistani state that evolved as a 
centralized, exclusionary state discouraged the democratic political forces that 
emerged within the non-state social space, while it encouraged religious forces 
under specific conditions. To support our argument, chapter 4 shows that it is 
not religion per se that contributes to violence, rather specific political and 
social contexts that may lead to such an interpretation. Chapter 4 presents the 
case study of the Taliban, whereby religion has been used to legitimize violence.  
To explore the process of the potential emergence of civil society in Peshawar 
informed by immanent sources and answer our research question, needed an 
in-depth analysis, which is presented in chapter 5 and 6. The analysis of the data 
shows that the peace oriented struggle show that the Pakhtun, immersed in 
ascriptive identities seems to realize and recognize the importance of 
constructing a peaceful society. However, to build a peaceful society based on 
non-violent interactions, they do not seem to be inclined to embrace individual 
liberalism as the philosophical foundation of their interactions as we see in the 
case of the ‘liberal’ variant of civil society. Gellner’s assumption that only 
modularity, informed by individual liberalism, can become the foundation of 
civil society, which is why Muslim Ummah cannot become civil society, seems to 
be a ‘mistaken’ approach. Individual liberalism along with the Western 
industrialism and liberal market economy as discussed in chapter 3, which seem 
to be important defining features of the ‘liberal’ variant of civil society, do not 
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seem to be relevant in our case. For instance, the bourgeoisie played an 
important role in advocating the rule of law in the West as the market economy 
was emerging in the 17th and 18th centuries. However, in Pakistan, the liberal 
market economy has operated within different political dynamics. The 
bourgeoisie emerged within the specific political conditions of Pakistan, 
whereby the state power was overwhelmingly tilted more towards the elites 
and land owning class. In order to be part of the market economy, the 
bourgeoisie, in Pakistan, had to rely on these powerful elites as the latter were 
in control of the emerging market economy. The nexus between the bourgeoisie 
and political elites did not allow the former to play a role of advocating the rule 
of law. Poor condition of the rule of law in Pakistan suited, to a certain extent, 
the new emerging economic class to seek under the table deals. However, on the 
other hand, civil society and market relations, at a conceptual level, do not 
necessarily represent a positive co-relation as discussed in chapter 1. Thus, civil 
society may not be seen within the logic of marketization in our context. 
However, the non-relevance of the ‘liberal’ model of civil society is also because 
that the Pakhtuns’ consciousness is rooted in local cultural milieu rather 
individual liberalism as explained below.  
While liberalism and marketization seem to be important features of the ‘liberal’ 
model of civil society as some historical evidence informs us, the possibility of 
an alternative model of civil society cannot be dismissed. An alternative model 
may not put emphasis on liberalism and marketization as such.  
In other words, the construction of the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar 
seems to deviate from the liberal logic of civil society. The ‘emergent civil 
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society’ in Peshawar is informed by a strong desire of embracing the local 
traditional and religious perspectives. Tradition and religion are perceived as 
potential hindrances to construct a civil society, as the works of Gellner shows, 
as discussed in the third chapter, whereas in our case they are perceived as 
sources of strength because our respondents could see important values and 
norms that could possibly build a peaceful society. Providing norms and local 
mechanism of social order and peace, the entire idea of civil society seems to 
gravitate more towards such immanent value systems.  
The analysis also shows that there are problems within this trajectory. To build 
a civil society where interactions amongst different members irrespective of 
their background are based on non-violence and peace may not occur with ease. 
Rather, this may be accompanied by stresses and strains. Immanent sources 
may not offer a harmonious, well-coherent and tension-free philosophical 
foundation. As civil society may arise from a given culture and there might be 
different, competing perspectives in that culture, therefore, competition 
between such worldviews may exist. This was an important observation in our 
case, whereby tensions between different immanent sources invoked by 
different respondents in Peshawar exist and the ‘emergent civil society’ 
emerges as a battleground between competing ideas and perspectives.  
We observed that tensions between different worldviews do not necessarily 
stand in the way of constructing a new peaceful society until the navigation of 
civil society across different ideals trigger certain antithetical forces. These 
antithetical forces seem to limit the construction of civil society and seem to 
eclipse the potential emergence of civil society in Peshawar. In other words, 
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there are certain deeply held opinions, values and structures which are 
identified by some members in the Pakhtun society as problematic and thus 
advocate the transformation of such values and structures. Nevertheless, being 
deeply and passionately held by some members of the Pakhtun society, the 
identification of such values and structures as problematic areas also generate 
strong reaction amongst such members who perceive the entire effort of change 
as alien and thus resist such change.  
We observe the limiting role of antithetical forces at two points.  
First, we observe the rise of antithetical forces when the ‘emergent civil society’ 
in Peshawar identifies latent violence embedded within local traditional and 
religious perspectives and preserved in the name of tradition and cultural 
identity. The ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar demonstrates the desire of 
cultural change and shift by putting up an agenda of human rights as 
demonstrated by women’s associations in Peshawar and thus acquires a 
feminist outlook. To advocate cultural change, certain values and structures are 
identified as problematic areas, which need transformation. It is precisely here 
that Gellner’s argument of the role of tradition in inhibiting the potential 
emergence of civil society resonates. However, our thesis argues that a certain 
aspect of tradition, such as gender roles, may not be conflated with the entire 
tradition. The desire of cultural change as demonstrated by women’s 
organizations in Peshawar is resisted by the conservative forces of tradition 
that seem to controversialize the entire realm of NGOs, especially those led by 
women as explored in chapter 5. Although women’s voices seem to posit that 
their desire of cultural change does not necessarily contradict the desire of 
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indigenizing the entire concept of civil society, yet their slogan of women’s 
rights renders their agenda of change as a Westernized scheme that is injected 
by the Western aid donors, as some of the proponents of the Pakhtun tradition 
and religious orthodox sections perceive. Such conservative sections, then 
perceive the entire agenda of civil society as a foreign agenda. While criticizing 
such a masculine mind set, women’s associations, then look towards the state to 
provide favourable conditions to pursue their agenda of change.  
Second, we observe the rise of antithetical forces when the ‘emergent civil 
society’ in Peshawar identifies violent extremism as a non-indigenous 
programme that is perceived as the product of certain regional, geostrategic 
objectives whereby religion has been employed to justify violence. Rejecting 
violent extremism as the antithesis of peace, peace-voices from Peshawar 
identify two related spheres that may potentially sustain violent extremism. By 
pointing to the role of the state and growing religious orthodoxy within the non-
state social space, peace-voices’ desire to construct interactions based on non-
violence run into frictional encounters with the state and religious fundamental 
forces. The state’s use of a specific brand of Islam to mobilize people for Jihad 
and involvement in the Jihad project seem to have enhanced the social and 
political position of certain religious groups, both political and non-political 
groups, within the non-state social space that do not seem to reject violent 
extremism as exhibited by the Taliban. Such religious groups advocate a 
conservative worldview and support the implementation of a strict version of 
Sharia, which is resisted by the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar. Moreover, 
the religious orthodox forces reject the construction of the ‘emergent civil 
society’ within immanent sources as antithetical to Islam. Using a specific, but 
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conservative version of Islam as the only measuring standard, these religious 
forces decide what is to be advocated and what is to be resisted. According to 
them a religious conservative order has to prevail as the only accepted way of 
life. Peace-voices, then, criticise the state for not providing the conditions of 
social justice and security and for not discouraging the totalizing tendency of 
growing religious orthodoxy. Criticality, then, emerges as the important feature 
of the ‘emergent civil society’.  
What binds these two segments of our argument together into a single coherent 
thread is that in both cases we encounter heterogeneity of worldviews. In other 
words, the non-state social space is filled with conflictive worldviews, which is 
an important theoretical thread of ‘alternative’ version of civil society. Conflict 
between different worldviews fluctuates between mild and frictional 
encounters. In both parts of our argument, i.e. the struggle to contest hyper 
masculinity and peace consciousness’ rejection of violent extremism, we 
observe that the struggle is taking place outside the state within the non-state 
social space and is informed by a strong tendency of indigenizing the ‘emergent 
civil society’ in Peshawar.  
In both cases the ‘emergent civil society’ seems to identify certain conditions 
that include the rule of law, citizenship and security as the prime and most 
important conditions that may enable the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar to 
resolve various dilemmas and challenges that this thesis has identified. While in 
both cases the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar looks towards the state for 
support yet by coming into contact with such antithetical forces, the ‘emergent 
civil society’ also criticises such forces to minimize their potential influence and 
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weaken their impact on the overall society and demonstrate to the public an 
alternative vision of life based on non-violence.  
While the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar criticizes and pressurizes the 
state to provide favourable conditions, some of the internal issues seem to have 
created serious challenges for the ‘emergent civil society’, which needs equal 
focus and energy. In order to build a concerted social action to advocate civil 
ideals, internal complex issues such as the charges of corruption, 
mismanagement in the formal sector of the ‘emergent civil society’ and a gap 
between formal and informal civil society in Peshawar, require deeper 
understanding and commitment. In other words, alongside an outward looking 
tendency that criticizes the state, an inward looking tendency within the 
‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar may enhance the prospects of the 
‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar.  
Nevertheless, the primary data does show some evidence that the ‘emergent 
civil society’ in Peshawar seems to be conscious of the internal issues. The 
‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar shows an awareness of the importance of 
debate and dialogue within and thus advocates communitizing the entire idea of 
civil society. However, to fill the gap between the formal and informal civil 
society in Peshawar, the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar also proposes 
communitizing the praxis of civil society. Taking the concept and practice of civil 
society deep within the community and working with people may reduce the 
tension between the emergent civil society and antithetical forces through 
debate and dialogue. Communitizing the concept and practice of civil society in 
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Peshawar is informed, however, by the overarching tendency of indigenizing the 
entire concept of civil society.  
Such desires, however, emerge in shreds and pieces and lack coherence 
compared to certain expectations that the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar 
put, quite systematically, before the state. Also, such realizations and desires 
have very rarely been translated into organizational objectives as we did not 
observe any organization committed to such realizations or groups of 
associations engaged in such work to promote dialogue. Such desires do not 
seem to be sufficient enough to contribute to a shared civil narrative because 
such desires seem to reside more within individuals or specific individuals 
within specific associations. In other words, robust networking and co-
ordination within various associations, working on peace-related projects, and 
connecting with the community on more sustainable grounds may enhance the 
prospects of the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar to contribute to 
peacebuilding.   
Research implications 
This thesis may be relevant to different groups of people and institutions, both 
inside and outside Pakistan, therefore, some research implications may be 
counted as follows.  
Foremost amongst potential research implications is its direct importance to 
the civil society organizations in Peshawar in specific and to the civil society in 
the non-Western world, both at national and international levels, in general. To 
the best of researcher’s knowledge, no such attempt has been made, in the form 
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of a systematic empirical research, aimed at exploration of the ordinary people’s 
voices of peace and its potential limitations in Peshawar. As my thesis deals 
with the potential of the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar to build peace and 
minimize violence, therefore, civil society, both within Pakistan and outside may 
find this research a useful self-reflective tool that may engender dialogue and 
further research.  
Second, the donors’ community at national, regional, and international levels, 
working with civil society in Pakistan, mostly formal sector, may find this 
research relevant. This research shows that the ‘emergent civil society’ in 
Peshawar and elsewhere in Pakistan needs to be seen within its specific 
historical, social and political context and its specific character needs to be 
understood. A simplistic prescriptive solution mainly in the form of funding and 
overseeing the activities of a given association, and counting the outcomes of a 
given project and celebrating the density of civil society, perhaps, may not 
actualize the assumed hopes of seeing a vibrant civil society. A simplistic 
prescriptive solution may weaken the organic resilience of community and the 
indigenous sources of non-violence, which a particular civil society may be 
using as important sources of peacebuilding. The argument of this thesis that 
there is a possibility imagining an alternative vision of civil society, may engage 
donors and the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar and elsewhere in Pakistan 
on more sustainable grounds.  
Third, while there is very limited literature on the Pakistani civil society’s role in 
development and service delivery yet no empirical research exists that has 
assessed the potential role of Pakistani civil society in peacebuilding. So far, the 
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discourse of building peace has only been restricted to the potential role of the 
state and civil society is not seen as an important potential player in the overall 
project of peace. However, peace is neither the end of a conflict nor an affair 
restricted to few groups or individuals, rather it pervades the entire social 
spectrum of a given society and, therefore, needs an effort at the social level, in 
which civil society may be seen a potential actor.  
Lastly, this research seeks to demonstrate that the Pakhtun culture and Islam 
may provide indigenous sources of non-violence that may be used by the 
‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar for contributing to peacebuilding. As some 
political parties in Pakistan use both local culture and Islam to mobilize people, 
therefore, this research may be perceived as an endorsement of their respective 
political agendas. However, this research does not intend to support any 
particular political agenda rather this research was triggered by a key desire to 
understand the emergent associational life outside the state structures. 
Further Research 
Although this research focuses on the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar yet 
there are potential areas that could need further research.  
This thesis mentions marketization as an important feature of the liberal model 
of civil society and makes some references to the role played by market 
economy in the Western history towards civil society in chapter 3. However, a 
thorough examination of how market forces are emerging in Pakistan and to 
what extent business class may have an impact on civil society in urban centres, 
such as Lahore and Karachi, may be suggested for further research.  
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Although the researcher was able, to a certain extent, to reach out to some 
informal associations in Peshawar yet a systematic analysis may require deeper 
understanding of this specific section of the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar. 
There is, perhaps, a need to understand whether or not every informal 
association can become part of the emergent civil society.  
While my research mentions some of the internal issues that emanate from 
within the ‘emergent civil society’ in Peshawar yet a more in-depth and 
systematic study is required to understand to what extent these issues can 
adversely impact upon the ‘emergent civil society’. Perhaps, to develop a single 
data base of both formal and informal associations in Peshawar may also 
enhance research prospects in future.  
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Source: Axis of Logic available on 
http://axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/Article_29145.shtml 
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Source: Map of Pakistan available on 
http://www.lonelyplanet.com/maps/asia/pakistan/ 
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Appendix E 
 
 
Source:  Mr Crossen’s hirsoty page avalaible on 
http://crossenhistory.weebly.com/chapter-30-a-second-global-conflict-and-
the-end-of-the-european-world-order.html 
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Appendix F 
Consent Form for Interviewees 
Title: Peacebuilding in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP): Can Civil Society (CS) 
contribute to peace? 
What you will do in this research: If you decide to volunteer, you will be 
asked to participate in one interview. You will be asked several questions.  Some 
of them will be about CS’s roles and responsibilities in relation to peace building 
in KP while some questions will be about you or your organization’s 
contribution to peace building.With your permission, I will tape record the 
interviews so I don't have to make so many notes. You will not be asked to state 
your name on the recording.  
Time required: The interview will take approximately 2 hours. However the 
interview may come to an end early.  
Benefits: This is a chance for you to share your experiences and thoughts, 
related to CS’s potential to build peace.  
Confidentiality: Your responses to interview questions will be kept 
confidential. At no time will your actual identity be revealed. You will be 
assigned a random numerical code. Anyone who helps me transcribe responses 
will only know you by this code. The recording will be destroyed within 5 to 7 
months after it has been transcribed. The transcript, without your name, will be 
kept until the research is complete.  
The key code linking your name with your number will be kept in a lockable 
cabinet accessibel to me only, and its safety will be strictly ensured by not 
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allowing any person to access it. It will be destroyed by 31-12-2012. The data 
you give me will be used for my PhD research and may be used as the basis for 
articles or presentations in the future. I won’t use your name or information 
that would identify you in any publications or presentations. 
Participation and withdrawal: Your participation is completely voluntary. 
Therefore you may withdraw from the interview at any stage of the interview 
without any penalty. For example, you may cancel the interview altogether or 
withdraw in the middle. No questions will be asked to explore the reasons of 
withdrawal, however, rescheduling may be requested if the withdrawal is 
caused by something unexpected. You may withdraw by informing me that you 
no longer wish to participate. You may also skip any question during the 
interview if you think you are not comfortable in answering it (again, no 
question will be asked about it), but continue to participate in the rest of the 
study. 
To contact the researcher: If you have questions or concerns about this 
research, please contact:  Arshad Habib on email: arshad_habibpk @yahoo.com  
Whom to contact about your rights in this research, for questions, concerns, 
suggestions, or complaints that are not being addressed by the researcher, or 
research-related harm: Prof: Jenny Pearce, University of Bradford, Bradford, 
West Yorkshire, BD7 1DP E-mail: j.v.pearce@bradford.ac.uk   
Agreement: The nature and purpose of this research have been sufficiently 
explained and I agree to participate in this study.  I understand that I am free to 
withdraw at any time without incurring any penalty. Name and signature is 
optional.  
334 
 
Signature: ______________________________ Date: __________________ 
Name (print): ________________________________________________          
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Appendix G 
Aman Ittehad (All-United for Peace) was established in 2009 over growing 
concerns related to violent extremism in Pakistan. It is a connecting platform for 
citizens and organizations from all over Pakistan, besides KP.  
Aman Tehreek (Peace Movement), established in 2009, is a Peshawar based 
peace movement and is an umbrella organization of about 40 NGOs in KP and 
outside KP. It held a three day seminar in October 2009 and a published a 
document, named ‘Peshawar Declaration’. ‘Peshawar Declaration’ is an attempt 
to trace the origin of extremism in the region and the involvement of the state in 
the Afghan Jihad. The document also encourages local people to rise against 
terrorism in the region and pressurize the state to support ordinary people’s 
struggle to bring peace to the region. Aman Tehreek regularly holds seminars, 
talk shows, protests and arranges events, wherein ordinary people participate 
and share their desire of peace.   
AKBT (Association for Behaviour and Knowledge Transformation), established 
in 1994, is a registered non-profit development organization working on 
economic and political empowerment of communities in the under-served areas 
of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA)) of Pakistan, with a special focus on women and other marginalized 
groups. AKBT initially worked as an unregistered association in a remote area of 
KP but gradually was transformed into a formal organization. Based in 
Peshawar, it operates in 12 districts of KP.  
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Aurath Foundation (AF-Women Foundation), established in 1986 in Punjab, is 
a non-profit, non-governmental association. AF is also based in Peshawar and 
works in different parts of KP. AF works on women’s rights and encourages 
women to participate in public affairs. AF regularly reports crime against 
women, honor killings in particular.  
CAMP (Community Appraisal and Motivation Programme), established in 2002, 
is a non-profit, non-governmental organization. It works with some of the most 
underprivileged communities in FATA and KP and responds to emergencies. It 
also runs various programmes aimed at improving access to quality health and 
education, creating livelihood opportunities and working closely with 
communities and government to promote human rights, peace and security. 
CAMP also specifically works on improving the status of Jirga as local 
mechanism of conflict resolution.  
CYAD (College of Youth Activism and Development), established in 2010, 
perceives tradition to have contributed to the marginalization of youth both 
male and female and thus provide spaces to the young Pakhtun in KP to interact 
and explore local solution to various problems. CYAD provides youth with 
opportunities in education and technical training.  
JPI (Just Peace Initiatives), established in 2004, based in Peshawar is a 
registered, non-profit, and non-governmental association. JPI seek to use local 
conflict resolution mechanism of Jirga to promote peace and justice in the 
Pakhtun community. ‘Peace by game’ and ‘Peace by Art’ were some of its famous 
projects.  
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Khwendo Kor (KK-Sisters’ Home), established in 1993, is a non-profit, non-
governmental association, based in Peshawar. KK came into being as an urgent 
need expressed by local women to address women issues. It has developed into 
sisterhood, guiding local women to take practical steps for the betterment of 
their families. It strongly advocates women’s rights. 
RIPORT (Regional Institute of Policy Research and Training), established in 
2005 and based in Peshawar, is a non-profit, non-governmental association. It 
works on peace and regional stability. It regularly conducts research on 
development-related local issues.  
Shrikat Gah (space of participation), established in 1975 in Punjab, is a non-
profit, non-governmental association based in Peshawar. It works for the 
emancipation and empowerment of women in Pakistani society. It regularly 
reports instances of honor killings and acts as a watchdog on the biased 
decisions of Jirga.  
SPO (Strengthening Participatory Organization), established in 1994, works on 
human rights, governance, security, justice and peace issues in FATA and other 
parts of KP.  
TNC (Tribal NGOs Consortium), established in 2009, is an umbrealla association 
to work with other local associations in FATA, mainly informal and 
unregistered, towards sustainable peace and development. 
 
 
 
